Laurie E. Jago

The 81-year-old offender was convicted of aggravated assault and assault against his intimate partner, a 77-year-old woman, after knocking her down and striking her, causing a fractured patella and other injuries.

The court considered the offender's advanced age and diagnosed personality disorders, but found they did not preclude a custodial sentence given the severity of the domestic violence, his lack of remorse, and a high risk of future violence.

The offender was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment followed by three years of probation.

The accused was charged with two counts of break and enter with sexual assault.

The Crown's case relied primarily on eyewitness identification evidence from the first complainant and DNA evidence from a discarded cigarette butt found near the second residence.

The accused denied the allegations and testified that he was at home sleeping at the time of the offences.

The court found that while the first complainant made a positive identification, there were significant frailties in the identification evidence and alternative suspects with stronger circumstantial connections to the crimes.

The DNA evidence, while probative, could not establish when the cigarette butt was smoked.

The court concluded that the Crown had not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both counts.

Jordan McPhee pleaded guilty to sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and robbery.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation.

The court, considering McPhee's criminal record, a subsequent aggravated assault conviction, and a psychiatric risk assessment, found him to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of six years imprisonment (less pre-sentence custody) followed by a ten-year Long Term Supervision Order, with specific recommendations for conditions to the parole board.

The accused was charged with four offences arising from an incident on March 3, 2014 in Oakville: assault on Ashley Prosser, confinement of Ashley Prosser, assault on a peace officer (Constable Bayliss) in the execution of his duties, and assault with a weapon (steel-toed shoe) on Special Constable Colling.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused pleaded not guilty and a trial was held.

The court found the accused's testimony highly unreliable due to numerous inconsistencies with witness evidence, video recordings, 911 recordings, and medical records.

The court accepted the evidence of the Crown witnesses and found the accused guilty of assault on Prosser, confinement of Prosser, and assault on Constable Bayliss.

The charge of assault with a weapon was dismissed due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the contact was deliberate.

The accused's application for a stay of proceedings based on Charter violations (sections 7 and 9) was dismissed, as the court found no serious state misconduct undermining trial fairness or judicial integrity.

The accused was charged with impaired operation (alcohol and/or drug) and Over 80 following a single vehicle rollover on the QEW in Burlington on February 27, 2015.

The court found a serious breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel when police failed to make reasonable efforts to contact the accused's counsel of choice before proceeding with breath testing.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence and dismissed the Over 80 charge.

On the impaired operation charge, the court found the evidence of impairment insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused, noting that a dangerous operation charge would have been more appropriate.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in such quantity that the concentration in his blood exceeded eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence launched a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 regarding the validity of the approved screening device and the timing of the breath demand.

The court found that the officer had a reasonable subjective and objective belief that the screening device was properly calibrated and in working order, and that the breath demand was made as soon as practicable.

All Charter applications were dismissed and the defendant was convicted.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of possessing child pornography.

The trial judge had excluded evidence obtained via a search warrant, finding a violation of s. 8 of the Charter due to insufficient reasonable grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO) the warrant, particularly concerning the 13-month delay between the alleged offence and the warrant application.

The trial judge also excluded statements made by the respondent, finding a violation of his s. 10(b) right to counsel due to unlawful detention prior to being advised of his rights.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings on both Charter violations and the subsequent exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), dismissing the Crown's appeal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test.

The court found the police officer had objectively reasonable grounds to suspect impairment based on the totality of circumstances, including erratic driving, unusual vehicle placement, placement of air fresheners in unusual locations, and minimal responses to questioning.

The court also found the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable despite the two-hour-and-twenty-five-minute delay, which was attributable to unusual weather conditions, unavailability of a qualified technician in Burlington, and equipment issues.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with assaulting the complainant on November 12, 2014, in Oakville in an incident arising from a road rage altercation.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The court found that the accused initiated a confrontation after a minor traffic incident, blocked the complainant's vehicle at an intersection, approached the complainant's window, and assaulted him, causing injuries.

