Sharon Crowe

Ten groups brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning whether a municipal by-law prohibiting individuals from erecting tents or living in public parks violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to seven groups, finding they would provide unique and helpful perspectives on issues such as Charter damages, international human rights standards, and the social context of homelessness.

Leave was denied to three groups whose proposed submissions either expanded the scope of the appeal or duplicated arguments already raised by the parties.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether it could hear an appeal of two interlocutory orders together with an appeal of a final order in a Charter challenge by 14 unhoused individuals against the City of Hamilton.

The interlocutory orders excluded physician evidence and demographic data relevant to the Charter claims.

The Court held that because the interlocutory and final orders were so interrelated, leave to appeal the interlocutory orders would inevitably have been granted, and thus the appeals could be heard together.

The motion to strike the grounds relating to the interlocutory orders was dismissed.

The court sentenced Daniel Keefe to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 10 years after a jury found him guilty of second degree murder.

The decision reviews the facts of the offence, the impact on the victim’s family, the legal parameters for sentencing, and the positions of Crown and defence.

The court accepted a joint submission for the minimum period of parole ineligibility, citing the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, and absence of aggravating factors.

Ancillary orders were also imposed, including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and non-communication orders.

The decision concerns a defence motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused, Daniel Keefe, argued that the evidence could not support a finding of second degree murder and that only manslaughter should be left to the jury.

The court reviewed the evidence, including witness testimony, the 911 call, and expert pathology evidence, and applied the legal test for a directed verdict.

The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence on which a properly instructed jury could convict of second degree murder, and dismissed the motion.

This direction addresses the admissibility and use of a third video clip in a criminal trial involving Daniel Keefe.

The court considers the relevance and potential prejudice of the video, which depicts an attack by Aiden Cunningham on a third party, and provides guidance on how the jury should be instructed if the attacker is not identified in evidence.

The decision addresses whether the statement made by Daniel Keefe to police was voluntary and whether his section 10(b) Charter rights were breached.

The court found that, although Keefe was advised of his rights and consulted counsel, the circumstances of his detention—including his youth, inexperience, anxiety, lack of medication, and not being told about the recording or use of his statement—meant the Crown did not prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The statement was excluded.

The applicants, 14 homeless individuals, sought a declaration that the City of Hamilton's enforcement of its Parks by-law from August 2021 to August 2023 breached their Charter rights under s.7 (life, liberty, security of the person) and s.15 (equality), and sought damages.

The applicants argued they were prevented from staying overnight and forced to move daily due to insufficient accessible shelter beds.

The court found that applicants were not prevented from staying overnight and declined to extend Charter protection to allow indefinite daytime encampments, disagreeing with prior jurisprudence (Victoria v. Adams, Waterloo v. Persons Unknown) on the basis that encampments are inherently dangerous and unsanitary, and the City's actions were not in bad faith.

The court also found no s.15 violation, as homelessness is not an enumerated or analogous ground, and the by-law did not differentially treat disadvantaged groups.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to admit three videos and the victim's criminal record to support a self-defence claim.

The defence argued this evidence would demonstrate the victim's violent disposition and the reasonableness of the accused's apprehension of violence.

The Crown conceded the admissibility of two videos but opposed the third and the criminal record.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence highly probative of the victim's propensity for violence and the risk of harm perceived by the accused, concluding that its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

This decision concerns a fresh bail application by Daniel Keefe, charged with second-degree murder, following an initial denial.

The Crown conceded a material change in circumstances due to the passage of time.

The court assessed the bail plan against the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code.

The proposed sureties (Keefe's mother and aunt) were found to lack sufficient awareness of their undertaking's gravity, and their proposed plan was deemed unrealistic and inconsistent with information about Keefe's mental health.

The court found a substantial likelihood that Keefe could interfere with the administration of justice and that his release would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the serious charge and the strength of the Crown's case.

The application for bail was dismissed, and Keefe was ordered to remain in detention.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) applied to displace an individual as guardian for property of an elderly person and to compel the individual to repay substantial funds transferred from the elderly person.

The elderly person, suffering from cognitive impairment, had appointed the individual as her attorney for property.

Shortly after, the elderly person transferred significant sums to the attorney and another individual.

The court found that the attorney failed to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust for the funds she received and breached her fiduciary duty by not acting in the elderly person's best interests.

The PGT's application was allowed, terminating the attorney's power of attorney, appointing the PGT as permanent guardian, and ordering the attorney to repay over $334,000.

The applicants, two First Nations, brought a motion seeking an interim order to restrain the four respondent First Nations from distributing funds from their jointly owned corporation, Rainy Lake Tribal Resource Management Inc., to its shareholders.

This motion was brought in connection with an application claiming relief under the oppression remedies of s. 248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The applicants argued that the notice for the shareholders' meeting, which approved the distribution, was inadequate and that the distribution was unfairly prejudicial.

The court applied the traditional three-stage test for interlocutory injunctions, as affirmed in Le Maitre Ltd v. Segeren and Lakhani v. Gilla Enterprises Inc, finding that the applicants failed to establish irreparable harm.

The court noted that the harm complained of was monetary and adequately secured by funds held in trust by the respondents' solicitors, and that the corporation itself had significant remaining funds.

Consequently, the motion for an interim restraining order was dismissed.

This action arose from a motor vehicle accident.

The primary issue at trial was whether the vehicle owner, Crystal Vincent, had given implied consent to Riley Sabourin, an unlicensed driver, to possess her vehicle at the time of the accident.

The court considered the long-term relationship between the defendants, Ms. Vincent's knowledge of Mr. Sabourin's past unauthorized driving, her failure to secure keys, and her general admonishments rather than explicit prohibitions.

The court found that Ms. Vincent failed to discharge her onus to prove lack of implied consent, concluding that Mr. Sabourin was justified in deeming he had implied consent.