A. Introduction

1Massoomeh Panahiannigjeh and Azadeh Vosoughian are business partners. They are 50:50 co-owners of Iranizone Corporation, which carried on business as a social-media marketing influencer and marketing promoter. Iranizone Corporation’s business had been good, but the business partners’ relationship, which was good, has become deplorably bad.

2Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian who used to be friends, no longer trust each other. There is ill-will and spiteful behaviour. They cannot co-operate for their mutual interest or for the best interests of Iranizone. They cannot co-operate for their own self-interest. Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian each have interfered with each other’s business affairs and with the business affairs of Iranizone Corporation, whose business has been comatose for more than five months; hence this urgent motion for interlocutory relief.

3In this action, Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Iranizone sue Ms. Vosoughian with respect to the business affairs of Iranizone Corporation. They also sue Arash Alizadeh, who is Ms. Vosoughian’s husband, for defamation, and they sue Mohsen Yazdi, who had the misfortune of attempting unsuccessfully to mediate a peace between Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian.

4The motion now before the court is just between Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian.

5Ms. Panahiannigjeh seeks interlocutory restrictive and mandatory injunctions to govern the business relationship between her and Ms. Vosoughian. On this interlocutory motion, Ms. Panahiannigjeh seeks:

a. an interlocutory mandatory injunction requiring Ms. Vosoughian to provide Ms. Panahiannigjeh with the account information and passwords to all the Iranizone accounts;

b. an interlocutory injunction prohibiting Ms. Vosoughian from changing the account information and passwords to all the Iranizone accounts without immediately providing the information to Ms. Panahiannigjeh;

c. an interlocutory injunction prohibiting Ms. Vosoughian from depreciating Iranizone’s assets;

i. an interlocutory mandatory injunction requiring Ms. Vosoughian to take steps to ensure that all Iranizone accounts (electronic or other) are associated only with official Iranizone email accounts and no other email accounts;

ii. a permanent injunction prohibiting Ms. Vosoughian from serving clients within Iranizone’s client base through Fanoos [Ms. Vosoughian’s personal social media page on Instagram] or any other similar enterprise; and

iii. a permanent injunction requiring Ms. Vosoughian to divert all Fanoos clients within Iranizone’s client base to Iranizone.

6In response to Ms. Panahiannigjeh’s motion for interlocutory restrictive and mandatory injunctions, but without formally bringing a counter-motion, Ms. Vosoughian also seeks interlocutory relief. She seeks the following Order:

a. Ms. Vosoughian will share the password to Iranizone with Ms. Panahiannigjeh.

i. Neither Ms. Vosoughian nor Ms. Panahiannigjeh will lock the other out of the Iranizone page.

b. Ms. Vosoughian and Ms. Panahiannigjeh will each be paid for the client for whom they work with each day and funds will be deposited directly into their personal accounts.

i. If Ms. Vosoughian and Ms. Panahiannigjeh both work on/for an ad/client, the funds will be deposited into the business account.

ii. Ms. Vosoughian and Ms. Panahiannigjeh will each refrain from contacting the other’s clients.

iii. Ms. Vosoughian and Ms. Panahiannigjeh may each continue to operate their personal pages, but they will agree to only do business with clients that are clearly their own.

c. Ms. Vosoughian and Ms. Panahiannigjeh will each refrain from posting derogatory or defamatory content about the other and refrain from discussing or posting any details about the business or legal dispute between them.

d. Ms. Panahiannigjeh will return the phone number to Ms. Vosoughian and transfer the account to her name.

i. Ms. Vosoughian will be responsible for paying all current and future amounts owing on the phone account.

e. Any party breaching the above referenced conditions will be deemed in breach of the Order.

7Notwithstanding that Ms. Vosoughian did not bring a formal notice of motion, I am treating her affidavit and her factum as a notional notice of cross-motion.

8For the reasons that follow, I order Ms. Vosoughian to provide Ms. Panahiannigjeh with the account information and passwords to all the Iranizone accounts, and I otherwise dismiss Ms. Panahiannigjeh’s motion without costs. For the reasons that follow I dismiss Ms. Vosoughian’s cross-motion without costs.

