Sandra Antoniani

The respondents brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the applicant's application to rectify the parcel register and discharge a charge against his property, arguing the application disclosed no cause of action and was statute-barred.

The court held that Rule 21.01(1)(a) does not apply to applications, and the limitations issue involved mixed fact and law.

While Rule 21.01(1)(b) applies to applications via Rule 14.09, the court found the Notice of Application disclosed a valid cause of action for civil fraud against the moving parties.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff bank in relation to a corporate loan and personal guarantee.

The court applied the test from Mountain View Farms and found that the defendants did not act promptly, having delayed 17 months and made numerous procedural errors.

Furthermore, the defendants failed to establish an arguable defence on the merits, as their arguments regarding interest rates, overdrafts, and guarantees were unsupported by the record.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.

The applicant mortgagor challenged the respondent mortgagee's sale of her residential property under power of sale proceedings, alleging the sale was improvident and that the respondent breached her right of redemption.

The court found that the respondent took reasonable precautions to obtain the true market value in a declining market, actively marketing the property and reasonably accepting the final offer.

The court also held that the applicant's request to complete a conditional sale herself did not constitute a valid tender to exercise the right of redemption.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment relating to a collateral mortgage registered against her properties.

She argued that she was not properly served with the statement of claim under Rule 16.03(5) because she no longer resided at the address where service was attempted, and alternatively, that she met the test for setting aside a default judgment.

The court found that service was non-compliant, entitling the defendant to have the judgment set aside as of right.

The court further held that the defendant met the test for setting aside the judgment, noting her prompt action upon discovery, plausible explanation for default, and arguable defence of fraud and lack of consent due to language and vision impairments.

In this contract interpretation dispute, the plaintiff developer (Losani) sought payment from the defendant developer (Tobyn Park Homes) for the defendant's share of infrastructure costs under a Construction and Cost Sharing Agreement.

The central issue was whether interim payments were due upon issuance of Progress Certificates by the consulting engineer, or whether payment could be deferred until the City of Hamilton formally accepted the works as complete.

The court found that the CSA clearly required interim payments within 20 days of each Progress Certificate, and that the External Works Agreement (annexed to the CSA) addressed only the standard for final completion, not the timing of interim payments.

All of Tobyn's payments were late, and interest at 15% per annum, compounded monthly, accrued on all amounts owing.

The applicants sought approval of a settlement agreement regarding the validity and distribution of the deceased's estate.

The parties agreed that the 2017 will was valid but proposed a distribution that deviated from its terms.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer filed a rejection of settlement on behalf of a minor grandchild who had a potential interest under an earlier will.

The court approved the settlement despite the rejection, finding that Rule 75.07.1 does not grant a non-party absolute veto power over settlement approval, but rather requires the court to consider the non-party's rights when assessing whether the settlement is fair and reasonable.

The appellant appealed a Property Standards Order requiring her to remove interior LED lighting that spilled onto her driveway and into a neighbour's home, causing a nuisance.

The City relied on the 'exterior lighting' provision of its Property Standards By-law.

The court applied the modern principle of statutory interpretation and found that the by-law's exterior lighting provisions apply to any lighting that primarily or significantly impacts the exterior, regardless of the physical location of the electrical source.

The appeal was dismissed and the Order to Comply was confirmed.

The applicant, Berardi Construction, sought to rescind an order to comply issued by the County of Norfolk requiring a building permit for a retaining wall.

The court found that the retaining wall was not a "building" for the purposes of the Building Code Act and that no building permit was required.

The order to comply was rescinded, and the issue of damages was directed to proceed to trial.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment brought by Allstate Insurance Company of Canada to determine whether William Bezemer was at least 1% liable for a motor vehicle accident involving the plaintiff, Charmaine Farrugia.

The accident involved an unidentified third driver, John Doe.

The court found that a third vehicle was involved and that Mr. Bezemer was not negligent, applying the "agony of the moment" doctrine.

The action was dismissed as against Mr. Bezemer, and costs were awarded.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment in a civil action arising from a criminal prosecution for fraud against Anthony Falasca.

The plaintiffs alleged malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance, failure to withdraw the charge, and abuse of process.

The court found that the claims relating to the criminal prosecution, including abuse of process, were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the action was commenced after the expiry of the limitation period.

The court declined to consider the separate abuse of process claim relating to a bankruptcy proceeding, as it was not properly before the court on this motion.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of discoverability and the application of limitation periods in prosecutorial torts.

