Jennifer Carrie Gleitman

The defendant brought a s. 8 Charter motion to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, arguing procedural flaws related to the use of the telewarrant process and substantive flaws regarding the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the telewarrant procedure was justified due to impracticability, not necessarily urgency, and that the ITO, when read holistically, provided sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance despite minor imperfections.

Consequently, the seized evidence was admissible.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging he was assaulted by police detectives after his arrest for armed robbery.

The accused claimed the officers beat him in an unmonitored interview room to extract a confession, washed his blood-stained shirt to conceal the assault, and deliberately conducted his videotaped interview with his back to the camera.

The court found the accused's evidence credible and concluded that the officers had indeed assaulted him and attempted to cover it up.

The court held that the police misconduct was so offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency that it fell into the residual category of abuse of process.

The application was granted and the proceedings were stayed.

The defendant, Andre Evans, was charged with 15 counts including procurement, human trafficking, assault, criminal harassment, drug trafficking, and various firearms offences involving two complainants, KJ and AB.

The court acquitted Evans on the procurement charges (counts 1 and 13) for both complainants, finding insufficient evidence of inducement.

However, Evans was found guilty of human trafficking (counts 2 and 12) for both complainants, as the court determined he exercised control and influence over their movements for exploitation, creating a culture of dependence and fear.

He was also found guilty of assault (counts 3 and 14) against both complainants, criminal harassment (count 4) against KJ, breach of a non-communication order (count 15), possession of marijuana and cocaine for trafficking (counts 5 and 6), and all five firearms offences (counts 7-11).

The Crown applied under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a complainant in a human trafficking and procuring case to testify via closed-circuit television.

The complainant expressed significant anxiety about testifying in the presence of the accused due to past trauma.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it would infringe the accused's right to face his accuser and impede cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding that the use of a testimonial aid would facilitate a full and candid account from the witness and enhance the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that the right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for trials in provincial court.

The net delay was 14 months and 3 days, falling below the ceiling.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from arrest to the projected end of the trial was approximately 32 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

However, the court deducted three periods of defence delay, including time when defence counsel was unavailable for offered trial dates, a scheduling error by defence counsel, and a frivolous mistrial application regarding an interpreter.

After these deductions, the net delay fell below the 30-month ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

During a jury trial for sexual assault, a juror sent a note to the trial judge reporting that another juror had shared a story with the panel about a friend who was falsely accused of a similar offence.

The trial judge conducted an inquiry in accordance with the process set out in R. v. Giroux.

The judge discharged the offending juror under s. 644 of the Criminal Code for reasonable cause, finding she could be influenced by her friend's experience and had failed to disclose this during jury selection.

The juror who reported the incident was retained, as she had appropriately followed the court's preliminary instructions.

The appellant appealed his voyeurism conviction, challenging the trial judge's finding of "explicit sexual activity" and the treatment of a witness's statement as an informal admission.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that one photograph unequivocally depicted explicit sexual activity and that the trial judge correctly considered the witness's "acknowledged evidence" as an informal admission in the context of a directed verdict motion.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

The Crown and defence agreed that the accused was in care or control and that his blood alcohol level exceeded 80 mg/100 mL.

The remaining issues were whether the Crown proved alcohol impairment, whether the demand for breath samples was made without reasonable grounds contrary to s. 8 of the Charter, and whether any breath test readings should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds for the demand based on observations of impairment and erratic driving.

The court found the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was significantly impaired by alcohol based on observed signs including slurred speech, unsteadiness, poor motor skills, and inability to remain conscious.

The court convicted the accused on both charges.

Ricky DeSousa was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and one count of evading police, and pleaded guilty to eight counts of robbery.

The court considered aggravating factors including the vulnerability of robbery victims, use of a weapon, injuries to victims, and the fact that aggravated assault victims were police officers.

Mitigating factors included DeSousa's guilty plea to robberies, triable issues on other counts, and community support for rehabilitation.

The court imposed a global sentence of 13 years imprisonment, consisting of eight years consecutive for the robberies and five years concurrent for the aggravated assault and evasion of police, with the five-year sentence to be served consecutively to the eight-year robbery sentence.

Pre-trial custody credit of eight years and eleven months was applied, including an additional 90 days for harsh lockdown conditions.

Ancillary orders for a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA sample were also made.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of procuring under s.212(1), one count of uttering a threat to cause death under s.264.1(1), and one count of failing to comply with a recognizance under s.145(3).

The accused lured two young women into working as dancers at strip clubs and encouraged them to engage in prostitution, taking all their earnings.

He also made violent threats against a former partner.