B. Procedural and Evidentiary Background

9On June 23, 2022, Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Iranizone commenced an action against Ms. Vosoughian, Mr. Alizadeh, and Mr. Yazdi.

10On July 27, 2022, Mr. Alizadeh delivered his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and Ms. Vosoughian delivered her Statement of Defence and Counterclaim.

11On July 28, 2022, Mr. Yazdi delivered his Statement of Defence.

12On August 16, 2022, there was an attendance in Practice Court. Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Iranizone requested the urgent scheduling of a motion under s. 241 of the Canadian Business Corporations Act,¹ and Rule 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure² for injunctive relief. Justice Sanfilippo scheduled the motion for September 13, 2022.

13On August 26, 2022, Ms. Panahiannigjeh delivered a Notice of Motion for interlocutory injunctive relief. Her motion was supported by the following evidentiary record:

a. Affidavit of Solmaz Naseri Karimvand dated August 25, 2022. Mr. Karimvand is the director of Art of Skin Atelier Inc., which was a client of Iranizone.

b. Affidavit of Ms. Panahiannigjeh dated August 26, 2022.

c. Affidavit of Jalal Yeylaghi dated August 25, 5022. Mr. Yeylaghi was the translator for Mr. Karimvand who speaks Farsi.

14On September 6, 2022, Ms. Panahiannigjeh delivered her factum for the interlocutory motion.

15On September 9, 2022, Ms. Vosoughian delivered her responding affidavit dated September 6, 2022 to the Plaintiffs’ motion.

16On September 12, 2022, Ms. Vosoughian delivered her responding factum to the Plaintiffs’ motion. Although there was no accompanying notice of cross-motion, Ms. Vosoughian’s factum requested interlocutory relief.

17There were no cross-examinations of the affiants.

C. Facts

18Ms. Panahiannigjeh, who lives in Toronto, and Ms. Vosoughian, who lives in Markham, are social media marketing influencers in the Iranian Canadian community in the Greater Toronto Area. A social media marketing influencer is a person who has the power to affect the purchasing decisions of others because of his or her celebrity, prestige, expertise, experience, or relationship with his or her audience. The influencer uses his or her endorsement power to create trends and encourage followers to buy the products that the influencer promotes for marketers.

19In September 2017, Ms. Vosoughian opened an Instagram account, known as Iranizone, to continue her social-media influencer business. She began Iranizone as a sole proprietor. Ms. Vosoughian already had an Internet presence at a blogging site unifolio/azifolio, which she later changed to Fanoos.canada, another Instagram account.

20In the Autumn of 2018, Ms. Vosoughian invited an unnamed third party and Ms. Panahiannigjeh to join her unincorporated business operating the Iranizone account. At that time, like Ms. Vosoughian, Ms. Panahiannigjeh already had an internet presence at sites massi.blog, which she later changed to incanada.life.

21In December 2019, Iranizone was incorporated. It operated its Instagram account, and it also had a website, YouTube accounts, a Google account, a Telegram account, a Facebook account, Twitter account, email accounts, and Gmail accounts.

22In April 2020, the third party who had joined the business in the autumn of 2018 left the Iranizone Corporation’s business.

23Sometime in July or August 2020, Ms. Vosoughian agreed to make Ms. Panahiannigjeh a co-owner and a co-director of Iranizone. They signed a handwritten note allocating a 50% shareholder interest to each of them.

24For the purposes of deciding the motion and the cross-motion, it shall be important to note that there is no shareholder’s agreement. There are no non-solicitation or non-competition agreements. There is no formal agreement as to how revenues are to be shared. The parties’ business relationship is governed by informal arrangements and by the provisions of the Canadian Business Corporations Act.

