Jeffrey V. Milligan

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in such quantity that the concentration in his blood exceeded eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence launched a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 regarding the validity of the approved screening device and the timing of the breath demand.

The court found that the officer had a reasonable subjective and objective belief that the screening device was properly calibrated and in working order, and that the breath demand was made as soon as practicable.

All Charter applications were dismissed and the defendant was convicted.

The accused pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 for his role in an investment scheme where funds were diverted from a promised offshore investment to a retirement home project.

A Gardiner hearing was held to determine if the accused was the directing and controlling mind of the fraud.

The court reviewed the accused's corporate positions, his role in soliciting investors, and his control over the flow of funds.

The court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the directing and controlling mind of the fraud.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay and by providing insufficient reasons for that ruling.

The appellate court agreed that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate to permit appellate review and therefore conducted its own analysis of the delay under the Askov and Morin framework.

The court found the total delay of approximately 14 months and 20 days warranted scrutiny but concluded that only about nine months and three weeks constituted institutional and Crown delay.

Some delay was attributable to defence conduct, including insisting on an adjournment based on a mistaken interpretation of s. 657.3 of the Criminal Code and failing to raise s. 11(b) concerns when a continuation date was set.

Although some prejudice arose from multiple trial dates, the court held the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances.

The accused pleaded guilty to uttering threats to cause death contrary to section 264.1 of the Criminal Code.

The offence occurred when the heavily intoxicated accused threatened to kill his wife in the presence of police who had attended a mischief call.

The court considered a comprehensive Gladue report detailing the accused's background as an Inuit from a remote community, his attendance at residential school, his career as a nationally known artist, and his ongoing struggles with alcoholism.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months of probation, noting the accused's prior sobriety, personal insight into his difficulties, and current engagement in counselling for alcoholism and anger management.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and failure to stop for police, arguing that the trial judge improperly relied on the appellant’s silence at the scene as a factor in rejecting his testimony.

The appeal court held that using an accused’s failure to protest innocence at the scene as a credibility factor is impermissible.

Because the trial judge’s reasoning indicated that this improper factor formed part of the chain of reasoning leading to conviction, the court could not conclude that the verdict would inevitably have been the same without it.

The conviction was therefore set aside.

A new trial was ordered on both counts and the conditional stay on the failure to stop charge was lifted.

The appellant appealed her effective five-year sentence for impaired driving causing death and impaired driving causing bodily harm.

She argued the sentencing judge overemphasized deterrence and failed to give sufficient weight to her aboriginal background and rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge carefully considered her background but appropriately weighed serious aggravating factors, including her prior record, high blood alcohol level, and lack of accepted responsibility.

The sentence was found to be fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge erred in upholding the trial judge's finding that he was in care and control of his vehicle after crashing into a stone gate post.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law.

The trial judge properly concluded the appellant retained care and control based on his proximity to the vehicle, possession of the keys, declared intention to continue driving, and repeated attempts to extricate the vehicle.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a summary conviction appeal court judge.

The appellant conceded that the appeal must be dismissed unless the court was prepared to overrule its previous decision in R. v. Hatfield.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to depart from the precedent and dismissed the appeal.