Jordan Daniel Moses Diacur

The plaintiff franchisee sued the defendant franchisor for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and conversion following the termination of a franchise agreement for a Wings Up! restaurant.

The franchisee alleged the franchisor failed to provide required training and wrongfully forced a sale of the business.

The court found the franchisee had waived the training and was in material breach of the franchise agreement due to repeated operational and health safety failures.

The court interpreted a Voluntary Surrender Agreement and found it did not require the franchisor to pay off the franchisee's entire bank debt, only the portion related to operational assets.

However, because the franchisor disposed of the operational assets without accounting for the secured creditor's interest, the court awarded the secured creditor $25,000 in damages for conversion.

The plaintiffs sued for breach of an oral profit-sharing agreement related to a federal government contract to supply surgical gowns during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the parties had formed a binding oral contract to collaborate and share net profits on an 80.6/19.4 split, despite the lack of a signed written agreement and the defendant's claim that board approval was required.

The court awarded the plaintiff $10,229,782 in damages, representing 19.4% of the net profits from the gowns contract.

The appellant landlord appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim for prospective rent after terminating a commercial lease for the tenant's default.

The motion judge interpreted the lease as limiting the landlord's recovery upon termination to arrears and a fixed penalty, finding that the lease's reference to "any other remedies available at law or in equity" did not preserve a right to prospective damages that was explicitly precluded later in the same provision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the interpretation, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error, and dismissed the appellant's additional claims for pool removal costs, maintenance expenses, and costs on the motion below.

Ten groups brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning whether a municipal by-law prohibiting individuals from erecting tents or living in public parks violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to seven groups, finding they would provide unique and helpful perspectives on issues such as Charter damages, international human rights standards, and the social context of homelessness.

Leave was denied to three groups whose proposed submissions either expanded the scope of the appeal or duplicated arguments already raised by the parties.

In this contract interpretation dispute, the plaintiff developer (Losani) sought payment from the defendant developer (Tobyn Park Homes) for the defendant's share of infrastructure costs under a Construction and Cost Sharing Agreement.

The central issue was whether interim payments were due upon issuance of Progress Certificates by the consulting engineer, or whether payment could be deferred until the City of Hamilton formally accepted the works as complete.

The court found that the CSA clearly required interim payments within 20 days of each Progress Certificate, and that the External Works Agreement (annexed to the CSA) addressed only the standard for final completion, not the timing of interim payments.

All of Tobyn's payments were late, and interest at 15% per annum, compounded monthly, accrued on all amounts owing.

The appellant City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment finding it and ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc. (AMD) jointly and severally liable for damages arising from periodic flooding of the respondent National Steel Car Limited's industrial property caused by wastewater discharge into a clogged drainage channel.

The trial judge awarded compensatory damages of approximately $5.3 million (apportioned equally between the defendants), punitive damages of $400,000 against the City and $500,000 against AMD, and granted a mandatory injunction requiring remediation and maintenance of the channel.

The City appealed on four grounds: (1) the equal apportionment of liability; (2) failure to find mitigation by National; (3) the punitive damages award; and (4) the terms of the injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal except for a clarification to the injunction language.

The applicant corporation sought an extension of time to perfect an appeal of a trial judgment dated June 27, 2025.

The non-lawyer representative sought leave to represent the corporation pursuant to Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge refused leave to represent the corporation, finding that the representative had repeatedly filed factums containing fabricated legal citations, non-existent cases, miscited authorities, false statutory provisions, and fabricated quotations.

The court held that while access to justice is a relevant consideration, the integrity of the justice system and the undue burden imposed on opposing counsel and the court outweighed such considerations.

The motion for extension of time was adjourned, and the corporation was directed to appoint a lawyer within 30 days or face dismissal of both the motion and the appeal.

The applicant sought to quash a municipal by-law establishing a new municipal accommodation tax on the grounds that it violated the Municipal Act by attempting to repeal a by-law under which a debt had been contracted, and that it was passed in bad faith to vitiate a valid and subsisting agreement.

The court found that the revenue sharing arrangement under the transient accommodation tax did not constitute a debt under the Municipal Act, and that the municipality had not acted in bad faith in passing the new by-law.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the municipality retained the power to enter into agreements with eligible tourism entities and that no exclusivity was granted to the applicant.

A case management conference was held to schedule the next steps in an appeal concerning the eviction of individuals from city parks.

The case management judge set deadlines for perfecting the appeal, filing responding materials, a motion for fresh evidence, and intervention motions.

The judge also granted the parties leave to file factums up to 12,000 words, exceeding the standard limits, due to the extensive evidentiary record involving fourteen appellants.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering it to pay $338,984.20 in unpaid licence fees for sports fields that were closed or restricted due to COVID-19.

The appellant argued the agreements should be interpreted as 'pay-if-available', while the respondent argued payment was required for bargained-for times regardless of use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable errors of law or palpable and overriding errors in her application of contractual interpretation principles.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicants, 14 homeless individuals, sought a declaration that the City of Hamilton's enforcement of its Parks by-law from August 2021 to August 2023 breached their Charter rights under s.7 (life, liberty, security of the person) and s.15 (equality), and sought damages.

