Lisa Jørgensen

The Crown applied to designate the respondent a dangerous offender following his convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm, choking, and unlawful confinement.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal history, institutional behavior, and psychiatric assessments.

The court found that the respondent met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behavior.

However, noting some recent improvements and the possibility of managing his risk in the community, the court imposed a determinate sentence of 15 years and 9 months, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order, rather than an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of her former boyfriend.

At trial, the Crown cross-examined its own key witness on a prior inconsistent statement without bringing an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, and subsequently used the inconsistency to impeach the witness's credibility during closing submissions.

The trial judge permitted this use and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Court of Appeal held that this improper cross-examination and the subsequent use of the evidence prejudiced the appellant's defence, rendering the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, sought interim judicial release pending her appeal, citing concerns about contracting COVID-19 in custody.

The court assessed the application under the public interest criterion of s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

Finding that the grounds of appeal were not strong, the offence was exceptionally serious, the release plan was inadequate, and the COVID-19 risk in her institution was low, the court concluded that the applicant's detention remained necessary in the public interest.

The application for release was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and choking with intent, as well as his sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decision to permit cross-examination on his prior conviction for attempted murder under the Corbett framework, and alleged improper Crown conduct during cross-examination and closing argument.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to allow the cross-examination given the defence's all-out attack on the complainant's credibility and the absence of other evidence to neutralize that attack.

The Crown's conduct was found to be vigorous but proper advocacy.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the dangerous offender hearing should have proceeded under post-2008 legislation but sought to uphold the designation under the curative proviso.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the curative proviso was unavailable due to significant evidentiary overlap between the designation and sentencing stages and the possibility that fresh evidence could affect the designation determination.

The Crown sought to introduce historical text messages sent by the accused to his wife, which were obtained by police pursuant to a valid general warrant.

The accused sought to exclude the messages on the basis of spousal privilege under s. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act and s. 189(6) of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, holding that spousal privilege is a testimonial privilege that protects a spouse from being compelled to testify, but does not render the communications themselves inadmissible when independently and lawfully obtained by police.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

At trial, the judge accepted the complainant's evidence that the appellant touched her breast without consent after attempting to kiss her and asking about her sex life.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and erred in finding the touching was sexual under Chase.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or legal application.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in declining to grant a conditional discharge.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her certiorari application seeking to quash the order committing her to trial on drug-related charges.

The appellant argued that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error due to the absence of evidence, particularly regarding timing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal, finding that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer knowledge and control of contraband found in locked rooms, including circumstantial evidence such as sole ownership of the house, items in plain view, mail addressed to the appellant, and intercepted communications with her co-accused spouse.

The court held that the lack of precise timing evidence did not render the inferences speculative.

The accused, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application challenging the search warrant for his residence.

The warrant was based primarily on information from a confidential informant who stated the accused kept a handgun in his vehicle.

The affiant officer asserted a generalized belief that the accused might transfer the firearm to his home, but omitted a material fact from surveillance that a satchel suspected of containing the firearm was left in the vehicle.

The court found the Information to Obtain lacked sufficient grounds to search the home, resulting in a section 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court excluded the firearm and ammunition, finding the serious Charter-infringing conduct and impact on privacy outweighed the societal interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appellant appealed a sentencing decision from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the appellant, who was self-represented, was deprived of a fair hearing because the trial judge failed to provide appropriate assistance to her as a self-represented party.

The appellate court found it was not in a position to make the necessary factual findings to conduct the appeal and therefore allowed the appeal, remitting the matter back to the Ontario Court of Justice for a new sentencing hearing.

The offender was found guilty of sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, and threatening death for an attack on a sex trade worker in 1990.

At the time of the offences, the offender was 17 years old.

The Crown applied to have the offender sentenced as an adult under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and a youth sentence would not be sufficient to hold the offender accountable.

The offender was sentenced as an adult to a total of 8 years in custody.

Leone Bruno brought an application to exclude evidence obtained via a search warrant, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds and violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown relied on a heavily redacted ITO to protect a confidential informant's identity, necessitating a judicial summary under the R. v. Garofoli framework.

The court assessed the adequacy of the judicial summary and other disclosure, finding it sufficient for the defence to mount a challenge.