The decision addresses a pretrial motion regarding the admissibility of bad character evidence about the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The Applicant sought to introduce evidence from Brittany Crozier regarding the complainant’s alleged drug use and trafficking while incarcerated, arguing it was relevant to credibility and reliability.

The court found the evidence to be collateral, of low probative value, and likely to distract and confuse the jury, and excluded it.

The ruling reviews the collateral fact rule and its exceptions, and applies the balancing of probative value versus prejudicial effect.

This decision addresses two pretrial motions: the Crown’s application to admit prior consistent statements of the complainant, and the admissibility of statements from both the complainant and Mr. Burnette as res gestae and, for Mr. Burnette, as after-the-fact conduct.

The court reviews the legal framework for prior consistent statements, the narrative exception, and the admissibility of after-the-fact conduct, ultimately allowing certain narrative evidence and after-the-fact conduct to be admitted, but excluding the audio recording of a prior consistent statement as evidence.

This decision addresses whether compelled statements made by a correctional officer during a disciplinary investigation can be used in a subsequent criminal trial.

The court held that the statements, made under statutory compulsion and in an adversarial context, are excluded from use for any purpose in the criminal proceedings, including for cross-examination on credibility.

The ruling applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. White and R. v. Nedelcu, emphasizing the protection against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The decision addresses whether intercepted telephone communications of a complainant, disclosed to the accused in a sexual assault prosecution, constitute "records" under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code and, if so, whether they are admissible under section 278.92.

The court finds that the intercepted calls are "records" and that limited cross-examination on certain topics (money, parole, and civil action) is permitted, as the probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The ruling clarifies the application of the s. 278 regime to institutional records and the balancing of privacy and fair trial rights.

The plaintiff, Fady Dawood, brought a motion for summary judgment against Popes Property Holdings Inc. (PPH) and Nicholas John Pope, alleging breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The defendants agreed the matter should be resolved by summary judgment and did not oppose judgment against PPH, but Pope sought reverse summary judgment to dismiss the claim against him personally.

The court found PPH liable for the plaintiff’s losses but dismissed the action against Pope, holding that PPH had properly adopted the contract after incorporation and that there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil or impose personal liability on Pope.

The Crown appealed a sentence for sexual assault in which the respondent received a conditional discharge with probation terms including six months of house arrest and electronic monitoring.

The court held the appeal was not moot despite completion of the sentence because entry of a conviction carried continuing consequences.

Applying sentencing appeal principles, the court found the sentencing judge unlawfully used probation as a disguised conditional sentence and gave undue weight to immigration-related collateral consequences, producing a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The appeal was allowed, a conviction was entered, and a four-month conditional sentence was imposed but stayed because the respondent had already completed an equivalent community-based sentence.

The court separately declined to make a SOIRA order under s. 490.012.

The court considered whether to rescind an agreement of purchase and sale for farmland and a residence, where the defendant failed to register a severance as required, preventing the plaintiff from regaining title to the house.

The court found the defendant breached a fundamental condition of the agreement and ordered a new severance application, with rescission as an alternative remedy if the severance could not be obtained.

The court also addressed allocation of severance costs, property taxes, and the removal of a fence.

The court struck Daniel Hartman's claim against the Attorney General of Canada and the Minister of Health, which alleged negligence and misfeasance in public office following the death of his son after receiving a COVID-19 vaccine.

The court found that the government’s public health actions and communications were directed to the public at large and did not create a private law duty of care to individuals.

The claim was dismissed as it was plain and obvious that it could not succeed, even with proposed amendments.

The plaintiffs sought to pursue claims against the defendants in relation to a mortgage enforcement action that had already been decided in favour of the defendants.

The court found that all claims in the current action were either previously adjudicated or could have been raised in the prior proceeding.

The action was dismissed on the basis of issue estoppel, action estoppel, and abuse of process.

The court considered whether Baketree Inc. validly exercised its option to extend a commercial lease with Nico Properties Inc., or whether alleged defaults precluded the extension.

The court found that Baketree met all preconditions for extension, including payment of rent, compliance with lease terms, and maintenance of financial strength.

Even if there had been a default, the court would have granted relief from forfeiture.

However, Baketree lost its right to negotiate a purchase of the property under Schedule E due to prior defaults, and the court declined to grant relief from forfeiture for that right.