Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Court File No.: CV-24-137
Date: 2025-06-20
BETWEEN:
1391570 Ontario Inc., o/a Berardi Construction (Applicant)
– and –
County of Norfolk (Respondent)
Appearances:
Courtney Boyd, for the Applicant
Shene Harris, for the Respondent
Heard: January 21, 2025
Justice S. Antoniani
Overview
[1] The applicant, Berardi Construction (“Berardi”), seeks an order rescinding the order to comply issued on April 19, 2024 by the respondent, County of Norfolk (the “County”), requiring a building permit for a retaining wall constructed on Berardi’s property located at 208 Nichol Street, Waterford, Ontario (the “Property”).
[2] Berardi is developing the Property with newly constructed homes, for which it obtained approval for its draft plan of subdivision on May 16, 2023.
[3] On or about March 15, 2024, Berardi commenced construction of a retaining wall on the property line between the Property and 178 Nichol Street, its immediate neighbour. On April 19, 2024, the County issued an order to comply requiring a building permit for the retaining wall to be obtained by May 3, 2024.
[4] No stop order relating to the construction of the retaining wall has been issued by the County. However, the retaining wall remains only partially constructed.
[5] Berardi seeks:
(a) A declaration that the retaining wall at the Property is not a building for the purposes of the Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23 (the “Act”);
(b) A declaration that no building permit is required for the retaining wall; and
(c) An order that the balance of the issues as they relate to damages proceed to trial.
Issues
The issues to be determined on this application are as follows:
- What is the applicable standard of review?
- Is the retaining wall at issue a “building” for the purposes of the Act?
- Is a building permit required or should the order to comply be rescinded?
- Should the balance of the issues related to damages proceed to trial?
Decision
[6] The standard of review is one of reasonableness.
[7] The retaining wall is not a building for the purposes of the Act. As such, no building permit was required. The order to comply is rescinded.
[8] The balance of issues related to damages will proceed to trial.
Law
The Standard of Review
[9] Section 25 of the Act provides a right of appeal to the Superior Court of Justice from “an order or decision made by the chief building official, a registered code agency or an inspector".
[10] In FNX Mining Company Inc. v. City of Greater Sudbury, 2018 ONSC 4912, the standard of review applicable to the court’s review of an order to comply was in issue. The court set out the applicable standard as follows, at paras. 18, 21-22:
[T]he standard of correctness applies to questions of law decided by a chief building official, whereas questions of fact and mixed fact and law are reviewed on the standard of reasonableness.
The issue at the heart of this case is whether particular types of structures meet a statutory definition: the court is being asked to decide whether the building inspector erred by finding that the generator enclosure and trailers are "buildings" as defined in the BCA, s. 1(1). That determination must be made on a consideration of the particular circumstances of the individual structures, and the relationship of those circumstances to the statutory definition. As such, this is a question of mixed fact and law, and the standard of review is reasonableness.
A reasonableness standard requires the reviewing court to determine whether any reasons support the conclusion under review. A decision can be unreasonable if the evidentiary foundation does not support the decision or if conclusions are illogically drawn from the evidence. [Citations omitted.]
[11] In this case, as in FNX Mining, supra, the determination will be based on the particular circumstances of the retaining wall, of neighbouring property and structures, and the relationship of those circumstances to the statutory definition. As such, I conclude that the standard of review is reasonableness.
Is the Retaining Wall at Issue a “Building” for the Purposes of the Act?
[12] Section 8 of the Act provides:
8 (1) No person shall construct or demolish a building or cause a building to be constructed or demolished unless a permit has been issued therefor by the chief building official.