25For the purposes of deciding the motion and the cross-motion, it shall prove important to note how Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian operated their business during the good times. In this regard, during the good times, Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian were not paid a salary. Rather, they each respectively earned revenues paid by vendors of goods and services who paid Ms. Panahiannigjeh or Ms. Vosoughian for posting promotional materials and endorsements on Iranizone’s web page. Whoever was engaged by the vendor to make the posting would be paid a commission, and then the balance of the charge for the posting would be divided 50:50 through the accounts of Iranizone Corporation. Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian were each responsible for soliciting clients and for preparing the postings. Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian would also reciprocally link postings on their own individual Internet pages to the Iranizone page.

26Unfortunately, the good years for the joint enterprise did not last. In November-December 2021, the interpersonal relationship between Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian had broken down. The interpersonal relationship had begun to break down during the preceding summer, when Ms. Vosoughian was deeply affronted by something said by Ms. Panahiannigjeh. Because of the ill-will, by the end of the year working together was no longer possible, and Ms. Vosoughian suggested that they buy the other out of the business or that they sell the business altogether.

27For the purposes of deciding the motion and the cross-motion, it shall be important to note that the business arrangements for the operation of Iranizone fundamentally changed at the beginning of 2022. It is important to note how they operated their business during these bad times. Just before the start of the new year, Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian agreed that they would work as independents on Iranizone on alternate days.

28Under the new business arrangement, whoever retained a client and made a posting on their working day of access to Iranizone would keep the revenues from the client and there would be no sharing - unless the client requested an invoice, in which case the payment would be deposited into Iranizone’s bank account to be divided between the shareholders. The business arrangement was now two sole proprietors using Iranizone to earn income independently, a sort of business arrangement of working together but working separate and apart and independently earning income.

29The new business arrangement lasted for a few months. Ms. Panahiannigjeh deposes that on March 18, 2022, she was surprised to learn from a posting made for Heeva Fine Foods on both Iranizone’s page and on Ms. Vosoughian’s Fanoos Instagram page that Ms. Vosoughian was using her Fanoos page on Instagram to earn income for herself rather than earning money from postings on Iranizone.

30Ms. Panahiannigjeh was upset by this discovery, because she felt that the Fanoos postings on Instagram were Iranizone’s income to earn. She was upset that Ms. Vosoughian was soliciting Iranizone’s clients to use Fanoos’s services instead of Iranizone’s services. Ms. Panahiannigjeh deposes that she confronted Ms. Vosoughian about what she says was a conflict of interest and a breach of fiduciary duty to her and to Iranizone. Ms. Panahiannigjeh regarded Ms. Vosoughian’s conduct as damaging to Iranizone’s business and reputation.

31Pausing here in the story, it is a contested issue whether any of Ms. Vosoughian’s activity was a surprise to Ms. Panahiannigjeh, since both parties were aware of their independent Internet presences, but for reasons explained later, nothing turns on whether Ms. Panahiannigjeh was surprised to learn that Ms. Vosoughian was earning revenue from her Fanoos page on Instagram. And nothing turns on Ms. Vosoughian’s unproven tit-for-tat allegation that Ms. Panahiannigjeh was or could have been earning money from her personal Internet presence on her own Instagram account.

32It is also a contested issue about whether Ms. Vosoughian’s activities on Fanoos were competitive or synergistically complementary to the activities of Iranizone Corporation, but, once again, for the purposes of deciding the competing interlocutory injunction motions, it is not necessary to resolve this dispute between the parties.

33Returning to the story, Ms. Vosoughian agrees that there was a confrontation in March 2022, and she deposes that Ms. Panahiannigjeh demanded that Ms. Vosoughian stop doing what she was doing. Ms. Vosoughian was upset by these demands. She regarded Ms. Panahiannigjeh as attempting to shut down her activities on Fanoos and to takeover Iranizone Corporation.

34Ms. Vosoughian responded to what she regarded as Ms. Panahiannigjeh’s aggression by changing the passwords to Iranizone’s social media accounts and by refusing to divulge the passwords to Ms. Panahiannigjeh.

35Because she now distrusted Ms. Panahiannigjeh, instead of providing her with access to the Iranizone accounts, Ms. Vosoughian proposed a system in which Mr. Yazdi, a mutual friend, would have the passwords, and Ms. Vosoughian and Ms. Panahiannigjeh would each have half of the password; they would enlist Mr. Yazdi’s assistance to complete the password for access to the Iranizone account.

