Shaneka Shaw Taylor

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 37.14(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a summary judgment order granted by Justice Stevenson on January 8, 2025.

The defendants' counsel served a last-minute motion to remove himself as counsel and adjourn the hearing at 7:48 pm the night before the hearing.

Counsel did not attend the hearing, claiming an unexpected medical matter.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside, finding that: (1) the medical evidence did not support an urgent medical condition preventing counsel's attendance; (2) counsel made an informed decision not to attend without proper reason; and (3) the defendant's email at 10:22 am did not establish insufficient notice.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $6,000 to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs (vendors) brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a $50,000 deposit from the defendants (purchasers) after a residential real estate deal failed.

The vendors argued a binding agreement was formed, while the purchasers contended that the vendors' addition of "Schedule B" and requirement for its acknowledgment constituted a counteroffer that was never accepted.

The court applied the test for summary judgment and found that the vendors' actions, including the MLS listing stipulation and the demand for Schedule B to be initialled and signed, indicated they considered Schedule B an essential part of the agreement.

Therefore, the return of the agreement with Schedule B was a counteroffer, which the purchasers did not accept.

The court concluded that no binding contract existed and dismissed the vendors' claim for the deposit.

This motion concerned the enforcement of a prior court order for the sale of jointly owned real property.

The respondent, Jason Andrew Whiting, failed to cooperate with the sale process, including accepting a written offer and vacating the premises, despite previous warnings and opportunities to provide evidence of alternative buyers.

The court found no justification for further delay, declared the existing agreement of purchase and sale binding, and ordered the respondent to vacate the property by a specified date.

Costs were fixed against the respondent.

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment for specific performance in relation to the purchase of a residential co-operative unit, where the appellant anticipatorily breached the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's arguments that the motion judge erred in finding the property unique, justifying specific performance, and in finding the respondent ready, willing, and able to close the transaction.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment granting specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court found no reprehensible or outrageous conduct by the defendant to justify elevated costs.

The plaintiff was awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $18,416.24.

The plaintiff brought a motion to vary an order for specific performance arising from the defendant's failure to close a real estate transaction.

The plaintiff sought compensation for out-of-pocket expenses and increased mortgage rates incurred due to the breach.

The court granted the motion in part, awarding the plaintiff legal fees, moving costs, ongoing storage costs, and the difference in mortgage rates, to be deducted from the purchase price on closing.

The claim for rent was denied as it was offset by the savings from not paying a mortgage.

The Plaintiff sought summary judgment and specific performance for an aborted real estate transaction.

The Defendant breached the Agreement of Purchase and Sale by refusing to close, initially citing spousal objection, which was later resolved by a court order.

The court found the Defendant in anticipatory breach and the Plaintiff to be the innocent party.

The central issue was whether the Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance or damages.

Applying the "uniqueness" test from Semelhago, the court found the property unique, considering market conditions and the unavailability of comparable properties within the Plaintiff's price range.

The Plaintiff was deemed justified in not mitigating damages, especially given the Defendant's retention of the deposit.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the Plaintiff, ordering specific performance of the agreement.

This endorsement concerns a request to reconsider a costs disposition made on July 27, 2021.

The moving party for the reconsideration (respondents in the underlying appeal) had their costs submissions filed late and not forwarded to the panel.

The court reviewed the submissions but found no reason to vary the original costs order, confirming the previous disposition.

AIG Insurance Company of Canada sought substantial indemnity costs against The Corporation of the City of Markham and Lloyd’s Underwriters following a motion for reconsideration of an appeal decision.

The court found the reconsideration motion to be entirely without merit, having put AIG to needless expense.

Consequently, the court awarded AIG $13,000 in substantial indemnity costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable forthwith.

The respondents (moving parties on the motion) sought reconsideration of a Court of Appeal decision rendered 15 months prior.

The motion was dismissed as lacking merit, with the court emphasizing the principle of finality.

Reconsideration is rarely granted, especially when the moving party has already unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on the same arguments, which was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from the Toronto Region to the Southwest Region (Windsor).

The action arose from a failed real estate transaction for a property located in Windsor.

The plaintiff, who resides in Toronto, commenced the action in Toronto seeking specific performance or damages.

Applying the holistic approach under Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that the plaintiff's choice of venue was reasonable and the defendant failed to establish that Windsor would be a significantly better venue.

The motion to transfer was dismissed.

The City of Oshawa sought a declaration that MEARIE had a duty to defend it in a slip-and-fall action arising from an uneven sidewalk where Oshawa PUC had previously performed work.

The City was an additional insured on Oshawa PUC's policy.

The court found that MEARIE had a duty to defend because there was a mere possibility that the claim fell within coverage, as the liability could arise from Oshawa PUC's operations.

However, the court held that the City must bear its share of defence costs for uncovered claims and denied the City's request to appoint its own counsel, finding that MEARIE's proposed safeguards adequately addressed any conflict of interest.

This appeal concerns a dispute between two insurers, AIG Insurance Company of Canada and Lloyd's Underwriters, regarding their respective duties to defend the City of Markham in a personal injury action.

The application judge had found AIG solely responsible for the defence and denied AIG the right to participate in the defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that both AIG and Lloyd's had a concurrent duty to defend the City, and must share defence costs equally, subject to reallocation at the conclusion of the action.

Furthermore, the Court found that AIG has a right to participate in the defence, including retaining and instructing counsel, provided a "split file" protocol with additional safeguards is implemented to manage potential conflicts of interest.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a trial where there was divided success between the parties.

The Defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis, arguing they were the successful parties as they recovered compensation and secured protection from mortgage liability.

The Plaintiff also sought costs.

The court agreed that the Defendants were the successful parties for the purpose of costs but adjusted the amount claimed by the Defendants downwards.

The court awarded costs, including disbursements and taxes, to the Defendants in the amount of $45,000, to be paid by the Plaintiff.

The applicants sought a mandatory interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent regulatory body from revoking their status as approved providers of Continuing Professional Development (CPD) programs.

The court applied the tripartite test for injunctions, noting the higher standard for mandatory injunctions (strong prima facie case).

The court found no strong prima facie case, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience did not favor granting the injunction, particularly given the applicant's history of vexatious allegations against the respondent and the availability of other income sources.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicants, two municipalities, sought a declaration entitling them to appoint their own counsel and manage their defence in a main action at the expense of the respondent insurers.

The municipalities argued a clear conflict of interest existed because the insurers were also defending contractors (Miller and Langley) against whom the municipalities had alleged negligence and sought indemnification.

The court found an irremediable conflict of interest, as the insurers' pecuniary interests in limiting the contractors' liability directly conflicted with the municipalities' defence strategy.

The application was granted, allowing the municipalities to appoint independent counsel at the insurers' expense and be reimbursed for past defence costs, with reporting limited to settlement issues of covered claims.