Rachel Young

The applicant, Stephane Gagnon, brought two applications seeking a stay of proceedings: one alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time, and another alleging abuse of process related to his return to Canada from Indonesia (argued as a "disguised extradition") and alleged misrepresentations at his bail hearing.

The court dismissed the s. 11(b) application, finding the delay was "Defence Delay" due to Gagnon being a fugitive.

The court also dismissed the abuse of process application, concluding there was no "disguised extradition" as Indonesia acted lawfully and Canada only provided logistical support, and that the Crown's statements at the bail hearing were not misleading.

The court found no breach of the applicant's s. 7 Charter rights and that a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Glen Davis in a Toronto parking garage.

The appellant's nephew orchestrated the murder and recruited the appellant and others to carry it out.

The appellant's defence was that he had a last-minute change of heart and did not shoot Davis, but rather his co-accused did.

The appeal raised three grounds: that the trial judge unjustifiably curtailed cross-examination of key Crown witnesses; that the trial judge erred in giving a Browne v. Dunn instruction; and that the trial judge erred in his charge regarding post-offence conduct.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that despite some questionable interventions, the trial was fair and the conviction was supported by compelling evidence.

Appeal from a dangerous offender designation imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and theft.

The Crown sought and obtained a dangerous offender designation under section 753 of the Criminal Code based on evidence including police synopses of prior convictions, correctional records, and expert psychiatric evidence.

The appellant challenged the admissibility and reliability of police synopses and argued that the trial judge erred in finding their contents proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal held that while police synopses are generally admissible at sentencing, they must be treated with caution and their contents cannot be accepted in their entirety as proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found that the trial judge's error was harmless because the dangerous offender finding was well-supported by other evidence in the record, including the appellant's extensive criminal history, expert psychiatric evidence of high risk of violent recidivism, and corroborating evidence from guilty plea transcripts and institutional records.

The accused appealed a conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial reasons failed to resolve a key inconsistency in the complainant's evidence and did not adequately explain credibility findings.

A majority of the Court adopted the majority appellate reasons and held that the trial reasons were responsive to the live issues and parties' core arguments.

The appeal was dismissed, with one judge dissenting and favouring allowing the appeal.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board decision concerning whether the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre was required to notify the Board of a significant increase in restrictions on the appellant's liberty when she was transferred from the Secure Forensic Rehabilitation Unit (FRU) to the Secure Forensic Assessment Unit (FAU).

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2004, had been abusing substances while on the FRU, leading to the transfer.

The Board was divided on whether notice was required under s. 672.56(2) of the Criminal Code, but unanimously concluded that the transfer constituted the least onerous and least restrictive measure available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, establishing a framework for determining when notice of significant increases in restrictions on liberty is required.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from a trial decision rendered by Justice J.A.T. Colvin of the Ontario Court of Justice on May 9, 2016, with sentence imposed on August 19, 2016.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's evidence by failing to assess its reliability despite assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment, noting that the trial judge considered all relevant factors affecting the trustworthiness of the complainant's evidence and that corroborating evidence from the complainant's sister was available.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was also refused, as no basis for appellate intervention was demonstrated.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing that the application judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay.

The appellant contended that the application judge erred in his Morin analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the delay was reasonable under the Morin framework.

The delay arose from the Crown's decision to join co-accused, and even on the appellant's argument, the excess delay was only one month.

The court found no prejudice to the appellant's liberty interest or ability to make full answer and defence, and noted the serious nature of the fraud and societal interest in bringing the case to trial.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to small business loans obtained under Industry Canada's Small Business Loan Program.

The loans were fraudulently obtained for purposes other than those specified in the program requirements.

The sole issue at trial was whether the appellant, a professional loan broker, knowingly participated in the frauds.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty on both counts and imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence on the first count followed by a consecutive 12-month conditional sentence on the second count.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, raising arguments regarding misapprehension of evidence, credibility analysis, and burden of proof, as well as seeking leave to appeal the sentence on parity grounds.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against a minor.

The trial judge stayed the sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching counts pursuant to Kienapple v. R. The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge failed to resolve a critical inconsistency in the complainant's evidence regarding an alleged oral sex incident that was never repeated in subsequent statements or testimony; and second, that the trial judge failed to consider innocent explanations for the complainant's knowledge of sexual acts.

The majority dismissed the appeal, finding the inconsistency was not a live issue at trial and that the core allegations remained consistent.

Justice Trotter dissented, finding the inconsistency was significant and that the trial judge's failure to address it constituted reversible error.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and forcible confinement entered after a jury trial.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence of a prior conviction for sexual assault as part of similar fact evidence, and also challenged the trial judge's instruction to the jury regarding the use of such evidence on the issue of consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the prior conviction was properly admitted as part of a package of similar fact evidence and that the trial judge's charge to the jury was adequate.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of armed robbery, four counts of forcible confinement, and breaking and entering a dwelling house to commit an indictable offence following a home invasion robbery.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's Charter application challenging the admissibility of statements made to police before consulting with counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in multiple respects regarding the requirement to provide a Prosper warning.

The trial judge incorrectly found that the appellant was not reasonably diligent in seeking legal advice by choosing to wait until the next day to speak to his lawyer of choice, failed to recognize that an apparent change of mind about seeking counsel without delay triggers the Prosper warning requirement, and erred in finding that a standard police caution was an adequate substitute for a Prosper warning.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the appellant's statements should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Without these statements, the Crown's case could not proceed, and the convictions were quashed with acquittals entered.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated November 29, 2016.

The appellant sought a hybrid order, but the Board imposed secure detention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board acted reasonably in rejecting the hybrid order request based on evidence from the treatment team and the hospital that secure detention was the necessary and appropriate disposition.

The Board retained discretion to determine when the appellant would be ready for transfer to a less secure setting.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated July 5, 2016.

The appellant challenged the Board's order regarding his detention and conditions.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's conduct troubling but close to the threshold for satisfying the "significant threat to the safety of the public" requirement.

The Court upheld the Board's order but directed that on the next review, all possibilities including conditional discharge be fully addressed, noting the appellant's prior successful functioning on conditions for approximately four years.

The defendant, Luigi Trinchi, facing a seven-count indictment for distributing fake emails with nude photographs, sought to admit third-party suspect evidence implicating Ms. Donna Bardy.

The Crown opposed the admission of this evidence during the trial.

The court applied the test for admissibility of third-party suspect evidence, requiring the defence to demonstrate a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime, showing motive, opportunity, and propensity.

The court found that the defendant met the evidential burden, ruling the evidence admissible for the trial proper.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences involving child pornography possession and distribution, possession of stolen photographs of children, sexual interference with his young niece, and invitation to sexual touching.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day for the child pornography charges (joint submission), followed by two and a half years consecutive for sexual interference (with credit for pre-trial custody), with concurrent sentences on the remaining charges.

Ancillary orders included DNA sampling, firearm prohibition, sex offender registry compliance, and restrictions on contact with minors.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation following the accused’s conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child.

The defence conceded that the statutory criteria for dangerous offender status were met but argued that a determinate penitentiary sentence followed by a ten‑year long‑term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

The court reviewed extensive expert psychiatric and psychological evidence, actuarial risk assessments, and the offender’s lengthy history of sexual offences against children.

Applying the post‑2008 Criminal Code framework under s. 753(4.1), the court held that an indeterminate sentence must be imposed unless there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The evidence established only a speculative hope of successful treatment and demonstrated that the offender would require lifelong structure and supervision to manage risk.