[13] Pursuant to the Act, a “building” is defined as:
(a) a structure occupying an area greater than ten square metres consisting of a wall, roof and floor or any of them or a structural system serving the function thereof including all plumbing, works, fixtures and service systems appurtenant thereto,
(b) a structure occupying an area of ten square metres or less that contains plumbing, including the plumbing appurtenant thereto,
(c) plumbing not located in a structure,
(c.1) a sewage system, or
(d) structures designated in the building code;
[14] A “designated structure” is defined under s. 1.3.1.1.(1) of the Building Code, O. Reg. 332/12 and specifically provides for retaining walls as follows:
(1) The following structures are designated for the purposes of clause (d) of the definition of building in subsection 1 (1) of the Act:
(a) a retaining wall exceeding 1 000 mm in exposed height adjacent to,
(i) public property,
(ii) access to a building, or
(iii) private property to which the public is admitted
[15] The words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, para. 21.
Analysis
[16] On or about March 15, 2024, Berardi commenced construction of the retaining wall. No building permit was applied for or received with respect to its construction.
[17] If the retaining wall the applicant is building on the Property meets the above noted definition of a “designated structure”, then a building permit is required pursuant to s. 8 of the Act.
[18] The wall runs on the border between the Property and its neighbour at 178 Nichol Street. That property is privately owned.
[19] The retaining wall runs along the property lines, perpendicular to Nichol Street. It runs about 116 feet to the rear of the Property and then along the back property line at a height of 12 feet.
[20] The maximum exposed height of the wall, on the back of the Property, which is furthest from Nichol Street, is 12 feet. Berardi’s evidence is that the back wall commences at the end of the 116 feet of wall that runs between the Property and 178 Nichol Street and is approximately 140 feet back from Nichol Street itself. As such, it is necessary to consider whether it is adjacent to: public property, access to a building, or private property to which the public is admitted.
The County’s Position Before Construction
[21] The application, and the action for damages which Berardi seeks to continue, rests on two arguments: first and foremost, Berardi argues that the retaining wall does not meet the definition of a designated structure and therefore no building permit is required.
[22] Berardi’s allegations of damages, which it seeks to pursue in an action hereafter, rely on the communications of the County before and after construction of the wall began. The county’s eventual position is that the retaining wall does not meet the requisite standard and may have to be demolished and rebuilt, or otherwise remediated.
[23] The evidence shows that Berardi communicated with the County about the retaining wall, prior to construction, on a number of occasions. On each occasion, Berardi was advised that the intended retaining wall did not require a building permit.
The Timeline and a Review of the Communications Between Berardi and the County
[24] I outline here a brief review of the communications between the parties on the issue of the retaining wall:
[25] I begin by stating that Berardi made several inquiries with the County in an effort to determine whether a building permit would be required.
[26] The retaining wall was depicted on the draft preliminary grading plan and functional servicing report which were submitted to the County in November 2021.
[27] In an email between the County building inspector and Berardi, dated December 10, 2021, the County advised that no building permit was necessary.
[28] On July 25, 2022, Berardi’s planning consultants contacted the County to inquire whether there were concerns with or objections to the construction of the wall. That email stated the following:
Good afternoon Gentleman:
We are the planning consultants for Mr. Berardi and have been trying to secure comments from the planning staff to the proposed Draft Plan and Zoning Bylaw as noted above with no success over several months.
In the interim, our client wants to construct a retaining wall on the property to secure a slope and wants confirmation that the County has no concerns or objections if he was to proceed to construct on their private property.
Please review and provide your comments.
[29] On August 2, 2022, the County’s Project Manager of Development Engineering, Environmental and Infrastructure Services Division, Tim Dickhout, advised Berardi that the retaining wall was “not a structure” and that they had “no lot level controls to limit your ability to secure the slope.” In relation to this response from the County August 2, 2022 communication, since this litigation commenced, the County has disclosed communications previously unknown to Berardi. These are communications between employees of the County’s building department.
[30] The disclosure is of communications from Tim Dickhout to a number of people at the building department, including Fritz Enzlin, the Chief Building Official, on June 3, 2022. Dickhout’s email asked, inter alia:
Would someone in the Building Department determine if the retaining wall as depicted on the attached drawing would be considered a designated structure and require a building permit? I believe that there is a commercial use adjacent to the property (near proposed Block 19) which might influence the decision, but the overall height of the wall might not warrant a permit. As well, the retaining will be constructed close to existing structures at the dead end of Temperance Street.
