Dona Maria Hoe Yin Salmon

Nine parties brought motions to intervene in an action concerning the interpretation of the Robinson Huron Treaty and the boundaries of the plaintiff's reserve lands.

Eight of the proposed intervenors were neighbouring First Nations who are also signatories to the Treaty, while the ninth was an unincorporated litigation trust.

The Superior Court of Justice granted party intervenor status to the eight First Nations, finding they had a direct interest in the boundary dispute and could provide useful context without overwhelming the plaintiff's case.

The court imposed strict conditions on their participation to prevent undue delay.

The motion by the litigation trust was dismissed, as it was not a rights-holder itself and its participation would be duplicative and unduly prejudicial to the plaintiff.

The Attorney General of Canada sought summary judgment to dismiss a claim by Atikameksheng Anishnawbek First Nation, arguing that their request to re-delineate reserve boundaries constituted a collateral attack and abuse of process on a 1889 judgment (Francis).

The First Nation argued the Francis decision was unfair as they were not an equal party.

The court dismissed Canada's motion, exercising its residual discretion to allow the claim to proceed to trial, emphasizing that while re-litigation doctrines are important, justice and reconciliation, particularly for Indigenous rights, can override them when there was a structural unfairness in prior proceedings.

This is an appeal from a decision dismissing an action for abuse of process due to the appellant's failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement.

The appellant, Skymark Finance Corporation, entered into Minutes of Settlement with a key defendant, Lorraine Smith, which fundamentally altered the litigation dynamics by changing an adversarial relationship into a cooperative one.

Skymark failed to disclose this agreement for eight months, only doing so after being threatened with an abuse of process motion.

The motion judge stayed the action, and the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, reiterating the strict obligation for immediate disclosure of such agreements and confirming that the absence of prejudice does not excuse non-compliance.

This appeal concerned proposed class actions against auto insurers for improperly deducting HST from statutory accident benefits (SABs) and against the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) for alleged regulatory failures.

The motion judge had dismissed claims against insurers due to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, but allowed claims against FSCO to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction over SAB disputes and affirming the court's jurisdiction over tort claims against the regulator.

The court also refused leave to appeal the motion judge's costs order, finding it within his discretion.

Following a jurisdiction motion where the defendant insurers successfully argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the proposed class actions, the insurers sought costs of approximately $620,000.

The court found this request preposterous and excessive, fixing costs payable by the plaintiffs to the 13 non-settling insurers at $28,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The costs payable by the government regulator to the plaintiffs were settled at $12,500.

The plaintiffs filed proposed class actions against 15 auto insurers and the provincial regulator, FSCO, alleging improper deduction of HST from statutory accident benefits.

The defendant insurers brought motions to dismiss the actions for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) has exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes.

The court agreed, dismissing the actions against the insurers and refusing to approve two early settlements, as the claims fell squarely within the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction under s. 280 of the Insurance Act.

However, the court found it had jurisdiction to hear the claims against FSCO for regulatory negligence, as those allegations did not directly concern benefit entitlements or amounts.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision that a single notice letter satisfied the 60-day notice requirement under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act for 15 separate class actions.

The actions alleged the Crown failed to enforce HST guidelines against automobile insurers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the notice letter communicated a broad complaint on behalf of a defined class and fulfilled the legislative purpose of allowing the Crown to investigate and prepare for litigation, even though 15 separate actions with different representative plaintiffs were ultimately commenced.

The Crown and the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) brought motions to transfer four related Small Claims Court actions to the Superior Court of Justice.

The self-represented plaintiffs, former employees affected by a 1998 pension divestment, opposed the transfer.

The court applied the factors from Farlow v. Hospital for Sick Children, balancing the complexity of issues, need for expert evidence, and discovery against access to justice concerns.

The court concluded that the moving parties failed to demonstrate that the claims could not be fairly and justly resolved in the Small Claims Court, and dismissed the motions.

The applicant pharmacy sought judicial review of a decision by the executive officer of the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care terminating its billing privileges under the Ontario Drug Benefit Program due to overbilling.

The pharmacy argued the executive officer only had the power to suspend, not terminate, privileges under the statute, and alleged procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the executive officer's decision to revoke privileges was reasonable, within her authority, and procedurally fair.

The Attorney General of Ontario moved to dismiss 14 proposed class actions against the Crown (specifically, former and current FSCO superintendents Philip Howell and Brian Mills) for non-compliance with the 60-day notice requirement under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The plaintiffs had filed 15 class actions alleging that auto insurers failed to comply with FSCO guidelines regarding HST calculation in SABS benefits, and that the FSCO superintendents failed to enforce these guidelines.