36Mr. Yazdi was recruited to act as custodian of the passwords and to attempt to mediate a resolution of the dispute between the parties.

37The password scheme, however, never worked, and Mr. Yazdi’s efforts to be peacemaker failed. Neither party has been using Iranizone’s accounts since March 2022 to promote the marketing of their respective clients’ goods and services.

38When Ms. Panahiannigjeh was unable to use the Iranizone Instagram account for posting, she cloned the Iranizone Instagram account, with a slightly different internet address. On June 8, 2022, she copied posts and videos from the original Instagram page and transferred them to the copycat page without Ms. Vosoughian’s consent.

39Ms. Vosoughian demanded that this creation of a copycat account stop, and efforts to settle the dispute stopped. In response to the creation of the copycat account, on June 17, 2022, Ms. Vosoughian posted on the Iranizone’s Instagram account the following message which translated from Farsi stated:

Companions of Iranizone! We inform you that the Iranizone page has been temporarily closed due to some internal changes. “It should be noted that this page is the only official source and account of Iranizone on Instagram and any misuse of the name, logo and content of Iranizone is invalid and will be prosecuted.”

40On June 23, 2022, Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Iranizone commenced an action against Ms. Vosoughian, Mr. Alizadeh, and Mr. Yazdi. Ms. Vosoughian has defended and counterclaimed. Her husband, Mr. Alizadeh has defended and filed a counterclaim for defamation. Mr. Yazdi has defended the action.

41Ms. Panahiannigjeh’s and Ms. Vosoughian’s shelving of Iranizone since March 2022 has not been particularly harmful to Iranizone. While the parties have been fighting, the moribund Iranizone Instagram account, which had approximately 46,100 followers, has lost 700 followers.

42Although both parties have lost their business opportunities through using Iranizone’s accounts, the cessation of business has been somewhat more harmful to Ms. Panahiannigjeh than to Ms. Vosoughian. Ms. Vosoughian’s Fanoos Instagram account has increased from approximately 32,000 followers to approximately 44,200, in the last several months. Before the disruption of the business, Ms. Panahiannigjeh was earning approximately $3,000.00 - $5,000 monthly and Ms. Vosoughian was earning approximately the same or perhaps somewhat slightly more.

43Based on the present record, I am unable to address the matter of Ms. Vosoughian’s request for a return of her telephone account. I was advised by the parties’ lawyers of their radically different instructions about the matter of the telephone account. For present purposes, the lawyers’ instructions are just more evidence that the relationship between Ms. Panahiannigjeh and Ms. Vosoughian is totally dysfunctional.

44I note that there are several other disputes about the conduct of the parties that I am unable to resolve in the context of this interlocutory injunction.

D. Mandatory and Prohibitory Interlocutory Injunctions

45Section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act³ provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant interlocutory injunctions. Section 101 states:

Injunctions and receivers

101 (1) In the Superior Court of Justice, an interlocutory injunction or mandatory Order may be granted or a receiver or receiver and manager may be appointed by an interlocutory Order, where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so.

Terms

(2) An Order under subsection (1) may include such terms as are considered just.

46In RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),⁴ the Supreme Court set out the test used for granting or refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction. Under the RJR-MacDonald test for an interlocutory injunction, the court considers three factors: (1) whether the plaintiff has presented a serious issue to be tried or, in a narrow band of cases, a strong prima facie case; (2) whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the remedy for the defendant's misconduct were left to be granted at trial; and (3) where lies the balance of convenience or inconvenience in the granting or the refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction.