[31] In response, the Chief Building Official wrote on June 10, 2022, “The wall is less than 3m in height from adjacent grade and therefore would not require a permit.”
[32] The Chief Building Official did not inquire further about the potential uses of properties adjacent to the Property, or to the retaining wall, or make any other request for further information. In cross examination on this application, the Chief Building Official admitted that he did not review anything other than the email communications before coming to his conclusion.
[33] The County does not deny that it told the Applicant on more than one occasion that a building permit was not required. It argues, however, that the situation had changed when the County sent a Notice of Decision to Berardi in relation to its development proposal. This notice was delivered after the various admitted communications advising that no building permit was required.
[34] That document referred to as the Notice of Decision included conditions for the Draft Plan of Subdivision. Condition #4 of that document provides:
AND FURTHER THAT the Owner covenants and agrees that the subject lands will not be developed, serviced, altered, disturbed or graded prior to the final plan approval.
[35] On or about May 8, 2023, prior to the commencement of construction of the retaining wall, an agent wrote on behalf of Berardi to the Supervisor, Development Planning at Norfolk, requesting, inter alia, changes to above noted Condition #4, to “be modified to acknowledge: that owner may implement the required retaining wall as previously discussed with the municipality and accepts responsibility for the retaining wall if built prior to the final plan of approval.”
[36] By email dated May 12, 2023, Berardi was advised that the request to change Condition #4 was denied. The response stated “generally we do not have exception within the condition. Previously Development Engineering allowed site alteration under certain conditions. You may want to talk about this with Engineering during further review process.”
[37] Robert Berardi is the president of Berardi Construction (the corporate entity). In his affidavit in support of these proceedings, he does not deny the communications above, but he indicates that he did further speak about the retaining wall with the County, during a the subsequent/further review process. Robert Berardi swore that in September 2023, months after the above noted communication, he had a meeting at the Property with County engineering and planning staff, Berardi’s consulting engineer and the owner of another development property located across the street, Mayberry Homes. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss subdivision and to further discuss his intention to construct the retaining wall. It is the uncontradicted evidence of Robert Berardi that during those discussions, County staff once again advised him that no building permit would be required for the retaining wall.
[38] The issue of what was permitted was also canvassed during the cross examination of the Chief Building Official:
Q. What restrictions are there for altering the existing grade of a land for movement, removal or placement of fill?
A. I don't believe there is currently any.
Q. So if a building permit is not required for the retaining wall and there is no site alteration by-law, what restrictions are there for moving fill at the property?
A. My understanding would be is that there isn't any other than potentially or possibly the property standards by-law.
[39] Later in cross examination, specifically addressing the conditions of approval, the following was put to the Chief Building Official:
Q. ...[T]he conditions of approval have no bearing on whether or not a building permit is required; right?
A. That's correct. That's correct.
[40] Construction on the retaining wall was started in March 2024.
[41] In April 2024, the County received a complaint about the wall and the Chief Building Official attended to visually inspect the construction roadside, without stepping onto the property. It is his evidence that, based on his visual inspection, which was unaided by any drawings, plans or other information, and without having inspected or informed himself about the use or zoning of adjacent properties, he determined that the retaining wall met the definition of a designated structure. He issued the order to comply that is in issue in this application.
[42] The order was issued on April 19, 2024. Since that date, the wall remains partially constructed.
[43] On or about April 23, 2024, Berardi received an email from the Chief Building Official, advising that it was his position that a building permit was required “as per Article 1.1.2.2.(2) of the Ontario Building Code.” On this position, he determined the wall is a “designated structure”. And further stated:
“The retaining wall in my opinion is in close proximity to the front property line adjacent to public property being County road allowance (Nichol St) and is within a development that provides a common element to residents….If it were to be determined by the court that this wall does not require a building permit, it would not relieve the County from exercising its due diligence to ensure that the wall is designed to good engineering practice.” [Emphasis added.]
[44] The Chief Building Official describes himself as the director of the building department for the County. He manages the staff, building inspector, and building administration team. His team issues building permits and orders and conducts inspections for new constructions and renovations.
