Catherine Patricia Coulter

The defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim, Canopy Growth Corporation and Canopy Hemp Corporation ("Canopy"), brought a motion seeking preliminary relief in relation to pending summary judgment motions.

Canopy sought an order adjourning the summary judgment motions, establishing a discovery plan, ordering specific document production, and examinations of non-parties.

The plaintiff and defendants by counterclaim opposed the motion.

The court, applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, found that the summary judgment motions were not simple questions of law and contractual interpretation and that Canopy required some evidence to respond fairly.

The court ordered specific document production from the defendants by counterclaim and examinations of non-parties Vic Neufeld and John Cervini under Rule 39.03, but declined to order a full discovery plan or affidavits of documents.

The court also clarified its lack of jurisdiction to adjourn a judge's summary judgment motion or vary a judge's timetable.

The appellants, former senior employees of the respondent software company, resigned without adequate notice to start a competing business.

They misappropriated confidential technical and business information, successfully targeting the respondent's clients.

The trial judge found them liable for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, and breach of contract, ordering them to disgorge 10 years of profits totaling over $12.3 million, plus full indemnity costs.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the 10-year accounting period, the finding of fiduciary duty for two employees, joint and several liability, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 10-year period reasonable given the highly specialized nature of the software and the time required to develop it.

The respondent's cross-appeal for a permanent injunction was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on insurance evidence, misstated evidence, and improperly admitted cumulative evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's general instructions that the jury was the sole judge of facts and to ignore the insurance evidence were sufficient to prevent prejudice.

The court also found no error in the admission of evidence or the costs award.