Kristine Genevieve Holder

These two appeals arise from a receivership order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge found both the debtor and its management, as well as United Group of Companies and its management, in civil contempt of the receivership and asset recovery orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the motion judge’s reasoning or exercise of discretion, and confirmed the costs awards and sentences imposed.

The plaintiffs (vendors) brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a $50,000 deposit from the defendants (purchasers) after a residential real estate deal failed.

The vendors argued a binding agreement was formed, while the purchasers contended that the vendors' addition of "Schedule B" and requirement for its acknowledgment constituted a counteroffer that was never accepted.

The court applied the test for summary judgment and found that the vendors' actions, including the MLS listing stipulation and the demand for Schedule B to be initialled and signed, indicated they considered Schedule B an essential part of the agreement.

Therefore, the return of the agreement with Schedule B was a counteroffer, which the purchasers did not accept.

The court concluded that no binding contract existed and dismissed the vendors' claim for the deposit.

The plaintiffs and the defendant were 50:50 co-owners of a social media marketing business.

Following a breakdown in their relationship, the defendant locked the plaintiffs out of the business's social media accounts, and the plaintiffs created a copycat account.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for interlocutory mandatory and restrictive injunctions, and the defendant brought a cross-motion for similar relief.

The court ordered the defendant to provide the plaintiffs with the account information and passwords, but otherwise dismissed both the motion and cross-motion, finding that neither party had clean hands and damages would be an adequate remedy.

The plaintiff, Wasiem Diab, sought repayment of $161,000 allegedly loaned to the defendants, George and Haralabos Tsitsos (referred to as Bobby and Georgia), for a property purchase.

The defendants denied an oral loan agreement with Diab, asserting the money came from Kakouli Poka, who later revealed Diab as the source.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing Diab's action.

The court found no direct oral agreement between Diab and Bobby, rejected theories of past consideration and agency, and concluded that the pleadings did not support claims against Georgia or the "primary debtor" theory.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for $78,600, alleging breach of an oral contract to provide immigration services to a third party.

The defendants counterclaimed for unpaid immigration services, an unpaid loan, and unpaid rent.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding his evidence and that of his witnesses lacked credibility and documentary support.

The court also dismissed the defendant Depinderdeep Singh's counterclaims for lack of documentary evidence.

However, the court granted the defendant Monisha Singh's counterclaim for unpaid rent in the amount of $16,400, based on a written lease agreement.

The plaintiff obtained default judgment for mortgage payment and possession due to the corporate defendant's default, with Mr. Casano as guarantor.

The defendants repeatedly sought stays of enforcement of the writ of possession, citing refinancing efforts and disputing the outstanding balance.

Despite multiple stays granted by the court over 19 months, no refinancing occurred, and the mortgage remained unsatisfied.

The defendants' latest ex parte motion for a further 30-day stay was denied, with the court finding a lack of credibility in their refinancing efforts and noting their failure to formally dispute the balance through proper legal channels.

The court emphasized that further extensions would bring the court's reputation into disrepute.

The applicants sought a contempt order against the respondents for alleged non-compliance with a Master's order requiring an accounting.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants lacked standing because the underlying action against them had been dismissed, and the Master's order for accounting was not made for their benefit.

Furthermore, the court agreed that the Master's order was not sufficiently clear or unequivocal to form the basis for a contempt finding.

The appellants appealed a Master's order that varied a previous 'last chance' order requiring the respondent to post security for costs.

The previous order stated that if the respondent failed to post security by a specific deadline, the action would be dismissed.

The respondent failed to comply, but the Master subsequently issued a new order extending the deadline and increasing the security amount.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Master was functus officio once the original order was issued, entered, and breached, resulting in the dismissal of the action.

The Master therefore had no jurisdiction to vary the order or grant a stay.

The applicant sought a declaration that a bankrupt's notional gift of 50% equity in a matrimonial home to his spouse was a transfer at undervalue and void under s. 96(1)(b)(i) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court found that even if the transfer was at undervalue, it would exercise its equitable discretion not to declare it void.

The court considered factors such as the spouses' good faith, the lack of intention to defeat creditors, the spouse's non-monetary contributions to the family, and her need for the funds to support herself and her children.

This was a post-trial costs decision following lengthy, highly contested mortgage litigation and an 11-day trial.

The successful defendants sought either full indemnity costs or a blended award, relying on their unaccepted offer to settle, fraud-like allegations advanced by the plaintiffs, and mortgage standard charge terms.

The court held that the offer to settle engaged Rule 49.10 and justified substantial indemnity costs from the offer date onward, while also recognizing limited enhancement arising from the unsuccessful fraud-like allegations.

After considering Rules 57.01 and 49 and the overall fairness of the award, the court fixed costs at $229,121.76.

The bankrupt appealed a registrar’s determination concerning the characterization of a disability tax credit refund received during bankruptcy.

The issue was whether the refund constituted “property” under s. 67 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or “income” under s. 68.

Relying on prior bankruptcy jurisprudence and policy considerations underlying the disability tax credit, the court held that the credit functions to augment income available to persons with disabilities.

Accordingly, the refund was properly treated as income under s. 68 of the Act rather than property of the estate.

The appellant appealed a bankruptcy order, arguing the motion judge erred in refusing an adjournment, finding she could not meet her debts, and failing to stay a receivership order pending other litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the refusal of the adjournment was a proper exercise of discretion and the finding of insolvency was supported by the record.

The court also noted the appellant had not sought a stay of the receivership order before the motion judge and the pending litigation was speculative.

The appellant debtor appealed an order relating to the sale of a property in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant did not appear before the motion judge and the issue of occupation rent was not raised below.

The court found no error in the motion judge's analysis or conclusion regarding the sale of the property.

The appellants, G&S Transport and Olympic Wholesale Ltd., appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding them liable for unpaid lease payments on a transport trailer leased by the respondent.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, finding no privity of contract between G&S and the respondent, and no evidentiary basis to pierce the corporate veil or apply the alter ego principle to hold Olympic liable for the lease entered into by a related company.

The judgments against both appellants were set aside.