[45] In an affidavit in support of this proceeding, the Chief Building Official swore, “Norfolk County had not received sufficient and/or accurate information required in order to properly assess and make an informed decision as to whether a building permit would be required for the construction of the retaining wall.”
[46] During cross examinations, he agreed that he made this statement relying on his review of an email chain, and that he did not review the file or any documentation that had been provided by Berardi to that date.
[47] The Chief Building Official also opined, "I have reason to believe that the retaining wall may be under-designed and therefore will require you to provide proper engineered design of the wall when submitting application for a building permit." When asked under oath the basis for this conclusion, it appears that he drew that conclusion from his one viewing at the Property line.
[48] I note that the evidence shows that the retaining wall starts about 26 feet from Nicol Street and is about 10 feet from the start of the Property line, and that it is 12 inches above grade at that starting point. It travels about 116 feet to the rear of the Berardi Property and then travels along the back property line at a height of 12 feet.
[49] The County requested drawings of the retaining wall and on April 23, 2024, Berardi provided an “as built” sketch of the wall.
[50] The sketch was prepared after the order to comply was issued and after construction of the retaining wall commenced, for the purposes of providing a response to the notice to comply and the Chief Building Official’s indication that he would require drawings.
[51] It appears that on or about May 14, 2024, the County contacted Tacoma Engineering to conduct a review of structural soundness of the retaining wall.
[52] About a week later, on May 20, 2024, the Chief Building Official advised Berardi that the County was not disputing that Berardi was told that no building permit was required. However, the County requested engineer stamped drawings of the wall.
[53] It is the evidence of Berardi that on May 30, 2024, J. H. Cohoon Engineering Limited prepared an engineer stamped drawing of the retaining wall and provided it to the County.
[54] There was no response from Chief Building Official or any other representative of the County in regard to the engineer stamped drawing. On or about June 10, 2024, J.H. Cohoon Engineering Limited attempted to contact the Chief Building Official via email, offering to discuss and assist with addressing any concerns of the County in relation to the retaining wall.
[55] On June 17, 2024, another attempt was made to contact the Chief Building Official via email to follow-up on the previous email. No response was received to either email.
[56] There is nothing before me to suggest that the County ever requested an onsite inspection when Berardi provided its Preliminary Grading Plan and Functional Servicing Report in 2021, nor were any requests made in 2022, when Berardi further inquired about the construction of the retaining wall, or at any time prior to the Chief Building Official’s attendance on the date he issued the order to comply in 2024, which attendance was prompted by the receipt of a complaint.
[57] The County retained engineers to conduct a peer review of Berardi’s engineer’s drawings. The County’s engineers did not do a site visit. The review concluded that there are deficiencies according to the property standards by-law.
[58] As of the hearing of the application, the County had issued neither a stop work order nor a property standards by-law order.
[59] The evidence of the Chief Building Official is that if the retaining wall is not governed by the Building Code, then engineer stamped drawings would not generally have been required. He testified however, that as the Chief Building Official, he has the discretion to require drawings, and to request a peer review under s. 18(1) of the Act.
[60] The County argues that Norfolk’s Property Standards By-law No. 2022-24 governs the repair and structural soundness of retaining walls. Berardi does not dispute this but argues that the Property Standards By-law does not give the County the discretion to require building permits for retaining walls. This Application is limited to a consideration of whether a building permit is required.
Section 8 of the Act and the Requirement for a Building Permit
[61] It appears that the County took a casual approach to providing Berardi with the direction, in 2021, 2022, and 2023, that no building permit was required to build its proposed retaining wall, and then took an equally casual approach to the decision to reverse itself and require a building permit.
[62] The County acknowledges that they had initially opined that the retaining wall was not a designated structure. There is no dispute that, since the County provided that direction, the Act has not changed and the location of the proposed retaining wall has not changed. There is no evidence that the use or zoning of the adjacent properties has changed.
