Jeffrey Haylock

The appellant landlord appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim for prospective rent after terminating a commercial lease for the tenant's default.

The motion judge interpreted the lease as limiting the landlord's recovery upon termination to arrears and a fixed penalty, finding that the lease's reference to "any other remedies available at law or in equity" did not preserve a right to prospective damages that was explicitly precluded later in the same provision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the interpretation, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error, and dismissed the appellant's additional claims for pool removal costs, maintenance expenses, and costs on the motion below.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order dismissing her request for an extension of time to cross-appeal a Divisional Court decision that had upheld the Law Society of Ontario's invalidation of her barrister examination result as procedurally fair and reasonable.

The moving party had been among candidates whose exam results were voided following an investigation into widespread cheating.

The panel held that the motion judge made no error in finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the procedural protections sought were ancillary to a right to a hearing that this court had previously held was not required, and candidates receiving a lesser sanction could not be accorded greater procedural fairness than those who faced more serious sanctions.

The motion was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect a cross-appeal against a Divisional Court decision regarding the Law Society of Ontario's voiding of licensing exam results and registrations following a security breach.

The Court of Appeal had previously upheld the LSO's decision to void registrations as procedurally fair, finding the decision to be administrative rather than adjudicative in nature.

The moving party sought to challenge the fairness of the voiding of her barrister exam result and the LSO's failure to disclose a key statistical report (the Caveon Report).

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed cross-appeal lacked merit and that the justice of the case did not favour granting an extension of time.

This costs endorsement follows the Law Society of Ontario’s successful motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court orders each of the moving parties severally liable for costs of $200, payable to the Law Society of Ontario, on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant, LAF Canada Company, sought an extension of its lease with the respondent, Woodbine Highway 7 Retail Inc., on the basis that the force majeure clause in the lease was triggered by government-mandated COVID-19 closures.

The court found the case to be on all fours with Niagara Falls Shopping Centre Inc. v. LAF Canada Company, 2023 ONCA 159, and held that the force majeure clause applied, extending the lease by 348 days.

LAF was not required to pay rent during the extension period, having already paid rent during the closure periods.

The court also awarded costs to LAF.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed a motion by 13 respondents to re-open an appeal regarding the Law Society of Ontario’s decision to void their licensing exam results and registrations due to exam integrity breaches.

The court found that the moving parties had not been denied judicial review, that their complaint was about the adequacy of reasons rather than a rare circumstance justifying re-opening, and that the interests of justice did not require reconsideration.

The court held that the Law Society’s actions were consistent with its by-laws and that the moving parties’ arguments had been addressed.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed its administrative decision to void the registrations of 20 licensing candidates implicated in a cheating scandal.

The Divisional Court had found the LSO breached procedural fairness by not holding oral hearings before voiding the registrations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court misapplied the Baker factors and conflated the LSO's administrative licensing functions with its disciplinary good character functions.

The Court held that the written process provided by the LSO, which included disclosure and multiple opportunities to respond, satisfied the duty of procedural fairness.

The Court also admitted new evidence and found the Divisional Court breached procedural fairness by making costs orders without allowing submissions.

Three law firms brought competing carriage motions to represent a class of shareholders of Canopy Growth Corporation in a securities misrepresentation class action.

The court evaluated the competing claims under s. 13.1(4) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court granted carriage to the Dziedziejko action, finding that its longer class period, which included thousands of additional shareholders based on prior financial misrepresentations, better served the goals of access to justice and behaviour modification without sacrificing efficiency.

The competing Leonard and Twidale actions were stayed.

This costs endorsement follows a prior decision where the Court of Appeal allowed the tenant's appeal in part, extending the lease due to government-mandated COVID closures without rent during the extension, but reaffirming the tenant's obligation to pay rent during the closure periods.

The court ordered the tenant (appellant) to pay $20,000 in all-inclusive costs for the appeal, reflecting the divided success.

No costs were awarded for the motions, action, and counterclaim, as both the landlord and tenant experienced mixed success in those matters, and each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

The Landlord, Niagara Falls Shopping Centre Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment against its tenant, LAF Canada Company, for unpaid rent during government-mandated COVID-19 closures.

LAF counterclaimed, seeking rent abatement based on force majeure, frustration of contract, "damage or destruction" under the lease, and unjust enrichment.

The court granted the Landlord's motion, finding that the force majeure clause did not excuse rent payment as financial inability was explicitly excepted and payment could cure the failure to perform.

The frustration defense was rejected because the event was contemplated by the force majeure clause.

The "damage or destruction" claim was dismissed as it required physical alteration to the property, not merely inability to use due to the virus.

