Shaneka Shaw Taylor

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order bifurcating the liability and damages issues in a non-jury personal injury trial without their consent.

The infant plaintiff suffered a severe head injury, and damages could not be assessed for several years.

The court held that the Master had inherent jurisdiction to order bifurcation in exceptional circumstances, finding that the obiter in Bondy-Rafael abolishing such jurisdiction in non-jury trials was not binding.

Alternatively, applying the Carter test, the court found that Hryniak represented a fundamental shift in civil litigation justifying a departure from precedent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, two municipalities, sought a declaration entitling them to appoint their own counsel and manage their defence in a main action at the expense of the respondent insurers.

The municipalities argued a clear conflict of interest existed because the insurers were also defending contractors (Miller and Langley) against whom the municipalities had alleged negligence and sought indemnification.

The court found an irremediable conflict of interest, as the insurers' pecuniary interests in limiting the contractors' liability directly conflicted with the municipalities' defence strategy.

The application was granted, allowing the municipalities to appoint independent counsel at the insurers' expense and be reimbursed for past defence costs, with reporting limited to settlement issues of covered claims.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial to allow for further medical assessment of a child who suffered a brain injury after falling from a balcony.

The defendant landlord brought a cross-motion to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases, arguing that key liability witnesses were elderly and their memories would fade if the trial was delayed.

The court held that it had inherent jurisdiction to order bifurcation without consent, despite conflicting case law on Rule 6.1.01.

Finding this to be an exceptional case where bifurcation would save time and preserve evidence, the court granted both the extension of time and the bifurcation order.

The plaintiff claimed sole ownership of a property and sought damages for unauthorized renovations by the defendants.

The defendant real estate agent claimed a 50% equitable interest based on an oral joint venture agreement and financial contributions to the deposit and closing costs.

The court found the defendant had an equitable interest despite the lack of a formal written agreement, applying the doctrine of part performance.

However, because the defendant repudiated the agreement after the plaintiff's son gutted the property, she was entitled to restitution of her financial contributions totaling $154,615.55, while the plaintiff's claims for damages and loss of rent were dismissed.

The County brought Rule 21 motions seeking a declaration that its winter maintenance contractor, Steve Walt Property Maintenance, breached their contract by failing to procure insurance naming the County as an additional insured.

The County also sought damages for defence costs and the right to appoint its own counsel due to a conflict of interest with Steve Walt and its insurer, Economical Mutual Insurance Company.

Economical argued the motion was inappropriate due to disputed material facts.

The court found the contract unambiguous, Steve Walt in breach, and granted the County damages for defence costs and the right to choose its own counsel due to a clear conflict of interest.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal, the plaintiff sought costs of $40,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on an offer to settle.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the offer was not a true compromise and did not trigger Rule 49.10.

Considering the complexity and significance of the litigation, the court fixed costs at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiff's claims for damages arising from delayed market entry of a generic drug.

The defendants argued the Patent Act provided a complete code, precluding common law claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting Ontario decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, emphasizing that pleadings motions should rarely warrant appellate review.

The plaintiff sued the municipality for a slip and fall.

The municipality claimed contribution and indemnity from its winter maintenance contractor and the contractor's insurer.

The insurer appointed a single law firm to represent both the contractor and the municipality.

When the insurer later attempted to remove itself from representing the municipality, the municipality brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement for full defence and indemnity.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appointment of joint counsel necessarily implied an agreement to both defend and indemnify the municipality, as any other interpretation would have placed counsel in an untenable conflict of interest.

The appellants abandoned their appeal and advised the court the day before the hearing.

Counsel appeared to argue costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded $3,000 in costs to the respondent for the abandoned appeal, and $500 to the appellants for the appearance, noting the issue should have been resolved.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a third mortgage against the defendant's property, claiming it secured loans previously made to the defendant's spouse.

The defendant argued she never consented to securing her spouse's debts and believed the mortgage was intended to replace an existing second mortgage.

The court found the mortgage was intended to replace the second mortgage and that no funds were advanced to the defendant.

The court also applied the defence of non est factum, finding the defendant did not consent to the mortgage's purported purpose.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed, and the mortgage was ordered discharged.

The defendant's counterclaim for slander of title was dismissed.

Following settlement of a mortgage enforcement action, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the mortgagor to the mortgagee.

