Michael John Beggs

On a statutory appeal under the Indian Act, the Registrar had removed the appellant's predecessors from the Indian Register on the basis that their 19th-century ancestor was lawfully withdrawn from treaty by the head of his family and validly received Metis scrip, disqualifying his descendants from registration.

The appeal judge reversed the Registrar, holding that the pre-1888 version of s. 13 did not permit a minor to be withdrawn from treaty along with the family head, and that the Registrar made palpable and overriding errors regarding the ancestor's age and an alleged scrip fraud.

A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the text, context, and purpose of the 1886 withdrawal provision showed Parliament intended minor children to be withdrawn automatically when the family head withdrew, and that the factual findings on fraud and age were not affected by palpable and overriding error.

The majority restored the Registrar's decision.

One judge dissented, concluding that the formalities requirements in the 1886 provision connoted legal capacity, barred withdrawal of minors, and that any ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the descendant.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of appeals by the Attorney General of Ontario, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, the Town of South Bruce Peninsula, Alberta Lemon, and the Estate of Barbara Twining, and the allowance of the cross-appeal by the Attorney General of Canada and His Majesty the King in Right of Canada.

The Court orders the Town and the Families to pay costs to the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and the Town to pay costs to Canada, finding the amounts sought reasonable in light of the complexity and significance of the appeal.

The Attorney General of Canada sought summary judgment to dismiss a claim by Atikameksheng Anishnawbek First Nation, arguing that their request to re-delineate reserve boundaries constituted a collateral attack and abuse of process on a 1889 judgment (Francis).

The First Nation argued the Francis decision was unfair as they were not an equal party.

The court dismissed Canada's motion, exercising its residual discretion to allow the claim to proceed to trial, emphasizing that while re-litigation doctrines are important, justice and reconciliation, particularly for Indigenous rights, can override them when there was a structural unfairness in prior proceedings.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation, having been entirely successful in the liability phase of a bifurcated proceeding concerning the status of the "Disputed Beach" as reserve land, sought costs.

This endorsement addresses the costs awards and apportionment among the multiple defendants.

The court awarded Saugeen their costs on a partial indemnity scale, totaling $3,221,802.54, on a joint and several liability basis.

These costs were apportioned for indemnification purposes among Canada (10%), Ontario (40%), and the Town of South Bruce Peninsula (50%).

Additionally, the court granted Canada a Sanderson order, requiring the Town to pay Canada $470,000 in partial indemnity costs, recognizing Canada's success on the essential issue of the reserve boundary location.

The Town's claim for costs against Canada was dismissed.

This costs endorsement addresses the entitlement of the Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation and Saugeen First Nation (SON) to costs from Ontario following a partially successful appeal.

SON had sued Canada and Ontario for Aboriginal title to submerged lands and for breaches of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal allowed SON’s title claim appeal to the extent of remitting the matter back to the trial judge for a determination on a more limited portion of the claim area, while dismissing their treaty claim appeal.

SON had settled costs with Canada and was not seeking costs for the treaty claim.

The court found that SON was the overall successful party on the title claim appeal against Ontario, as they obtained the relief sought (remittal), and Ontario's position was to dismiss the claim entirely.

The quantum of costs sought by SON was deemed reasonable given the complexity and public importance of the appeal.

The appellants, the Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation and the Saugeen First Nation, appealed the dismissal of their claim for Aboriginal title to submerged lands in Lake Huron and Georgian Bay, and their claim for breach of fiduciary duty regarding the Crown's failure to protect their lands from settler encroachment under Treaty 45 ½.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the broad Aboriginal title claim but remitted the matter to determine if title could be established over a smaller, specific area.

The Court affirmed that the Crown breached its treaty promise and the honour of the Crown by failing to diligently protect the lands, but agreed no fiduciary duty was owed.

The Court also allowed the municipalities' cross-appeal, dismissing the action against them on the basis that a constructive trust over municipal roads was an inappropriate remedy.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for judgment in a land claim case.

Following an earlier declaration that a substantial portion of Sauble Beach was reserved for the sole use and benefit of the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and forms part of Saugeen Indian Reserve No. 29, the court considered whether to grant a life interest in certain 'Disputed Lots' to current family title owners (Landowners).

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and Canada opposed this.

The court determined it lacked jurisdiction to impose a proprietary interest contrary to the Indian Act and Constitution Act, as reserve land is inalienable.

It also found that granting such an interest would not advance reconciliation.

Consequently, the temporary delay in the original declaration that no third parties have an interest in the land was terminated, making the declaration effective immediately.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation brought an action seeking a declaration that a 1.4-mile strip of Sauble Beach (the Disputed Beach) is part of their unsurrendered reserve land under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The court found that the Imperial Crown's surveyor, Charles Rankin, improperly marked the northern terminus of the reserve's eastern boundary further south than the Treaty stipulated, depriving the First Nation of the promised coastline.

The court held that the Imperial Crown and the federal Crown breached their sui generis fiduciary duties and acted inconsistently with the honour of the Crown by failing to properly survey, protect, and preserve the reserve.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the First Nation's claim was defeated by Crown patents, the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Limitations Act, laches, dedication, or proprietary estoppel.

