Leola Pon

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

A preliminary hearing was scheduled by teleconference, and notice was properly served on the applicant.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing and did not communicate with the Tribunal to explain the absence.

Consequently, the application was dismissed as abandoned.

The applicant, a teacher, filed an application alleging that the respondent school board reprised against him for reporting a colleague's improper conduct.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success and whether the applicant should be declared a vexatious litigant.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the alleged retaliation did not constitute a reprisal under section 8 of the Human Rights Code, as the applicant had not claimed or enforced a right under the Code.

The Tribunal declined to declare the applicant a vexatious litigant, finding insufficient evidence of vexatious conduct.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal by the respondents.

The last alleged incident occurred on June 26, 2013, but the application was filed on June 27, 2014, one day outside the one-year limitation period under section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The respondents requested the application be dismissed on a preliminary basis.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to provide any explanation for the delay and therefore did not establish that the delay was incurred in good faith under section 34(2).

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a Form 10 Request to reactivate his human rights application, which had been deferred pending the conclusion of his union grievance process.

The Tribunal found that the union had denied the applicant's appeal and would not be proceeding with the grievance.

As the grievance was no longer proceeding, the Tribunal ordered the application reactivated and directed the respondents to file their responses.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The organizational respondent had terminated the applicant's employment, and the applicant's union filed a grievance seeking damages for human rights breaches.

The union later withdrew the grievance, but the applicant appealed that decision.

The Tribunal deferred the human rights application pending the determination of the applicant's appeal to the union and the potential completion of the grievance process, noting the substantial overlap between the facts and issues in both proceedings.

The applicant filed a third human rights application against the respondents, raising essentially the same allegations of discrimination and reprisal that had been dismissed in two previous applications.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed as an abuse of process and that the applicant be declared a vexatious litigant.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was attempting to re-litigate the same issues, which constituted an abuse of process.

Furthermore, given the applicant's persistent filing of the same application without reasonable grounds and her refusal to pursue judicial review, the Tribunal declared her a vexatious litigant and required her to obtain permission before filing future applications against the respondents.

The applicant filed a second human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of family status, marital status, and reprisal, raising essentially the same allegations as a previous application that had been dismissed by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to determine whether the second application should be dismissed.

The Tribunal found that permitting the applicant to re-litigate the same allegations in a second application would violate the principles of judicial economy, consistency, and finality, and dismissed the application as an abuse of process.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the grounds of family status, marital status, and reprisal, following her termination.

The respondents requested the application be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing the substance of the application had already been dealt with in an Employment Standards Act proceeding.

The Tribunal found that the Ontario Labour Relations Board had heard evidence and rendered decisions on the same facts and issues, including the applicant's concerns about overtime and her termination.

Applying the principles from Figliola, the Tribunal concluded the other proceeding appropriately dealt with the substance of the application and dismissed it.

The applicant, a student in an ESL program, alleged discrimination on the basis of age and reprisal after complaining about class size and his teacher.

At a summary hearing, the applicant sought to amend his application to add place of origin as a ground of discrimination.

The Tribunal denied the amendment, finding the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The Tribunal also dismissed the application in its entirety, finding no reasonable prospect of success as the applicant had no evidence linking his treatment to his age, and the alleged reprisal did not stem from the assertion of human rights.

The applicant, an employee with a mobility-related disability, sought an interim remedy to park in contractor spaces at the rear of the respondent's building pending the hearing of his human rights application.

The respondent had offered accommodation allowing the applicant to park in handicapped spaces or the closest available guest parking space.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for an interim remedy, finding that the medical evidence did not support the applicant's assertions regarding the harm of not receiving his preferred parking spot, and the balance of harm or convenience did not favour granting the request.

The appellant First Nation enacted its own labour relations code after a union was certified to represent workers at a casino located on its reserve.

The appellant argued that its code displaced the provincial Labour Relations Act based on its aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish an aboriginal practice, custom, or tradition that supported the right to enact a labour relations code.

The Court also held that the Crown did not breach its duty to consult and accommodate, as the appellant's claim was not sufficiently credible and the appellant had taken unilateral action.