The applicants argued they were prevented from staying overnight and forced to move daily due to insufficient accessible shelter beds.

The court found that applicants were not prevented from staying overnight and declined to extend Charter protection to allow indefinite daytime encampments, disagreeing with prior jurisprudence (Victoria v. Adams, Waterloo v. Persons Unknown) on the basis that encampments are inherently dangerous and unsanitary, and the City's actions were not in bad faith.

The court also found no s.15 violation, as homelessness is not an enumerated or analogous ground, and the by-law did not differentially treat disadvantaged groups.

The application was dismissed.

Following a trial where the defendants were found liable in nuisance and negligence for flooding the plaintiff's lands, the parties disagreed on the calculation of prejudgment interest (PJI).

The plaintiff sought PJI based on the Canadian bank prime rate compounded annually, while the defendant argued for the statutory rate under s. 128 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 130 of the Act to award compound interest at the prime rate, finding that the statutory rate would under-compensate the plaintiff and provide an unwarranted financial windfall to the defendants who had avoided maintenance costs for decades.

The plaintiff, National Steel Car Limited, brought an action against the City of Hamilton, ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc., and the Hamilton Port Authority for damages caused by reoccurring flooding to its property from the Kenilworth Avenue Drainage Channel.

The court found the City and AMD liable in nuisance, negligence, and strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher for failing to maintain the channel and altering its flow, which caused substantial and unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's property.

The action against the Hamilton Port Authority was dismissed.

The court awarded the plaintiff over $5.2 million in compensatory damages, granted a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the City and AMD to remediate and maintain the channel, and awarded punitive damages of $500,000 against AMD and $400,000 against the City.

This appeal concerned an estate dispute where the appellant sought to exercise dissent rights under the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) in response to the liquidation of a family-owned holding company.

The application judge found these rights were waived by a Unanimous Shareholders Agreement (USA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the USA's provisions clearly waived dissent rights and that this interpretation was consistent with the company's purpose of managing estate assets.

The Court of Appeal considered whether a beach easement was expressly extinguished by an application to the Registrar of Land Titles.

The lower court had found the deletion was an error and ordered rectification.

The appellate court determined that the application judge erred in law by misinterpreting the application as lacking an express release, despite the dominant owner's clear intent and request to delete the easement.

The appeal was allowed, the rectification order set aside, and the original application dismissed, confirming the easement's extinguishment.

The defendant brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff, a corporation, to post security for costs.

The plaintiff claimed impecuniosity, arguing it had no assets or income.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient disclosure regarding its financial viability and its shareholders' ability to borrow, thus failing to establish impecuniosity.

The court also assessed the merits of the plaintiff's negligence claim, finding it did not have a good chance of success, and considered the defendant's delay in bringing the motion.

Applying a holistic approach, the court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to post $25,000 in security for costs on a partial indemnity scale within 90 days.

PC Forge, a manufacturer of custom forgings, sued BRC Motorsport Inc. for breach of contract and moved for summary judgment.

The parties had an agreement where PC Forge would pre-order raw materials and inventory forgings to reduce lead times, with BRC committing to pay for all purchase orders.

BRC repudiated the contract, failing to pay for a significant portion of ordered and manufactured goods.

The court found a clear contract existed, BRC breached it, and BRC's attempt to rely on unauthenticated terms and conditions was rejected.

The court also found that PC Forge had made reasonable efforts to mitigate its losses.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of PC Forge for damages totaling $205,907.24 plus pre- and post-judgment interest.

The applicant, a common shareholder in a family-owned real estate holding corporation, brought an application seeking dissent rights regarding the sale of corporate assets, an oppression remedy, and the appointment of a liquidator.

The court found that the applicant's dissent rights under the Business Corporations Act had been validly waived by a Unanimous Shareholders Agreement that granted the mother sole discretion to sell assets.

The oppression claim was dismissed as the applicant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of participation or any unfair prejudice.

However, the court ordered the appointment of an independent liquidator to wind up the corporation, finding that the current directors lacked the necessary expertise to manage the complex tax and legal implications of the liquidation.

The plaintiff sought a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring the defendants to remediate a drainage channel that was allegedly causing flooding on its property.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants had obstructed the channel in breach of a municipal by-law and committed nuisance.

The court found a strong prima facie case but dismissed the motion, holding that the balance of convenience did not favour an injunction given the complexity of the required remediation and that the plaintiff's ten-year delay in seeking relief cast doubt on the prospect of irreparable harm.

This appeal concerned the correct approach to defamation and civil conspiracy pleadings in the context of a motion to strike.

The Divisional Court had struck out the defendant's counterclaim, finding it lacked particularity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court misapplied the modern, flexible approach to pleadings and failed to read the pleadings generously.

The Court of Appeal reinstated the motion judge's decision, which had dismissed the motion to strike, emphasizing the high bar for striking pleadings and the deference owed to motion judges.