Glenn Frelick

This appeal concerned proposed class actions against auto insurers for improperly deducting HST from statutory accident benefits (SABs) and against the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) for alleged regulatory failures.

The motion judge had dismissed claims against insurers due to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, but allowed claims against FSCO to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction over SAB disputes and affirming the court's jurisdiction over tort claims against the regulator.

The court also refused leave to appeal the motion judge's costs order, finding it within his discretion.

The Attorney General of Ontario moved to dismiss 14 proposed class actions against the Crown (specifically, former and current FSCO superintendents Philip Howell and Brian Mills) for non-compliance with the 60-day notice requirement under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The plaintiffs had filed 15 class actions alleging that auto insurers failed to comply with FSCO guidelines regarding HST calculation in SABS benefits, and that the FSCO superintendents failed to enforce these guidelines.

The Crown argued that a single notice, the 'Ralston Notice,' was insufficient for the 14 subsequent actions as it did not name all representative plaintiffs.

Applying the 'legislative purpose' approach from Mattick Estate, the court found the Ralston Notice sufficient, as it communicated a complaint reasonably anticipated to result in litigation and provided enough particulars for the Crown to investigate.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the 14 actions were permitted to proceed.

The appellants purchased land near Sturgeon Lake and commissioned a survey indicating their property abutted land owned by the Long Beach Residents' Association.

They claimed that a portion of Long Beach's land between their property and the lake shore was originally part of their parcel and should be conveyed to them.

The application judge dismissed their claim, finding that Long Beach's property was originally a water lot conveyed to the federal government and that fill was deposited to construct a wharf, moving the shoreline eastward.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding the factual findings well-grounded in evidence and that survey monuments supported the boundary determination.

The court also dismissed the appellants' riparian rights claim, finding any such rights would have been extinguished under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The applicant sought an order declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act after the respondent initiated numerous civil, administrative, regulatory, and private criminal proceedings arising from the refusal of the Ministry of the Attorney General to reimburse legal fees incurred in defending withdrawn criminal charges.

The court reviewed the respondent’s litigation history, including unsuccessful human rights complaints, Small Claims actions, private criminal informations, and professional complaints against opposing counsel and decision-makers.

Applying established criteria for vexatious proceedings, the court concluded the respondent persistently instituted meritless proceedings, pursued improper purposes, repeatedly re-litigated determined issues, and failed to pay multiple costs awards.

The court held that these actions constituted an abuse of the court’s processes and justified a vexatious litigant designation.

The respondent was ordered to obtain leave of the Superior Court before instituting or continuing any civil proceedings, but the request to impose a similar restriction on private criminal prosecutions was denied.