Jason A. Gorda

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences after a handgun was found in the driver's footwell of a vehicle in which he was the sole passenger.

The driver was acquitted.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to assess his case independently from the driver's and by rendering an unreasonable verdict based on speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's opportunity, proximity to the firearm, and after-the-fact conduct.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting 911 recordings and the complainant's signed statement to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and in assigning them weight.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's admissibility ruling or her assessment of the evidence's weight.

Following the release of its decision on the appeal, the Court of Appeal determined the specific terms for the appellant's conditional sentence and probation.

The 14-month conditional sentence includes statutory conditions, a no-contact order, eight months of house arrest with exceptions, and a curfew for the remainder.

A one-year probation period follows with similar no-contact conditions.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and uttering forged documents after registering a forged deed to transfer his mother's condominium to himself.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding discreditable conduct, hearsay, and evidence review, and improperly restricted re-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal because the substituted sentencing judge imposed an 18-month jail term that the original trial judge had explicitly stated was excessive, without giving the appellant an opportunity to make further submissions.

The sentence was varied to an 18-month conditional sentence and one year of probation.

The appellant was convicted of several counts related to a home invasion and sentenced to 10 years in custody.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his alibi and in accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness to establish identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings or consideration of confirmatory evidence, including fingerprints and the timing of the arrest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year sentence reflected the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of assault and unlawful confinement for his role in a home invasion and robbery, and was sentenced to 18 months in custody.

He appealed the sentence, seeking an 18-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the custodial sentence fit and adequately reflective of mitigating factors, including his lack of a prior record and minor role in the offences.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a demand to give a breath sample without reasonable excuse.

He argued that he was arbitrarily detained, that the trial judge erred in finding he had the requisite mens rea, and that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the grounds of appeal were weak and had no significance to the administration of justice.

The court held that mere contact with a police officer does not constitute arbitrary detention, the trial judge correctly applied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for mens rea, and there was no misapprehension of evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for 20 months of pretrial custody.

The trial judge had only given 1 month of enhanced credit for 44 lock-down days.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted 1.5 to 1 credit for the entire 20 months of pretrial custody, reducing the sentence accordingly.

The appellant appealed convictions for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay and in finding that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the allocation of delay, including institutional delay, defence-caused adjournments, and delays arising from disclosure issues related to a police officer’s Drug Recognition Expert training.

The court concluded the trial judge did not err in characterizing the delay or in determining that the overall delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The court also held that the police acted reasonably in obtaining breath samples approximately 1 hour and 37 minutes after arrest and that the trial judge properly inferred that the delay was explained by operational circumstances at the police station.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and failure to stop for police, arguing that the trial judge improperly relied on the appellant’s silence at the scene as a factor in rejecting his testimony.

The appeal court held that using an accused’s failure to protest innocence at the scene as a credibility factor is impermissible.

Because the trial judge’s reasoning indicated that this improper factor formed part of the chain of reasoning leading to conviction, the court could not conclude that the verdict would inevitably have been the same without it.

The conviction was therefore set aside.

A new trial was ordered on both counts and the conditional stay on the failure to stop charge was lifted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving and driving over 80, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to permit a late Charter application under s. 24(1) after an earlier s. 24(2) exclusion application had failed.

The proposed remedy sought to prevent the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity under the Criminal Code following a finding of a minor s. 8 breach.

The court held that trial judges possess broad discretion to control proceedings and enforce compliance with procedural notice rules governing Charter applications.

Given the late timing, non‑compliance with notice requirements, and minimal seriousness of the underlying breach, the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing to entertain the application.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed criminal harassment convictions arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court found that several periods of delay had been incorrectly characterized as neutral, including delay caused by late disclosure, the Crown’s failure to subpoena witnesses, and the Crown’s late filing of written submissions.

Properly characterized, a substantial portion of the delay was attributable to the Crown and institutional factors, exceeding the Morin guidelines.

The appellant had also demonstrated actual prejudice resulting from restrictive bail conditions that interfered with employment and personal life.

The court concluded that the delay was unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.