47Under the RJR-MacDonald test, the court considers whether the plaintiff or applicant has shown that there is a serious issue to be tried in the sense that the plaintiff or applicant has a viable claim. For most cases, this factor sets a low threshold, and this approach negates the need of any intensive review of the merits at the preliminary phase of the proceedings. However, if its consideration of the other elements of the test is inconclusive, the court may revisit the question of the strength or merits of the plaintiff's case as an aspect of the balance of convenience factor.⁵

48When a court grants a mandatory injunction, it commands performance of a legal, equitable or statutory obligation owed the plaintiff.⁶ For a mandatory interlocutory injunction, the plaintiff must show a greater likelihood of success than must be shown for a prohibitory injunction.⁷ To find a strong prima facie case, the motion judge must be satisfied after an extensive review of the evidence of the merits of the case that there is a strong likelihood on the law and the evidence presented that the moving party would ultimately be successful at trial in proving the allegations set out in the notice of motion.⁸

49The irreparable harm analysis means the court will consider whether damages awarded after a trial will provide the plaintiff or applicant with an adequate remedy without the need for an interlocutory remedy.⁹ The onus is on the party seeking an injunction to place sufficient financial and other evidence before the court showing that irreparable harm will result.¹⁰ The onus is on the plaintiff or applicant to show that if made to wait for a hearing where damages are awarded, then he or she will suffer irreparable harm. If damages or some other trial remedy would come too late or be inadequate to repair the harm or be insufficient to do justice, then the harm may be said to be irreparable. Evidence of irreparable harm must be clear and not speculative.¹¹

50The balance of convenience analysis considers what is the effect on the parties and sometimes on third parties of the court granting or not granting the interlocutory injunction.¹² This analysis involves a determination of which of the two parties will suffer the greater harm from the granting or the refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction pending a decision on the merits. In this context, the court will need to compare and contrast the harm that the plaintiff may suffer if the interlocutory injunction is refused with the harm that the defendant would suffer that would not be reparable by the plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages if the interlocutory injunction is granted. The factors that the court may consider in assessing the balance of convenience and the weight to be given to them are indeterminate and will vary from case to case.¹³

51If the plaintiff's case seems weak, then the undoubted convenience of an injunction may not balance the inconvenience of the defendant suffering the interference with his or her rights based on a doubtful claim. Conversely, if the merits of the plaintiff's case seem quite strong then the plaintiff's inconvenience of being denied an interlocutory remedy may seem to outbalance the inconvenience of the defendant having to suffer a restraint on his or her rights.¹⁴

E. Discussion and Analysis

52In the immediate case, both parties agree about one matter. They both agree that each should have access to the Iranizone accounts without interference from the other. Both parties seek to have unfettered access to the passwords and various accounts operated by Iranizone. Both parties wish to revive and extend the business life of Iranizone but only for their own self-interested purposes. Beyond that common ground, the parties respectively seek restrictive and mandatory injunctions against each other.

53In the immediate case, if Ms. Vosoughian provides Ms. Panahiannigjeh with access to the Iranizone accounts, then they could return to the status quo when they respectively acted as a sole proprietor to earn revenue by posting promotional materials for their respective clients.

54In my opinion, neither party is entitled to any injunctive relief beyond ordering that Ms. Vosoughian provide Ms. Panahiannigjeh with the account information and passwords to all the Iranizone accounts, and I so order, without costs. I dismiss the balance of Ms. Panahiannigjeh’s request for interlocutory relief. I also dismiss Ms. Vosoughian’s cross-motion.

55In my opinion, neither party has demonstrated a strong prima facie case that would support any entitlement to mandatory injunctive relief, and while both parties can get over the low hurdle that there are serious issues to be tried between them about their totally dysfunctional business relationships, there is no irreparable harm in the sense that damages are an adequate remedy for their grievances and the balance of convenience favours neither party. Neither party deserves to be privileged over the other or have an edge over the other in their fight over control and ownership of Iranizone Corporation.

56The evidence on this interlocutory injunction reveals that the business behaviour of both parties has been wrongful, and each is likely culpable to the other. It was wrong for Ms. Vosoughian to deny access to the passwords of Iranizone, and it was wrong of Ms. Panahiannigjeh to create a copycat Instagram account to attempt to control the operation of Iranizone. Two wrongs do not make a right for either party.