The accused also uttered threats and fled the scene.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as self-serving and defying common sense, accepting the complainant's account and that of an independent witness.

The accused was found guilty of assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The impaired driving charge was dismissed at the conclusion of the Crown's evidence.

At trial, the defence raised two issues: a Charter application to exclude breath test results based on an allegedly invalid approved screening device demand, and an argument that the presumption relating breath test readings to the time of driving did not apply because the tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found no Charter breach but determined that the Crown failed to prove the tests were taken as soon as practicable, thereby defeating the statutory presumption.

The over 80 charge was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

She was charged with impaired operation and refusing to provide intoxilyzer breath samples arising from events on August 3, 2014.

The information was sworn on August 12, 2014, and trial was scheduled for November 5-6, 2015.

The court found that the total delay was at minimum 11.5 months, comprising 2 months of Crown delay due to incomplete vetting of disclosure and 9 months and 14 days of institutional delay due to lack of court resources in Halton Region.

The court also found that the trial time estimate of 2 days was unrealistic and that a proper estimate of 4 consecutive days would have pushed the trial date further out.

The applicant demonstrated real prejudice due to pre-existing mental health issues exacerbated by the delay.

The court concluded that the applicant's section 11(b) rights had been infringed and granted a stay of proceedings.

This is a retrial following a successful appeal in a criminal case involving six charges of sexual assault and sexual interference against the defendant MCJ.

The charges involved three complainants: LJ (alleged offences between December 5, 1987 and December 5, 1992), KJ (alleged offences between June 15 and September 10, 2007), and LH (alleged offences in 1998 and July 23, 2005).

The defendant was the uncle of two complainants and the uncle of the mother of the third complainant.

The trial judge found that while the complainants were credible in their sincerity, their evidence was not reliable to the requisite degree due to numerous material inconsistencies, evolving allegations, and implausibilities.

All charges were dismissed.

The applicant brought a constitutional motion in advance of sentencing challenging s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code insofar as it denied enhanced pre-sentence custody credit to offenders detained under s. 524(4) or (8) after a bail breach.

The court held that the provision engaged liberty and offended the principle of proportionality in sentencing because it made the ultimate period of incarceration depend on the offender's ability to obtain bail, a factor irrelevant to a fit sentence.

The court rejected the Crown's position that gross disproportionality was the governing standard, relied on appellate authority recognizing proportionality in sentencing as a principle of fundamental justice, and found the provision arbitrary in its operation.

Applying s. 1, the court held the provision was not rationally connected in a constitutionally sufficient way, did not minimally impair liberty, and produced deleterious effects outweighing any benefits.

The impugned words were declared of no force and effect to the extent they barred enhanced credit for detention under s. 524(4) or (8), and the applicant was not precluded from seeking enhanced credit for all pre-sentence custody.

The offender pleaded guilty to three counts arising from a home invasion: break and enter with intent to commit robbery, forcible confinement of an 86-year-old victim, and assault of a police officer resisting arrest.

The offender also acknowledged four additional counts.

The victim was confined for 4-5 hours, threatened with a knife held to her throat, physically assaulted, and suffered lasting psychological trauma.

The offender had a history of mental health issues, substance abuse, and prior criminal convictions.

A forensic psychiatric assessment found the offender to be at high risk to re-offend.

The court imposed an 8-year penitentiary sentence on top of 9 months pre-trial custody, with concurrent sentences on the other counts.

A lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order were imposed.

The accused was charged with failing to stop after an accident, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a series of collisions while driving with low blood sugar due to diabetes.

The accused admitted the actus reus but argued he lacked the necessary mens rea because he became disoriented due to hypoglycemia.

The court found the accused was aware that his blood sugar level had become low and nevertheless made a conscious decision to continue driving despite knowing the risks.

Expert evidence established that symptoms of disorientation would arise minutes after awareness of low blood sugar, leaving sufficient time to pull over.

The court held the accused’s conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent driver and found him guilty of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, but acquitted him of failing to stop.