[63] It may be argued that the decision of the Chief Building Official was not a reasonable one, since it did not appear to rely on a consideration of the specifics of the Act, the relevant facts relating to the retaining wall itself, or the circumstances of the immediately adjacent properties, which consideration would have been necessary in order to conclude that the retaining wall was a designated structure.
[64] The determination of whether a decision is reasonable turns on a conclusion as to whether the outcome is reasonable as per the governing law and the facts. I am left to consider in these circumstances whether it was reasonable to conclude that the retaining wall is in fact adjacent to any of: public property, access to a building, or private property to which the public is admitted.
[65] Berardi argues that the following facts, taken together, lead to a conclusion that the retaining wall is not a designated structure under the Act:
(a) the retaining wall is adjacent to only private property;
(b) the retaining wall does not abut any public property;
(c) the retaining wall does not face any public property;
(d) no sidewalk is present or contemplated on the south side of Nichol Street;
(e) the retaining wall is not adjacent to any building access;
(f) there is no support in evidence for the claim that the public is admitted onto 178 Nichol Street;
(g) the neighbouring property has no office or public access structures; and
(h) there are no common elements relating to the development at the Property.
[66] In response, the County argues that the retaining wall is in fact adjacent to public property, being in close proximity to the county road, Nichol Street. It further argues that the retaining wall is directly adjacent to a private commercial lot where storage containers are placed and to which the public is admitted. Finally, the County argues that the storage containers on the adjacent property are buildings, and that the access to those buildings is adjacent to the retaining wall. All of these facts lead to a conclusion that the retaining wall is a designated structure.
[67] I have considered each of the criteria which might lead to a conclusion that the retaining wall is a designated structure.
Private Property Which Is Adjacent to Access to a Building
[68] The Chief Building Official indicated that he observed the storage containers on his inspection of the adjacent property, at 178 Nichol Street, from the roadside. He observed that some of the containers were placed parallel to the retaining wall, and he testified that he presumed the doors to the containers faced Nichol Street.
[69] The Chief Building Official was not aware of the specific zoning for the adjacent property and had not made any inquiries with the owner. All of his conclusions were based on his visual observation and some assumptions as to what could be occurring at that property. He testified in cross examination that he has no actual knowledge as to whether or not the public is in fact admitted onto the property, or whether the storage containers are in use.
[70] He concluded that the storage containers are buildings, and that access to them is adjacent to the retaining wall. He was unable to define his own interpretation of “adjacent” and he did not measure the distance between those doors and the wall.
[71] The only evidence as to how long the containers had been on the property at 178 Nichol Street was that of Robert Berardi, who testified in cross examination that the storage containers had previously been on Berardi’s Property, and that they belonged to the owner of 178 Nichol Street, and were moved onto the 178 Nichol St. property to facilitate the build of the retaining wall.
[72] It was agreed by the County that the storage containers could not remain there lawfully for more than 30 days. The evidence is that if storage containers are buildings, then they require building permits, and there was no evidence that those containers were at 178 Nichol Street on the authority of building permits.
[73] As the Chief Building Official was not aware of the zoning of the property at 178 Nichol Street, he was not able to indicate whether the zoning allowed for the storage containers to be situated there at all.
[74] The evidence is that there was no order to comply issued in relation to the removal of the storage containers.
[75] I find that there is no evidence which allows a reasonable conclusion on a balance of probabilities that the retaining wall is adjacent to access to a building.
Private Property Which Is Adjacent to Public Property
[76] The evidence is that the retaining wall begins approximately 26 feet from Nichol Street and it begins at about 10 feet from the start of the Property line. The wall runs perpendicular to Nichol Street. It has an exposed height of 12 inches at the closest edge to the street.
[77] No definition of the term “adjacent” has been provided, and as such I have considered its ordinary meaning. Without more, I do not find that it is reasonable to conclude that a retaining wall, which is perpendicular to a public roadway, and which has an exposed height of 12 inches where it begins, some 26 feet from that roadway, can be considered to be adjacent to that public property.
[78] Further, as the property at 178 Nichol Street is privately owned I do not find that it was reasonable to conclude that the wall was adjacent to public property.
