Frederick S. Fedorsen

The accused, Azary Matanov, charged with sexual assault, brought a two-stage application under sections 278.93(1) and 278.94 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of certain evidence (text messages, a selfie, a phone call, and a kiss) at trial.

The evidence was sought to provide context to the relationship with the complainant and to challenge her credibility.

The court granted the Stage One application, finding the evidence capable of being admissible, and subsequently granted the Stage Two application, finding the evidence admissible.

The court emphasized that in a judge-alone trial, the risk of improper use of evidence is diminished, and the probative value of the evidence for context and credibility outweighed any potential prejudicial effect, without engaging "twin myth" reasoning.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The trial judge had delivered a brief oral acquittal and later provided comprehensive written reasons after inviting further submissions on a new appellate decision.

The parties agreed that under R. v. Teskey, the appellate court could not consider the written reasons, and under R. v. Sheppard, the oral reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The summary conviction appeal court accepted the joint submission, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, Rory Coutts, appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found Charter breaches regarding the roadside Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand not being made forthwith and a delay in providing reasons for detention, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court considered whether the breathalyzer demand under s. 254(3) was lawful, given the unlawful ASD demand.

The court found that the unlawful ASD demand rendered the "fail" result inadmissible to establish reasonable grounds for the s. 254(3) breathalyzer demand, thus making the latter demand unlawful.

Consequently, the appellant was under no legal obligation to comply, and his refusal was not a criminal offence.

The conviction was quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for impaired care and control and 'over 80'.

At trial, the judge relied on the evidence of two security guards to dismiss the appellant's Charter application, despite an explicit agreement between counsel that their testimony would only apply to the trial proper and not the voir dire.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's use of this evidence denied the appellant procedural fairness and a fair trial.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused was feigning to blow and did not provide a suitable sample despite being given seven opportunities.

The accused brought Charter arguments under sections 8 and 9 to exclude evidence of his refusal.

The court found violations of both sections 8 and 9 but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) after balancing the Grant factors.

On the substantive charge, the court found the accused intentionally failed to provide a suitable sample and convicted him as charged.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The trial proceeded with a blended Charter application challenging the validity of the breath sample evidence.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: (1) the demand under s. 254(2) Criminal Code was not made "forthwith" as required, with a 22-minute delay from formation of suspicion to commencement of testing; (2) the accused's s. 10(a)(b) Charter rights were not provided immediately after the roadside test failure.

Under s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the court excluded the Certificate of Analysis evidence as the breaches were multiple, protracted, and contrary to the officer's training, warranting disassociation by the justice system.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving and driving over 80, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to permit a late Charter application under s. 24(1) after an earlier s. 24(2) exclusion application had failed.

The proposed remedy sought to prevent the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity under the Criminal Code following a finding of a minor s. 8 breach.

The court held that trial judges possess broad discretion to control proceedings and enforce compliance with procedural notice rules governing Charter applications.

Given the late timing, non‑compliance with notice requirements, and minimal seriousness of the underlying breach, the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing to entertain the application.

The appeal was dismissed.