The mortgage contained a contractual provision requiring the mortgagor to pay the lender’s legal costs on a solicitor-and-client basis.

The court held that such provisions do not displace the court’s discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Concerns about an inaccurate discharge statement under the Mortgages Act, block-billed legal accounts, and proportionality justified refusing full indemnity costs.

Applying the principles of fairness and reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court reduced the claimed $65,831.32 in costs to $25,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

In a motor vehicle accident action involving multiple parties, a municipality brought a motion seeking an order requiring an insurer to defend it and allow it to retain counsel of its own choosing without reporting obligations to the insurer.

The municipality and insurer had partially settled the duty-to-defend issue, leaving the court to determine whether counsel retained by the municipality must report to the insurer that also insured another adverse party.

The court held that a conflict of interest existed because one insured was suing another insured in the same litigation and coverage issues remained live.

Given the conflict and the solicitor-client relationship, counsel retained by the municipality was not required to report to the insurer.

A municipality brought a motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement regarding insurance coverage and joint legal representation with a contractor and its insurer in a slip‑and‑fall action involving winter maintenance.

The municipality argued that email correspondence created a binding settlement requiring the insurer to provide legal representation for all potential municipal liability.

The insurer contended that any agreement was limited to liability arising from the contractor’s conduct and did not extend to the municipality’s independent negligence.

The court held that the communications did not demonstrate a meeting of the minds on all essential terms and that factual disputes remained regarding the scope of any agreement.

As a result, the court found no enforceable settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing their application for a refund of $13,000 plus interest.

The respondent argued the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal agreed and quashed the appeal, holding that under s. 19(1.2)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, an appeal from a final order dismissing a claim for less than $50,000 lies to the Divisional Court.

A municipality sought defence coverage as an additional insured under a contractor’s liability policy in a slip-and-fall action allegedly caused by icy sidewalk conditions.

The insurer brought a Rule 21 motion arguing that the statement of claim did not allege snow, ice, or sidewalks and therefore did not trigger the duty to defend.

The court held that particulars delivered in response to a demand form part of the pleadings and may trigger the duty to defend.

Examining the true nature of the claims, the court found that all negligence allegations potentially arose out of the contractor’s operations under the winter maintenance agreement.

The insurer was therefore required to defend or fund the municipality’s defence in full.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order granting multiple defendants security for costs in underlying litigation.

The motion relied on Rule 62.02(4)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and argued that the order would deny access to justice because the plaintiff corporation was impecunious.

The court found the plaintiff failed to demonstrate credible impecuniosity, noting financial records did not account for more than $2 million previously received from expropriation compensation and land sales.

The court held there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the security for costs order and the proposed appeal did not raise issues of general importance.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The plaintiffs purchased lots in an industrial subdivision and sued the municipality for negligent misrepresentation, alleging they relied on a letter from the building director indicating building permits would be available.

The plaintiffs claimed the letter failed to disclose that the Ministry of the Environment required a section 45 approval before permits could issue.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the letter was not misleading and that the plaintiffs failed to read the subdivision agreement, which explicitly stated the requirement for environmental approval.

The court also held that the action was statute-barred as the plaintiffs ought to have discovered the material facts more than six years before commencing the lawsuit.

The defendant municipality brought a motion seeking declarations that a contractor’s insurer owed it a duty to defend in a slip‑and‑fall action arising from alleged negligent winter sidewalk maintenance.

The court held that the pleadings test governs the duty to defend and that where allegations, if proven, could fall within policy coverage, the insurer must provide a defence.

Because the statement of claim alleged negligence related to snow removal operations covered by the policy and the municipality was a named insured, the insurer’s duty to defend was triggered.

The court further found a conflict of interest due to counterclaims between the defendants and the insurer’s earlier denial of coverage, entitling the municipality to independent counsel at the insurer’s expense.

The insurer was also ordered to reimburse the municipality’s past defence costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for damages against the respondent municipality.

The appellant and a friend had driven down a dead-end rural road, got stuck on a hydro right-of-way, and abandoned their vehicle in extreme cold, resulting in severe frostbite injuries.

The appellants argued the municipality breached its standard of care by failing to post 'No Exit' and checkerboard signs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the road conditions were not potentially dangerous to reasonable drivers and that the appellants would have ignored the signs regardless.

The appeal was dismissed.