Greta Ladanyi

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The defendant claimed she did not sign the agreement and was unaware of its terms, particularly that it lacked a financing condition.

The court found the defendant ratified the agreement through her conduct, including paying a deposit, retaining counsel and a mortgage broker, and taking steps toward closing.

The defendant failed to repudiate the agreement before the closing date.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff for the difference in sale price and carrying costs.

The court considered a motion by the moving defendants for an order requiring the plaintiff, River City Christian Reformed Church, to pay security for costs under Rule 56.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation, sought relief for alleged fraud, misrepresentation, breach of duty, oppression, and unjust enrichment relating to a failed property acquisition.

The court found that the plaintiff was impecunious and that its claim was not plainly devoid of merit, and therefore dismissed the motion for security for costs.

The plaintiff, Claire Lesley Crampton, contributed two-thirds of the purchase price for a property in Cayuga, Ontario, with the understanding she would have a corresponding ownership interest, though title was taken in the defendant David Lightfoot’s name alone.

When the relationship between the parties broke down, the plaintiff sought the return of her investment or a declaration of her ownership.

The court found that a resulting trust existed in favour of the plaintiff, entitling her to 66.67% of the property and ordered its sale under the Partition Act.

Following a trial where the defendants were found liable in nuisance and negligence for flooding the plaintiff's lands, the parties disagreed on the calculation of prejudgment interest (PJI).

The plaintiff sought PJI based on the Canadian bank prime rate compounded annually, while the defendant argued for the statutory rate under s. 128 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 130 of the Act to award compound interest at the prime rate, finding that the statutory rate would under-compensate the plaintiff and provide an unwarranted financial windfall to the defendants who had avoided maintenance costs for decades.

The plaintiff, National Steel Car Limited, brought an action against the City of Hamilton, ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc., and the Hamilton Port Authority for damages caused by reoccurring flooding to its property from the Kenilworth Avenue Drainage Channel.

The court found the City and AMD liable in nuisance, negligence, and strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher for failing to maintain the channel and altering its flow, which caused substantial and unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's property.

The action against the Hamilton Port Authority was dismissed.

The court awarded the plaintiff over $5.2 million in compensatory damages, granted a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the City and AMD to remediate and maintain the channel, and awarded punitive damages of $500,000 against AMD and $400,000 against the City.

The plaintiff, Joseph Grimaldi, sued the defendants for wrongful dismissal after being terminated without cause less than five months into his employment as a senior project manager.

Grimaldi claimed entitlement to a payment based on shares in the defendant company as part of his employment contract.

The court interpreted the employment contract, finding that shares would only transfer after five years of service and annual payments were akin to a bonus based on company value.

The court assessed reasonable notice using Bardal factors, finding no inducement or bad faith dismissal.

It determined a reasonable notice period of five months and two weeks.

Grimaldi's claims for annual payment and shares were dismissed due to the notice period not reaching the accrual date and lack of evidence for company valuation.

The claim against the individual defendant, Vince Volpe, was dismissed due to lack of evidence for personal liability.

The plaintiff purchased property from the defendant church to build social housing.

Prior to the sale, the church retained the defendant environmental consultant to conduct a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment.

The consultant's report, which contained a standard disclaimer clause limiting liability to third parties, was provided to the plaintiff by the church without the consultant's knowledge or consent.

After closing, the plaintiff discovered soil contamination and sued the church and the consultant for negligent misrepresentation.

The consultant moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the disclaimer clause effectively excluded any duty of care owed to the plaintiff, and dismissed the action and crossclaims against the consultant.

The appellant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating her tenancy and ordering her eviction for seriously impairing the safety of another person during a physical altercation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's challenges to the Board's evaluation of the evidence were questions of fact, not law.

The Court also held that the Board made no error of law in its analysis under section 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act, as it properly considered the circumstances of both parties before exercising its discretion to grant and briefly postpone the eviction.