The Crown argued that a single notice, the 'Ralston Notice,' was insufficient for the 14 subsequent actions as it did not name all representative plaintiffs.

Applying the 'legislative purpose' approach from Mattick Estate, the court found the Ralston Notice sufficient, as it communicated a complaint reasonably anticipated to result in litigation and provided enough particulars for the Crown to investigate.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the 14 actions were permitted to proceed.

The applicant filed a human rights application against multiple respondents, alleging discrimination and reprisal on various grounds.

The allegations primarily related to child protection proceedings, medical treatment, and benefit entitlements spanning several years.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application in its entirety, finding that the allegations either had no reasonable prospect of success, fell outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction, or had been appropriately dealt with in other proceedings.

The applicant retailer sought a temporary stay of a six‑month prohibition order issued under the Smoke Free Ontario Act preventing the sale of tobacco products following two convictions for selling tobacco to minors.

The motion was brought pending appeals and an intended judicial review raising issues of procedural fairness, constitutional validity, and Charter rights.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test for interlocutory relief, the court held that no serious issue to be tried was established because the prohibition was mandatory once two convictions occurred and involved no discretionary decision subject to review.

The court further found that the alleged financial losses were purely monetary and did not constitute irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured the public interest in protecting minors from tobacco access.

The applicants obtained a $1.5 million judgment against the respondent and sought to enforce a $350,000 mortgage he had placed on a property to secure the debt.

The respondent held the property as an estate trustee for his mother's estate, with himself and his two brothers as equal beneficiaries.

One brother brought a counter-application claiming sole ownership of the property based on an oral agreement with their late mother.

The court dismissed the counter-application, finding the oral agreement void under the Statute of Frauds and that the property interests had vested in the three brothers.

The court held the mortgage was valid but only enforceable against the respondent's one-third interest in the property, and granted the applicants the right to seek partition and sale.

The appellants were sued by a credit union for monies owed under a credit facility after an employee stole $30 million.

The appellants counterclaimed against the regulators, FSCO and DICO, seeking contribution and indemnity on the basis that they negligently failed to oversee the credit union.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the counterclaim, finding that FSCO is not an entity capable of being sued, DICO is protected by statutory immunity, and the appellants had no tenable claim for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act because they were not tortfeasors.

The Minister of Finance appealed a Superior Court decision regarding a tax assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the appeal judge's conclusion that the taxpayer was wholly-owned at the time of the transfer of tangible property within the meaning of Regulation 1013.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The respondent architectural firm produced volumes of blueprints and specifications, which it purchased from a third-party duplicator and distributed to contractors.

The Minister of Finance denied a retail sales tax exemption, arguing the volumes were not 'published' to the general public and were not 'solely' for a technical purpose due to the firm's commercial intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Minister's appeal, holding that distribution to a targeted audience satisfies the publication requirement and that the technical purpose is determined by the content of the books, not the producer's commercial intention.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision entitling the respondent corporation to defer land transfer tax on the acquisition of properties from a related company.

The deferment depended on whether the two companies were 'affiliates' controlled by the same person under the Land Transfer Tax Act.

While the companies were under the de facto control of the same individual, they were not under the same de jure control.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory definition of control is exhaustive and requires de jure control.

The appeal was allowed and the Minister's decision denying the deferment was restored.

The Minister of Finance appealed a trial judge's decision allowing FCMI Financial Corporation's appeal of capital tax reassessments for the years 1984 to 1989.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that FCMI was entitled to use its own fiscal year end to calculate its share of a partnership's paid-up capital, could retroactively reduce its earned surplus based on unpaid income tax reassessments, and could rely on a revised financial statement to correct an error in its 1989 return.

The appellant appealed a decision affirming the Minister of Finance's assessment of retail sales tax.

The appellant argued its boats were exempt under the Retail Sales Tax Act as they operated for 'commercial purposes' providing public transportation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the boats operated primarily for tourist purposes, such as glass-bottom shipwreck tours, rather than transportation.

The court also rejected the argument that refitting expenses were exempt capital costs, noting the tax applies to tangible personal property regardless of capital purpose.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its summary judgment motion and its appeal of a land transfer tax assessment by the Minister of Finance.

The dispute involved whether a transfer of land under a power of sale constituted a transfer from a trustee to another trustee, which would reduce the tax payable.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge correctly dismissed the summary judgment motion but erred in dismissing the appeal itself, as the factual context, beneficial ownership, and statutory interpretation required a full trial.