The Crown sought one year additional jail time, while the defence sought time served or a short intermittent sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation, citing the accused's extended pre-trial custody and house arrest, his demonstrated rehabilitation while on strict release, and his stable employment and family relationships.

The Crown brought an application to permit a non-accredited interpreter to provide simultaneous translation in Visayan for a defendant charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

The defendant, an elderly man from the Philippines with a grade 3 education, required interpretation to exercise his section 14 Charter rights.

The proposed interpreter was an intelligent and accomplished woman with extensive multilingual experience and prior court interpretation work, but lacked formal accreditation in Visayan and had not taken certification exams in that language.

The court found that while the interpreter possessed competence in the language, the Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that she could meet the constitutional standard required for a lengthy, complex trial involving simultaneous translation of all courtroom proceedings.

The accused was charged with two counts of attempted murder of police officers, failing to stop his vehicle during a police pursuit, and aggravated assault of a peace officer, following a violent vehicular takedown.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder, but sufficient to establish the lesser included offence of aggravated assault, based on objective foresight of harm.

The accused was also found guilty of evading police, as the court inferred he knew he was surrounded by officers.

The charge of aggravated assault of a peace officer was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The defence brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three expert witnesses for an upcoming jury trial involving charges of attempted murder and criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a police pursuit and 'rolling block' takedown.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey frameworks to assess the admissibility of the proposed experts.

The court denied the qualification of a ballistics expert, finding the evidence unnecessary and potentially distracting.

However, the court permitted the defence to call an expert in police training and use of force, as well as an expert in accident reconstruction, concluding that their testimony would assist the jury in understanding the chaotic scene and the context of the police actions.

The accused was charged with eight counts including possession of loaded restricted firearms without authorization, possession of firearms without a licence, careless storage of firearms, break and enter at a pharmacy, alteration of vehicle identification numbers, and possession of stolen motor vehicles.

The Crown withdrew charges related to VIN alterations and the co-accused.

The trial proceeded on counts relating to firearm possession, careless storage, break and enter, and possession of stolen vehicles.

The court found the accused guilty of counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 (firearm possession and stolen vehicle possession) but acquitted him of counts 4 and 6 (break and enter and possession of the Durango) due to insufficient evidence of knowledge and physical capability.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered on impaired driving and excess alcohol charges for breach of the respondent’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal turned on whether delay following unsuccessful trial dates was properly attributed to the defence or to institutional delay.

The court held that where a case is not reached and must be rescheduled, the matter should receive priority and isolated defence unavailability within multi-month periods does not necessarily convert the resulting delay into defence delay.

The trial judge did not err in treating the rescheduling delay, including delay flowing from the need for a further trial date after the s. 11(b) application, as institutional delay.

The appeal was dismissed and the stay of proceedings was upheld.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault against his ex-wife following a single violent incident in July 2012.

The assault resulted in severe facial bruising and permanent hearing loss to the victim.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years of probation, crediting six months for time served under stringent bail conditions.

The sentencing balanced the serious nature of domestic violence with significant mitigating factors including the accused's lack of prior criminal record, genuine remorse, engagement in counselling, and the isolated nature of the incident.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempt murder contrary to s. 239 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, the victim's impact statement, the accused's prior criminal record (two robbery convictions), and mitigating factors including the guilty plea, early resolution, and personal circumstances involving substance abuse.

The court applied enhanced credit for pre-trial custody on a 1.5 to 1 basis and imposed a sentence within the range jointly submitted by counsel.

The accused pleaded guilty to uttering threats to cause death contrary to section 264.1 of the Criminal Code.

The offence occurred when the heavily intoxicated accused threatened to kill his wife in the presence of police who had attended a mischief call.

The court considered a comprehensive Gladue report detailing the accused's background as an Inuit from a remote community, his attendance at residential school, his career as a nationally known artist, and his ongoing struggles with alcoholism.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months of probation, noting the accused's prior sobriety, personal insight into his difficulties, and current engagement in counselling for alcoholism and anger management.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, arguing that police violated section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by requiring her to remove her underwire bra during the booking process at a police station.

The trial judge held the removal of the bra did not constitute a strip search and that the police acted pursuant to a routine safety policy.

On appeal, the court held that requiring removal of an undergarment for visual inspection falls within the Supreme Court of Canada's definition of a strip search under R. v. Golden.

The court concluded that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the requirement that strip searches be justified by reasonable and probable grounds based on case‑specific circumstances rather than routine policy.

Because the search relied on an unwritten policy automatically applied to female detainees wearing underwire bras, the Charter analysis was flawed.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.