The court declared that the Disputed Beach remains unsurrendered reserve land for the sole use and benefit of the First Nation.

This decision addresses a motion for intervener status in an appeal concerning novel issues of Aboriginal title to submerged lands and the public right of navigation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted intervener status to four Indigenous communities, finding they could make a useful contribution to the appeal.

The order stipulated that interveners could not raise new issues and that affidavits filed in support of the motions were for contextual purposes only, not for adjudicative facts.

This is an appeal management endorsement providing directions for an appeal concerning the determination of the Missanabie Cree population for Treaty 9 reserve entitlement.

The endorsement addresses issues with exhibit books, factum lengths, electronic document formats, a timetable for materials, motions for leave to intervene, oral hearing compendia, and sets a hearing length and date.

It also provides general notice for intervention motions.

The Saugeen Ojibway Nation (SON) brought two actions against the Crown and several municipalities.

In the Aboriginal Title Claim, SON sought a novel declaration of Aboriginal title to a large portion of the submerged lands in Lake Huron and Georgian Bay.

The court dismissed this claim, finding that while SON had a spiritual connection to the water and relied on fishing, they did not establish sufficient and exclusive physical occupation of the claimed submerged lands at the time of British sovereignty in 1763.

In the Treaty Claim, SON alleged that the Crown breached Treaty 45½ (1836) by failing to protect the Bruce Peninsula from settler encroachments, and breached duties during the negotiation of Treaty 72 (1854).

The court found that the Crown breached the honour of the Crown by failing to diligently fulfill its promise to protect the Peninsula from squatters, and by inappropriate conduct during the August 1854 treaty negotiations.

However, the court dismissed the claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

The court also declared that Treaty 72 did not extinguish SON's harvesting rights, which continue on unsold lands and on sold lands where the use is not incompatible with harvesting.

Property-specific remedies and defences were deferred to a second phase of the trial.

The applicant, a reserve retailer, sought judicial review of a First Nation Council's decision to allocate tax-exempt cigarettes to another business, arguing the business was not located on the reserve.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing.

The applicant failed to show a causal relationship between the alleged prejudice and the challenged action, and the issue raised was not a serious justiciable issue affecting the public interest.

The plaintiff First Nation brought an action against Canada and Ontario for failing to set aside a reserve for them under Treaty No. 9 in 1906.

The parties agreed that a reserve should have been set aside.

The threshold issue at trial was determining the 'crystallization date'—the point in time at which the band's population should be assessed to calculate the size of the reserve.

The plaintiffs argued the population should be determined as of the date the reserve is actually set aside or the date of the court's declaration.

The Crown argued the population should be determined as of the date the treaty was made.

The court held that the common intention of the parties, based on the text of the treaty and its historical context, was that reserves were to be set aside and sized according to the population at the time the treaty was made.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 30.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order compelling the defendant to disclose a specific PhD thesis and other 'secondary sources' not included in the defendant's affidavit of documents.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that the thesis was relevant to any matter in issue or that any specific relevant documents had been omitted.

The court also held that ordering disclosure of documents consulted by the defendant's legal team would infringe litigation privilege.

The plaintiff First Nation, located in Quebec, commenced an action in Ontario against the federal Crown and two third-party managers for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation regarding the management of its funding.

The defendants moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction.

The court applied the real and substantial connection test and section 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding that the substance of the claims arose in Quebec where the alleged failures and losses were experienced.

The motion was granted and the action was stayed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order granting advance costs to plaintiffs in treaty land entitlement litigation involving the size of a reserve under Treaty 9.

The motion judge had found the plaintiffs met the Supreme Court of Canada test for advance costs and ordered the costs initially shared between the federal and provincial defendants, subject to later adjustment.

The court held there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s application of the three‑part test for advance costs or her discretionary decision to award them.

The allocation of costs between the governmental defendants was reasonable at this preliminary stage.

Leave to appeal was denied because the issues were fact‑driven and did not raise matters of public importance or legal development.

Following a prior decision in favour of the plaintiffs on a motion, the court addressed the quantum of costs payable.

The plaintiffs sought approximately $174,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, while the federal defendant argued that $75,000 was reasonable.

The court considered the substantial evidentiary record, the importance of the motion, and the extensive preparation required to establish a meritorious claim related to Indigenous rights litigation.

Balancing these factors, the court fixed costs at $125,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The costs award remained subject to possible re‑adjustment between the governmental defendants at trial.

The appellant First Nation enacted its own labour relations code after a union was certified to represent workers at a casino located on its reserve.

The appellant argued that its code displaced the provincial Labour Relations Act based on its aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish an aboriginal practice, custom, or tradition that supported the right to enact a labour relations code.

The Court also held that the Crown did not breach its duty to consult and accommodate, as the appellant's claim was not sufficiently credible and the appellant had taken unilateral action.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application seeking a declaration that certain lands in Ontario are not public lands available for disposition or regulation by the Crown.

The motion judge struck the application on the basis that the courts lack authority to adjudicate challenges to Canada's sovereignty.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the appellant's claim amounted to a challenge to sovereign jurisdiction, and dismissed the appeal.