Matt Brown

This decision addresses costs arising from a multi-part summary judgment motion.

The Township, as the moving party in the original summary judgment motion, sought partial indemnity costs of $69,638.46.

The plaintiffs opposed and sought their own partial indemnity costs of $28,392.61.

The court found that the Township had misrepresented the dispositive nature of the initial summary judgment motion.

While the Township succeeded in dismissing the public road and common road claims (Parts 1 and 2), the misfeasance claim and access road claim survived (Part 3).

The court awarded the Township $33,000.00 in all-inclusive partial indemnity costs for Part 1 of the motion, finding that the public road claim was the focal point.

For Parts 2 and 3, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs, acknowledging the plaintiffs' poor pleading but also the Township's overstatement of the motion's scope.

This is Part 3 of a summary judgment motion brought by the Township of Coleman.

The court determined which remaining allegations from the plaintiffs' claims (misfeasance in public office and access road) would proceed to trial, following previous partial summary judgments.

The court dismissed the allegation of negligent transfer of Parcel 12907 in 1975, finding it was not properly pleaded as evidence of intent for misfeasance or estoppel.

However, it allowed other allegations to proceed, including failure to follow precedents, coercion, bad faith, misleading investments, failure to identify the end of the road, and failure to create/maintain accurate records, as these were properly pleaded and had some evidentiary value.

In this class action, the plaintiffs brought a motion, with the defendants' consent, seeking court approval for the notice of a settlement approval hearing, the notice distribution plan, the procedure for class member objections, and the appointment of a notice administrator.

The court granted the motion, finding that the proposed notice and distribution plan complied with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and were consistent with practices in similar class action settlements, ensuring class members would be adequately informed of the proposed settlement and objection process.

This is the second part of a summary judgment motion brought by the Township of Coleman seeking to dismiss remaining claims by the Chitaroni plaintiffs.

The court previously ruled that a disputed road ("Road A") was not a public road.

In this part, the Township sought to dismiss claims for damages based on public misfeasance/malfeasance and declarations that Road A was an access or common road.

The court dismissed the Township's motion regarding the misfeasance claim and the access road claim, allowing them to proceed to trial.

However, the claim that Road A was a common road was dismissed.

The court also provided directions for the plaintiffs to particularize certain allegations for trial.

The Corporation of the Township of Coleman moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action in which the plaintiffs sought a declaration that "Road A" is a public highway.

The plaintiffs argued the road became public through common law dedication and acceptance or by by-law.

The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the claim for a public highway declaration against both the Township and Paul Chitaroni.

The court found no evidence of proper dedication by the owner (who was unaware of ownership of the disputed portion) or sufficient public or municipal acceptance.

Other claims for damages remain to be addressed.

The appellant, Qiangli Cao, appealed a summary judgment that dismissed his action for defamation, racial discrimination, and dereliction of duty against the City of Markham and Markham Public Library.

The motion judge had found the action barred by issue estoppel, as the claims largely impugned evidence previously determined in a prior action by the appellant's company (CPCL) against the same respondents.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's reasoning, confirming that the validity of the evidence had been finally determined and that the appellant was a privy to the prior proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff brought an action for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on a wet surface near a private cottage driveway.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing it had no jurisdiction over the area.

The plaintiff opposed the motion as premature because examinations for discovery had not yet occurred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that granting summary judgment before the plaintiff had the opportunity to explore historic ownership and maintenance through discovery would run an extreme risk of prejudice.

The plaintiffs sought prejudgment interest and costs following a third trial in a long-running personal injury action.

The court granted prejudgment interest on pecuniary damages from the date of the second trial's damage assessment (February 6, 2015) to the third trial's judgment (February 6, 2020), rejecting the Municipal Defendants' arguments for a lower rate or no interest on future losses.

For costs, the court fixed an award of $778,900 (fees, HST, disbursements) for the plaintiffs, excluding costs related to the first trial preparation and accident benefits claims, and denying interest on disbursements.

The court emphasized reasonableness and proportionality, declining to apply Rule 49.10(1) enhancements despite favorable offers from the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff sought a reconsideration of a costs decision awarding the defendant City partial indemnity costs of $10,517.19 for an abandoned motion.

The plaintiff argued it was unclear whether a response to the City's costs submissions was required.

The court dismissed the reconsideration request, noting the plaintiff failed to respond to the duly served submissions or challenge the presumptive entitlement to costs under Rule 37.09(3), and confirmed the previous costs award.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff had previously sued the defendants for breach of contract through his corporation, which was dismissed on summary judgment and upheld on appeal.

The court found that the defamation action was an attempt to relitigate the same material facts and issues decided in the prior action.

Applying the doctrine of issue estoppel, the court granted the motion and dismissed the action, awarding costs to the defendants.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a head-on collision with a propane tanker on a snow-covered municipal road.

The plaintiffs sued the driver of the tanker and the municipalities responsible for winter road maintenance.

The court found that the road was in a state of non-repair that contributed to the accident, and the municipality failed to prove it took reasonable steps to maintain the road.

Liability was apportioned 50% to the municipal defendants, 33% to the tanker driver, and 17% to the plaintiff for contributory negligence.

The plaintiff Medical Centre and defendant JD Development owned abutting properties subject to a system of easements.

Both submitted redevelopment site plans to the City of Markham.

The Medical Centre's plan relied on paving an easement over JD Development's property for vehicular access, while JD Development's plan showed the easement as partially sodded, which would block vehicular access.

The Medical Centre brought a motion for declarations regarding its right to use and pave the easement.

JD Development argued the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Superior Court held it had jurisdiction to determine property rights, declared the Medical Centre had the right to use the easement for vehicular traffic and to pave it at its own expense, but declined to order JD Development to amend its site plan.

The respondent moved for an order to sell the jointly owned matrimonial home before trial, which the applicant opposed.

The applicant also sought temporary spousal support and retroactive child support.

The court ordered the sale of the matrimonial home, finding the applicant could not afford the carrying costs and the equity would not justify transferring the respondent's interest to her.

The court dismissed the claim for temporary spousal support as the respondent lacked the ability to pay, but ordered the respondent to pay retroactive child support for the period the child lived with the applicant before completing high school.

The applicant sought retroactive and ongoing child support for the youngest child, and an order for the respondent to maintain life insurance.

The respondent failed to appear or provide financial disclosure.

The court imputed income to the respondent based on lifestyle and adverse inference, ordered retroactive child support from October 2009, ongoing child support, and life insurance coverage.

Costs were awarded to the applicant due to the respondent's unreasonable conduct.