Upon reviewing the unredacted ITO (with one minor excision), the court applied the Debot criteria (credibility, compelling nature, corroboration) and concluded that it provided reasonable grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The court also found that the affiant made full, fair, and frank disclosure regarding prior incident reports.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, and no s. 8 Charter violation was found.

Chukwuemeka Madumelu was sentenced for multiple counts of importing heroin into Canada and one count of possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking (Toronto charges), and an additional count of importing heroin while on bail (Brampton charge).

The court found the accused was more than a mere courier, actively involved in logistical arrangements for large-scale heroin importation.

Aggravating factors included the quantity and purity of heroin, the sophistication of the scheme, and re-offending while on bail.

Mitigating factors included community support, a dated criminal record, and an early guilty plea for the Brampton charge.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 19 years, while the defence sought 12 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 15 years, applying the totality principle to ensure proportionality, and granted 465 days of credit for pre-trial detention and stringent house arrest bail conditions.

A 10-year weapons prohibition order was also issued, but a DNA order was declined.

Caitlin Johannes sought certiorari to quash a committal order for trial on charges of possession of cocaine and marihuana for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The application challenged the preliminary inquiry judge's inferences regarding possession, particularly wilful blindness, based on circumstantial evidence from a shared residence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the inference of wilful blindness was speculative, other inferences drawn by the preliminary inquiry judge regarding knowledge and control were reasonable and logically supported by the evidence, thus providing sufficient evidence for committal to trial.

The defendant, a young person, was charged with sexual assault, robbery, and uttering threats related to an incident in 1990.

The Crown's case relied heavily on DNA evidence found on the complainant's underwear, which matched the defendant's profile.

The defence challenged the complainant's reliability and the chain of continuity of the DNA evidence.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible on critical issues and accepted the DNA analysis, concluding that the only rational inference was that the defendant was one of the attackers.

The defendant was found guilty on all counts.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing a breach of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

Although the total net delay, including retrial time, exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the court found the transitional exceptional circumstance applied.

The parties had relied on the prior Morin framework when the case was proceeding, and the operative delay under Morin guidelines, while exceeding them slightly, was not so egregious as to warrant a stay.

The application was dismissed and the case proceeded to trial.

The accused, Reece Korchinski and Darienne Colley-Welch, were jointly tried on multiple criminal charges, including possession of a firearm, pointing a firearm, unlawful confinement, robbery, and assault, arising from an alleged gun-point robbery.

Mr. Korchinski also faced charges for breach of court orders.

The Crown presented evidence from two witnesses, Matthew Thomas and Danielle Patai, whose credibility and reliability were significantly challenged due to dishonesty, inconsistencies, and animus towards the accused.

The defence called no evidence.

The court found the witnesses untrustworthy and their evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the acquittal of both accused on all counts.

In a pre-trial ruling for a first-degree murder trial, the accused applied to exclude security video surveillance recordings obtained by police from the common areas of his apartment building.

The accused argued the warrantless seizure violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the 246-unit building.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and important to the case.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mgs.

At trial, the judge excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the traffic stop was arbitrary.

In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge relied on extraneous information regarding the arresting officer's receipt of awards for apprehending impaired drivers, which was not entered into evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the trial judge erred in law by relying on this extraneous information, as it did not meet the test for judicial notice and could have affected the assessment of the officer's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, charged with nine drug offences, applied for a Rowbotham order after being denied legal aid funding.

The Crown conceded that the accused's right to a fair trial would be compromised without counsel but contested his indigency and whether he had exhausted all appeals.

The court found that the accused had exhausted his appeals and met the test for indigency, despite his initial failure to provide complete financial disclosure to Legal Aid Ontario.

The application was allowed, and the charges were ordered stayed unless the Crown agreed to provide funding at Legal Aid tariff rates.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused to police during a voluntariness voir dire.

The accused opposed admission, arguing the statements resulted from improper inducements or oppressive circumstances.

The court found no oppression, characterized certain inducements as minor, and determined the accused maintained meaningful choice throughout the interviews.

The court ruled the statements were voluntary and admissible, finding the accused understood the seriousness of the situation and was selective in his responses to police questioning.