Laurie Gonet

Neelkanth Shah, an 18-year-old first offender, was sentenced for three bank robberies committed in early 2021.

The robberies escalated in severity, with the final one involving an accomplice, brandished knives, an accidental injury to a police officer, and trauma to a bank teller.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the use of a knife and the amount stolen, and significant mitigating factors, including Shah's sincere remorse, rehabilitative efforts while on strict house arrest bail, and strong community support.

The Crown sought 3-4 years' incarceration, while the defence argued for 31 months, leading to an actual sentence of two years after credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest.

N.N. pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, while K.H. and Y.N. pleaded guilty to manslaughter, all related to the killing of Hashim Kinani.

The court determined the appropriate youth sentences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, focusing on the length of the custodial portion and credit for pre-sentence detention.

The decision balanced accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration, considering the serious nature of the offences, the young persons' backgrounds, and the impact of COVID-19 on their detention conditions.

The Crown appealed the sentence of a conditional discharge, probation, DNA order, and s. 110 order imposed on the respondent for assault and uttering a threat, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and failed to adequately emphasize denunciation and deterrence.

The court upheld the trial judge's sentence, finding no error in principle or law, and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, despite being comparatively lenient.

The self-represented appellant applied under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of state-funded counsel to assist with his appeal of convictions for assault causing bodily harm and assault of a peace officer.

The convictions arose from an altercation with correctional officers while the appellant was an inmate.

The court found that the appeal raised arguable issues regarding the officers' use of force, self-defence, and potential Charter breaches.

Concluding that the appeal involved complex legal issues that the court would be better able to determine with the assistance of counsel, the application was granted and counsel was appointed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault, forcible confinement, failure to comply with probation, and sexual assault against his wife.

At trial, the complainant recanted her initial police statement, which was admitted for the truth of its contents.

The appeal judge upheld the convictions for assault, forcible confinement, and breach of probation, finding no misapprehension of evidence or improper shifting of the burden of proof.

However, the appeal judge quashed the sexual assault conviction, finding the trial judge reversed the burden of proof on consent and relied on impermissible myths and stereotypes regarding the complainant's sexual preferences.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, E.A., on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by effectively applying a defence of automatism without proper analysis and by conceptualizing the offences as specific intent.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not rely on automatism but rather concluded that the Crown failed to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt due to vagueness in the complainant's evidence and the possibility that the touching was accidental while the respondent was asleep or half-asleep.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's understanding of the offences as general intent.

The appellant, Rory Coutts, appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found Charter breaches regarding the roadside Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand not being made forthwith and a delay in providing reasons for detention, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court considered whether the breathalyzer demand under s. 254(3) was lawful, given the unlawful ASD demand.

The court found that the unlawful ASD demand rendered the "fail" result inadmissible to establish reasonable grounds for the s. 254(3) breathalyzer demand, thus making the latter demand unlawful.

Consequently, the appellant was under no legal obligation to comply, and his refusal was not a criminal offence.

The conviction was quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on one count of sexual assault.

The appeal raised three grounds: whether the trial judge erred in not finding sexual assault on the couch, whether the reasons were inadequate regarding conflicting evidence about pinning, and whether the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual findings on consent were reasonable, his reasons were adequate, and he did not rely on impermissible stereotypes in his credibility assessment, having properly cautioned himself.

The appellant, Andrew Singh, appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The trial judge had found no breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice, or alternatively, that breathalyzer readings would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The appeal court found that police *did* violate Singh's s. 10(b) rights by failing to make adequate efforts to connect him with his counsel of choice and defaulting to duty counsel without asking.

However, applying the R. v. Grant framework for s. 24(2) exclusion, the court found the Charter breach to be moderately serious, the impact on Singh's protected interests minor (as he received legal advice and did not complain), and society's interest in adjudication on the merits high.

Consequently, the breathalyzer results were admitted, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant laid a private information against a transit driver for assault.

The Crown intervened, assumed carriage of the prosecution, and resolved the matter with a guilty plea and absolute discharge.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash the conviction and sentence.

The court dismissed the application, holding that once the Crown assumes carriage of a private prosecution, the private informant becomes merely a witness and lacks standing to challenge the Crown's conduct of the case.

On a summary conviction appeal from an assault conviction, the appellant argued that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapplied the reasonable doubt standard in assessing credibility.

The appeal court rejected the unreasonable verdict ground, holding that the alleged inconsistencies, intoxication concerns, and absence of corroboration did not render the conviction unreasonable.

However, the court held that the trial judge's reasons treated the case as a credibility contest and failed to address whether the defence evidence, even if disbelieved, nonetheless raised a reasonable doubt under the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the only count under appeal.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded that the primary and secondary grounds for detention were not engaged but argued for detention under the tertiary ground due to the gravity of the offence and the applicant's post-offence conduct.

The court found that the applicant had no prior criminal record, was not prone to violence, and proposed a stringent release plan with substantial sureties.

The court concluded that a reasonable member of the public would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released, and granted the application for bail.