The unjust enrichment claim failed as the lease provided a juristic reason for the enrichment.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 49 to enforce a settlement agreement after the defendant failed to make installment payments on time.

The defendant admitted the breach but requested a 30-day extension to raise funds to complete the settlement.

The court declined to delay enforcement, finding no compelling reason to depart from the agreement's terms.

The court granted judgment for the outstanding balance of $400,000, conditional upon the plaintiff transferring its investment units to the defendant upon payment.

The appellant, FCT Insurance Company Ltd., appealed a trial judgment that found FCT responsible for losses sustained by the respondent, John Breen, arising from structural defects in a cottage property for which he had obtained title insurance.

The trial judge found that the defects rendered the title unmarketable and fell within the coverage of the title insurance policy, relying on the principles established in MacDonald v. Chicago Title Insurance Company of Canada.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in applying MacDonald to the facts of this case.

The court distinguished this case on two fundamental grounds: first, Mr. Breen was on notice at the time of purchase of potential problems with the building permit process; and second, even if a final inspection had been conducted, it would not have revealed the hidden construction defects.

The court concluded that the situation involved unmarketability of the land rather than the title, and that title insurance is designed to protect against defects that would be revealed by off-title searches, not hidden defects.

The appeal was allowed and the claim dismissed.

The defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim, Canopy Growth Corporation and Canopy Hemp Corporation ("Canopy"), brought a motion seeking preliminary relief in relation to pending summary judgment motions.

Canopy sought an order adjourning the summary judgment motions, establishing a discovery plan, ordering specific document production, and examinations of non-parties.

The plaintiff and defendants by counterclaim opposed the motion.

The court, applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, found that the summary judgment motions were not simple questions of law and contractual interpretation and that Canopy required some evidence to respond fairly.

The court ordered specific document production from the defendants by counterclaim and examinations of non-parties Vic Neufeld and John Cervini under Rule 39.03, but declined to order a full discovery plan or affidavits of documents.

The court also clarified its lack of jurisdiction to adjourn a judge's summary judgment motion or vary a judge's timetable.

The Ontario government cancelled an electric car subsidy program but extended it for a two-month transition period.

The applicant, Tesla Motors Canada ULC, was explicitly excluded from this transition program by a condition limiting it to "franchised automobile dealerships." Tesla sought judicial review, arguing the exclusion was arbitrary, unlawful, and made for an improper purpose without procedural fairness.

The court found the decision to exclude Tesla was arbitrary, unrelated to the stated policy goal of protecting small to mid-sized dealers, and constituted an egregious exercise of discretion for an improper purpose.

The court quashed the minister's decision to implement the transitional program.

The plaintiff exporter claimed under an accounts receivable insurance policy issued by the defendant for unpaid shipments and demurrage charges.

The defendant indemnified the plaintiff for completely unpaid shipments but denied coverage for partially paid and unreleased shipments, relying on an exclusion clause for changed payment terms and a dispute clause.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found the exclusion clause did not apply as there was no agreement to change payment terms.

However, the court held the dispute clause applied because there were tenable disputes between the plaintiff and the buyer regarding the partially paid and unreleased shipments.

The court also found the defendant was not estopped from relying on the dispute clause and that the policy explicitly excluded demurrage.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

Following dismissal of a motion to extend an interim injunction relating to demolition of a historic school building and the discontinuance of a related judicial review application, a respondent school board sought costs against the applicant.

The applicant argued he was a public interest litigant acting to preserve a heritage building under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs against public interest litigants and applied factors including lack of personal financial interest, the broader public importance of heritage preservation, and the litigant’s good‑faith conduct.

The court concluded the applicant qualified as a public interest litigant and had not acted vexatiously or abusively.

Consistent with the usual approach in public interest litigation, the court declined to order costs.

The plaintiff First Nation, located in Quebec, commenced an action in Ontario against the federal Crown and two third-party managers for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation regarding the management of its funding.

The defendants moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction.

The court applied the real and substantial connection test and section 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding that the substance of the claims arose in Quebec where the alleged failures and losses were experienced.

The motion was granted and the action was stayed.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking orders that her former solicitors personally repay legal fees and indemnify her for costs incurred following the dismissal of her action for delay.

The lawyers admitted responsibility for significant delays that contributed to the dismissal.

The court considered the principles governing personal costs orders against lawyers, emphasizing that such orders must be made sparingly and only in clear cases.

Given the clear admissions of delay and the direct connection between that delay and the costs consequences faced by the plaintiff, the court exercised its discretion to require the lawyers to pay the defendants’ costs of the dismissed action and to reimburse the plaintiff for certain costs awards.

The court declined to order repayment of legal fees, leaving issues of negligence and causation to be determined in a separate solicitor’s negligence action.