57Viewing Iranizone Corporation discretely, it has suffered no irreparable harm. A loss of 700 followers is hardly irreparable harm. Moreover, Iranizone Corporation has never existed as more than a vehicle for limited liability for its shareholders who have carried on more as selfish sole proprietors. Neither Ms. Panahiannigjeh nor Ms. Vosoughian has suffered irreparable harm in the requisite legal sense. An award of damages or a winding-up order is the appropriate remedy for their internecine litigation.

58An injunction is an equitable remedy, and the unclean hands of both parties is reason enough to deny them both injunctive relief. One of those principles of equity is the maxim that “one who comes to equity must come with clean hands”. Equitable relief may be denied when the appropriateness of the remedy being sought is tainted by the claimant’s own wrongdoing associated with the transaction.¹⁵ The case at bar is an example where neither party is entitled to equitable relief.

59De facto and de jure, the evidence reveals that Iranizone has never operated with the formalities of a corporation. I surmise that the business was incorporated for the protection of limited liability, but Iranizone has functioned de facto as a partnership or as two sole proprietors co-owning email, telephone, and social media accounts. Operating as a corporation or as some sort of partnership, the current evidentiary record reveals that the likely future of the business is its winding up.

60I conclude that beyond the matter for which there is agreement, i.e., that Ms. Panahiannigjeh’s access to the Iranizone accounts be restored, neither party satisfies the tests for a mandatory interlocutory injunction or for a prohibitive interlocutory injunction.

F. Conclusion

61For the above reasons I order Ms. Vosoughian to provide Ms. Panahiannigjeh with the account information and passwords to all the Iranizone Accounts, and I otherwise dismiss Ms. Panahiannigjeh’s motion without costs. Notwithstanding that Ms. Vosoughian did not bring a formal motion, I am treating her factum as a notice of motion and I dismiss her motion without costs.

Perell, J.

Released: September 19, 2022

COURT FILE NO.: CV-22-00683145-0000

DATE: 20220919

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MASSOOMEH PANAHIANNIGJEH and IRANIZONE CORPORATION

Plaintiffs

and –

AZADEH VOSOUGHIAN, MOHSEN YAZDI, and ARASH ALIZADEH

Defendants

REASONS FOR DECISION

PERELL J.

Released: September 19, 2022

Footnotes

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.
R.S.O. 1990, reg. 194.
R.S.O. 1990, c. 43.
1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311.
Omega Digital Data Inc. v. Airos Technology Inc. (1996), 1996 11785 (ON SC), 32 O.R. (3d) 21; Empire Stevedores (1973) Ltd. v. Sparringa (1978), 1978 1479 (ON SC), 19 O.R. (2d) 610 (H.C.J.); American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., 1975 2598 (FC), [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.).
Ryerson Students’ Union v. Ryerson University, 2020 ONSC 1490; R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5; 1711811 Ontario Ltd. v. Buckley Insurance Brokers Ltd., 2014 ONCA 125 at paras. 49–59.
R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5.
Ryerson Students’ Union v. Ryerson University, 2020 ONSC 1490 at para. 44; R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5 at para. 17.
Traynor v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America (2003), 2003 40149 (ON SCDC), 65 O.R. (3d) 7 (Div. Ct.); Paddington Press Ltd. v. Champ, 1979 4566 (ON SC), [1979] O.J. No. 796 (H.C.J.).
2158124 Ontario Inc. v. Pitton, 2017 ONSC 411 at para. 48; Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v. Novopharm Ltd., 1994 19563 (FC), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1120 at paras. 117-118 (T.D.).
2158124 Ontario Inc. v. Pitton, 2017 ONSC 411 at paras. 49-51; Downtown Kids Academy Inc. v. Zakrzewski, 2017 ONSC 5045; Ontario v. Shehrazad Non-Profit Housing Inc. (2007), 2007 ONCA 267, 85 O.R. (3d) 81 at para. 26 (C.A.); Kanda Tsushin Kogyo Co. v. Coveley, [1997] O.J. No. 56 at para. 14 (Div. Ct.); 754223 Ontario Ltd v. R-M Trust Co, [1997] O.J. No. 282 at para. 40 (Gen. Div.); RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) 1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 at paras. 57-59.
Synergism Arithmetically Compounded Inc. v. 1130163 Ontario Inc., 1997 12381 (ON SC), [1997] O.J. No. 4271 (Gen. Div.); American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., 1975 2598 (FC), [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.).
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) 1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311.
Bell Canada v. Rogers Communications Inc., 2009 39481 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 3161 at para. 38 (S.C.J.); Quizno's Canada Restaurant Corp. v. 1450987 Ontario Corp., 2009 20708 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 1743 at para. 46 (S.C.J.); Omega Digital Data Inc. v. Airos Technology Inc. (1996), 1996 11785 (ON SC), 32 O.R. (3d) 21 (Gen. Div.); Empire Stevedores (1973) Ltd. v. Sparringa (1978), 1978 1479 (ON SC), 19 O.R. (2d) 610 (H.C.J.); American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., 1975 2598 (FC), [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.).
BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. v. Wellington West Capital Inc. (2005), 2005 30303 (ON CA), 77 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.); Sherwood Dash Inc. v. Woodview Products Inc., [2005] O.J. No. 5298 (S.C.J.); SBS Sealants Inc. v. Robroy Industries Ltd. (2002), 2002 41884 (ON CA), 59 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.); Raso v. Dionigi (1993), 1993 8664 (ON CA), 12 O.R. (3d) 580 (C.A.); Toronto (City) v. Polai, 1969 339 (ON CA), [1970] 1 O.R. 483 (C.A.), aff’d 1972 22 (SCC), [1973] S.C.R. 38.

