John J. Navarrete

The appellant appealed convictions for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay and in finding that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the allocation of delay, including institutional delay, defence-caused adjournments, and delays arising from disclosure issues related to a police officer’s Drug Recognition Expert training.

The court concluded the trial judge did not err in characterizing the delay or in determining that the overall delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The court also held that the police acted reasonably in obtaining breath samples approximately 1 hour and 37 minutes after arrest and that the trial judge properly inferred that the delay was explained by operational circumstances at the police station.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The appellant also argued that the trial judge’s “unorthodox” approach to hearing the application created a reasonable apprehension of bias because the judge outlined his preliminary views after reviewing the written materials before hearing full submissions.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s conduct reflected preparation rather than predisposition and that counsel had a full opportunity to make submissions.

The court further found no error in the trial judge’s attribution of delay or assessment of prejudice.

The conviction was upheld and the appeal dismissed.