Jeffrey Haylock

The appellant appealed a decision ordering her to pay the respondent physiotherapy clinic for unpaid treatment accounts out of her motor vehicle accident settlement.

The appellant argued the matter should have proceeded as an action rather than an application, challenged the factual findings, and argued the interest rate violated the Interest Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the procedural and interest arguments were improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

Furthermore, the court found no material facts in dispute and held that the Interest Act did not apply because the interest rate was governed by the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The plaintiff exporter claimed under an accounts receivable insurance policy issued by the defendant for unpaid shipments and demurrage charges.

The defendant indemnified the plaintiff for completely unpaid shipments but denied coverage for partially paid and unreleased shipments, relying on an exclusion clause for changed payment terms and a dispute clause.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found the exclusion clause did not apply as there was no agreement to change payment terms.

However, the court held the dispute clause applied because there were tenable disputes between the plaintiff and the buyer regarding the partially paid and unreleased shipments.

The court also found the defendant was not estopped from relying on the dispute clause and that the policy explicitly excluded demurrage.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

Following dismissal of a motion to extend an interim injunction relating to demolition of a historic school building and the discontinuance of a related judicial review application, a respondent school board sought costs against the applicant.

The applicant argued he was a public interest litigant acting to preserve a heritage building under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs against public interest litigants and applied factors including lack of personal financial interest, the broader public importance of heritage preservation, and the litigant’s good‑faith conduct.

The court concluded the applicant qualified as a public interest litigant and had not acted vexatiously or abusively.

Consistent with the usual approach in public interest litigation, the court declined to order costs.

The plaintiff First Nation, located in Quebec, commenced an action in Ontario against the federal Crown and two third-party managers for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation regarding the management of its funding.

The defendants moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction.

The court applied the real and substantial connection test and section 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding that the substance of the claims arose in Quebec where the alleged failures and losses were experienced.

The motion was granted and the action was stayed.

The appellant appealed a decision ordering the return of US $250,000 held in trust by the respondent law firm to the respondent client.

The appellant argued the funds were impressed with a trust in its favour and that the application judge erred in denying an adjournment to cross-examine a deponent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of a trust or escrow agreement and concluding the appellant had ample opportunity to cross-examine prior to the hearing but made a tactical decision not to do so.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing her action for delay.

The action had been struck from the trial list due to the inaction of her first lawyer, and a subsequent motion to restore it was delayed by her second lawyer, who concealed his neglect from her.

On appeal, the Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence detailing the second lawyer's neglect.

The court found the Master made reversible errors by inferring intentional delay without considering the appellant's instructions to her lawyers, and by presuming prejudice due to the expiry of a limitation period.

Applying the conjunctive test from Nissar, the court held the appellant had an acceptable explanation for the delay (solicitor negligence) and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and the action restored to the trial list.

The plaintiff's action was struck from the trial list and subsequently dismissed by a Master due to the inaction of her former counsel.

The plaintiff's second lawyer failed to advise her of the dismissal or her right to appeal.

Upon retaining new counsel, the plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time to file a Notice of Appeal of the Master's order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the delay was attributable to the plaintiff's former counsel and that extending the time would not prejudice the defendants, in accordance with the principle that matters should be determined on their merits.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking orders that her former solicitors personally repay legal fees and indemnify her for costs incurred following the dismissal of her action for delay.

The lawyers admitted responsibility for significant delays that contributed to the dismissal.

The court considered the principles governing personal costs orders against lawyers, emphasizing that such orders must be made sparingly and only in clear cases.

Given the clear admissions of delay and the direct connection between that delay and the costs consequences faced by the plaintiff, the court exercised its discretion to require the lawyers to pay the defendants’ costs of the dismissed action and to reimburse the plaintiff for certain costs awards.

The court declined to order repayment of legal fees, leaving issues of negligence and causation to be determined in a separate solicitor’s negligence action.