Footnotes

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.
R.S.O. 1990, reg. 194.
R.S.O. 1990, c. 43.
1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311.
Omega Digital Data Inc. v. Airos Technology Inc. (1996), 1996 11785 (ON SC), 32 O.R. (3d) 21; Empire Stevedores (1973) Ltd. v. Sparringa (1978), 1978 1479 (ON SC), 19 O.R. (2d) 610 (H.C.J.); American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., 1975 2598 (FC), [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.).
Ryerson Students’ Union v. Ryerson University, 2020 ONSC 1490; R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5; 1711811 Ontario Ltd. v. Buckley Insurance Brokers Ltd., 2014 ONCA 125 at paras. 49–59.
R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5.
Ryerson Students’ Union v. Ryerson University, 2020 ONSC 1490 at para. 44; R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2018 SCC 5 at para. 17.
Traynor v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America (2003), 2003 40149 (ON SCDC), 65 O.R. (3d) 7 (Div. Ct.); Paddington Press Ltd. v. Champ, 1979 4566 (ON SC), [1979] O.J. No. 796 (H.C.J.).
2158124 Ontario Inc. v. Pitton, 2017 ONSC 411 at para. 48; Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v. Novopharm Ltd., 1994 19563 (FC), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1120 at paras. 117-118 (T.D.).
2158124 Ontario Inc. v. Pitton, 2017 ONSC 411 at paras. 49-51; Downtown Kids Academy Inc. v. Zakrzewski, 2017 ONSC 5045; Ontario v. Shehrazad Non-Profit Housing Inc. (2007), 2007 ONCA 267, 85 O.R. (3d) 81 at para. 26 (C.A.); Kanda Tsushin Kogyo Co. v. Coveley, [1997] O.J. No. 56 at para. 14 (Div. Ct.); 754223 Ontario Ltd v. R-M Trust Co, [1997] O.J. No. 282 at para. 40 (Gen. Div.); RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) 1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 at paras. 57-59.
Synergism Arithmetically Compounded Inc. v. 1130163 Ontario Inc., 1997 12381 (ON SC), [1997] O.J. No. 4271 (Gen. Div.); American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., 1975 2598 (FC), [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.).
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) 1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311.
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Panahiannigjeh v. Vosoughian, 2022 ONSC 5298

Case Summary

A. Introduction

B. Procedural and Evidentiary Background