Maleeka Mohamed

The appellant, a first-time offender, appealed his 30-day intermittent sentence for impaired driving and dangerous driving.

He argued that a custodial sentence was demonstrably unfit because no accident or injury occurred, and that the trial judge failed to adequately consider non-custodial sanctions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the serious aggravating factors, including a blood alcohol concentration of 190 mg and the presence of the appellant's wife and two young children in the vehicle.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to small business loans obtained under Industry Canada's Small Business Loan Program.

The loans were fraudulently obtained for purposes other than those specified in the program requirements.

The sole issue at trial was whether the appellant, a professional loan broker, knowingly participated in the frauds.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty on both counts and imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence on the first count followed by a consecutive 12-month conditional sentence on the second count.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, raising arguments regarding misapprehension of evidence, credibility analysis, and burden of proof, as well as seeking leave to appeal the sentence on parity grounds.

The appellant, Mr. Wong, appealed his conviction for driving over 80, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding he waived his right to counsel and in not requiring a "Prosper warning." The appellant contended that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his understanding of his rights and that a Prosper warning was necessary given his initial statement that he would like to speak with a lawyer.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence.

The court clarified that a Prosper warning is only required when a detainee, after asserting the right to counsel, makes diligent but unsuccessful attempts to contact a lawyer and then indicates a change of mind, which was not the case here as the appellant declined counsel at the police station without making any attempts to contact one.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a RIDE spot check.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10.

The three issues at trial were: (1) whether the right to counsel was breached when the accused initially expressed a desire to speak to a lawyer but later declined; (2) whether breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii); and (3) whether any breaches warranted exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that directed a conviction.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred by focusing on whether the arresting officer actually knew a test result was reliable, rather than whether the officer's belief was reasonable.

However, the Court of Appeal held that the appropriate remedy was a new trial, not a directed conviction, because a trial judge could conclude the officer's belief was unreasonable given his reliance on a rookie officer whose training was unknown.

The appeal was allowed in part, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a bail condition prohibiting him from occupying the front seat of a motor vehicle, contrary to s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was stopped for speeding while driving a red Ferrari.

The defence conceded that the bail term was in effect and that the driving breached that term, but argued the breach was not intentional.

The accused claimed that upon receiving his license back from the Ministry of Transportation following a 90-day suspension, he believed he was permitted to drive.

The court found that the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, holding that the offence requires proof of an intentional act and that the accused's mistake was one he deliberately created by failing to inquire with either the Ministry of Transportation or his lawyer about his bail condition.