Mohamed M. Salama

In a constitutional compliance review arising from Robinson-Superior Treaty augmentation litigation, the moving parties challenged both the Crown's engagement process and the compensation amount set after negotiations failed.

The court held that although aspects of engagement, including late disclosure of reliance on per-capita benchmarking against a related treaty settlement, caused serious relational harm, the reviewing role required deference to a range of honourable discretionary outcomes.

Applying a sui generis review framework grounded in honour of the Crown and reconciliatory justice, the court concluded the Crown's ultimate compensation determination of $3.6 billion plus agreed costs was justified in the legal and factual context.

The court therefore declined to intervene in the compensation decision while also addressing allocation issues between federal and provincial Crown responsibility in the reasons.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer sought dismissal of a civil claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff had commenced a second action alleging negligence by the OCL arising from a prior family law proceeding, after a substantially identical claim had already been dismissed under the same rule.

The court found the negligence claim untenable because the OCL owed no duty of care to the plaintiff and, even if it did, the Divisional Court had already found no breach of the standard of care.

The claim was dismissed as an abuse of process and as duplicative of matters previously decided.

The appellant, a registered career college, appealed a Notice of Proposal to revoke its registration under the Ontario Career Colleges Act, 2005.

The Superintendent proposed revocation on the basis that the appellant failed to provide refunds to students after its Diagnostic Medical Sonography program was revoked and lost accreditation.

The Tribunal found that the appellant ignored written demands for refunds from students for over ten months, causing them financial and emotional distress.

The Tribunal concluded that the appellant's refusal to comply with the refund requirements of Ontario Regulation 415/06 demonstrated that it would not operate the college in accordance with the law and with integrity and honesty.

The Tribunal declined to impose the appellant's proposed conditions and directed the Superintendent to carry out the proposal to revoke the registration.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of appeals by the Attorney General of Ontario, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, the Town of South Bruce Peninsula, Alberta Lemon, and the Estate of Barbara Twining, and the allowance of the cross-appeal by the Attorney General of Canada and His Majesty the King in Right of Canada.

The Court orders the Town and the Families to pay costs to the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and the Town to pay costs to Canada, finding the amounts sought reasonable in light of the complexity and significance of the appeal.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and facing a joint judge-and-jury trial with a co-accused, sought a Rowbotham order after legal aid funding had been denied.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish the second precondition because proceeds from the sale of her home had not been pursued to fund the defence.

The application for state-funded counsel was therefore denied.

However, given the complexity of the anticipated trial, the accused's language and mobility limitations, the presence of a co-accused, and expected voluntariness and Charter motions, the court appointed amicus with an expanded adversarial mandate in the interests of justice.

The parties requested on consent to amend the procedural order to change the hearing start date from June 15, 2025, to November 24, 2025.

The Ontario Land Tribunal granted the request and ordered the hearing to commence on the new date, with all other aspects of the procedural order remaining the same.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that approximately 1.4 miles of coastline (the Disputed Beach) forms part of the Saugeen Indian Reserve No. 29 under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The trial judge found that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty and acted dishonourably when a surveyor improperly excluded the beach from the reserve boundaries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of treaty interpretation principles or her assessment of the historical record.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to deny the bona fide purchaser for value defence to private landowners, prioritizing the First Nation's constitutionally protected treaty rights.

A cross-appeal by Canada regarding the allocation of pre-Confederation liability was allowed and referred to the next phase of the trial.

The Ontario Land Tribunal issued a procedural order on consent of the parties to govern the proceedings leading up to a 10-day hearing scheduled to commence on June 16, 2025, regarding a land compensation claim under the Expropriations Act.

The applicant sought full recovery or substantial indemnity costs following a family law decision.

The respondents sought full recovery costs or no costs, citing limited means and divided success.

The court found the applicant was substantially successful despite divided success on an access order.

Taking into account the financial resources of one respondent and the limited role of the other, the court awarded the applicant $5,000 in inclusive costs, apportioned between the two respondents.

The Applicant and Respondent A. S. Tsinoglou brought cross-motions concerning interim child support, spousal support, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, interim access, and return of belongings.

The court addressed these issues prior to a case conference due to urgency and hardship.

The court found Santiago and Alejandra to be children of the marriage for interim child support purposes, awarded interim child and spousal support to the Applicant, and granted her exclusive possession of the matrimonial home (a leasehold interest) and maintenance payments from A. S. Tsinoglou.

Interim access was granted to A. S. Tsinoglou for Christian, and he was permitted to retrieve belongings.

The applicant, facing charges related to child pornography, brought a s. 8 Charter application (voir dire) to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, raising seven objections.

The court found two breaches of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights: the police obtained subscriber data without prior judicial authorization (a Spencer breach), and the search warrant was facially defective due to the absence of a judicially authorized appendix listing the items to be seized.

The court dismissed the remaining five objections, including arguments regarding the privacy interest in GUIDs, the adequacy of the ITO's explanation of GUIDs, the sufficiency of subscriber information to establish reasonable grounds, the misleading nature of the ITO, and the necessity of a second warrant for computer searches under R. v. Vu.

The matter was set for s. 24(2) submissions to determine the admissibility of the seized evidence.

Jordan McPhee pleaded guilty to sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and robbery.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation.

The court, considering McPhee's criminal record, a subsequent aggravated assault conviction, and a psychiatric risk assessment, found him to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of six years imprisonment (less pre-sentence custody) followed by a ten-year Long Term Supervision Order, with specific recommendations for conditions to the parole board.

Constable Robert Harris was charged with careless use of a firearm contrary to section 86 of the Criminal Code after firing his service weapon twice at a fleeing suspect during a high-speed pursuit.

Harris believed a female passenger was being dragged or run over by the suspect's tow truck when he discharged his weapon.

The court found that Harris's belief was reasonable under the circumstances, though ultimately incorrect, and that his response was proportionate to that belief.

The defendant was acquitted.