Private Property to Which the Public Is Admitted
[79] I begin with the assumption that “to which the public is admitted” cannot mean private property to which any member of the public is admitted. That interpretation would render the qualification meaningless as it would include virtually all private property.
[80] In Queen’s University v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (1994), Local 229, the Court of Appeal for Ontario interpreted the Ontario Labour Relations Act and held that university buildings were not premises to which the public normally has access as “there was no unrestricted invitation to the public to enter either of the buildings”. In other words, there was no standing invitation for the public to enter.
[81] The Newfoundland Court of Appeal, in Atlantic Shopping Centres Ltd v. Newfoundland (Minister of Labour), para. 10, held that “members of the public” in their ordinary meaning refer to “persons to whom the occupier of a public building offers its services or facilities such as for shopping, entertainment or business.” The court in that case held that the second floor of a building which is accessible only to employees was not an area to which the public had lawful access.
[82] In Kennedy v. Leeds, Grenville and Lanark District Health Unit, 2009 ONCA 685, the Court of Appeal, at para. 50, interpreted the phrase “open to the public” in the Smoke-Free Ontario Act to mean places to which “members of the public are customarily invited and admitted”.
[83] In my view, it is really the definition of the word “public” that is in issue. Clearly, people are admitted onto private properties. Which people are the public?
[84] I conclude that in specifying “private property to which the public is admitted”, the intention was to necessarily imply more than the owners and their friends and family, and incidental access such as that by parcel delivery people.
[85] The respondent relies on the decision in Flaro v. Roffey, [1993] O.J. No. 562. In that decision, there was no analysis which accompanied the conclusion that a retaining wall that was not adjacent to public property, or access to a building, and which was adjacent only to a private residence was nevertheless “adjacent to a private property to which the public is admitted”.
[86] The only evidence reviewed in the Roffey decision discloses that the adjacent property was a single family residence. It is not clear whether the applicants in that case made submissions on this issue, or opposed the conclusion. Given the brevity of that court’s dealing with the matter, which was simply to state “I agree with that submission”, I am unable to conclude whether it is distinguished from the present case on the facts, or whether I differ on an interpretation of the law.
[87] In this case, there is a paucity of evidence as to the use of the neighbouring private property. The County made no inquiry at the time of reversing its decision on the issue of the need for a building permit and produced no evidence upon which to support its position during this application, other than to refer to photographs which show storage containers on the property.
[88] The Chief Building Official testified that he did not make any inquiries about the use of the neighbouring property, not from the owner of the property, or anyone. He testified that he was not aware of the specific zoning of the neighbouring property, nor of what uses could be made of that property.
[89] The parties agree that the storage containers could only remain on the adjacent property lawfully for 30 days. There was no evidence as to whether the storage containers were in use and whether the use was by the owner or other members of the public, other than the evidence of Robert Berardi, who testified that he had “spoken to the owner many times, it is private property, he does not have even a washroom in that building.”
[90] Robert Berardi’s evidence is that the storage containers, belonging to the neighbour were previously on Berardi’s property, and that Berardi moved them onto the neighbour’s property prior to building the wall. Berardi’s evidence was that the public had not accessed the neighbouring property as it was only used by the neighbours themselves, who are private contractors.
[91] In all of the circumstances, I conclude that the phrase “private property to which the public is admitted” refers to private property over which the owner generally extends a broad or unrestricted invitation to the public as a component of a commercial operation undertaken on the property.
[92] There is no evidence at all upon which one might reasonably conclude that Berardi’s retaining wall is adjacent to private property to which the public is admitted.
The Property Standards By-law
[93] Upon this application having been brought, the County took an additional position: that the wall is not compliant with the Property Standards By-Law 2022-24 and contrary to the Draft Plan of Subdivision approval received by Berardi on May 16, 2024 (after construction of the wall). It is Berardi’s submission that these factors are not relevant to the issue of whether a building permit is required for the retaining wall for the following reasons:
(a) The order to comply refers only to s. 8(1) of the Act;
(b) The requirement of a building permit is imposed solely by the Act;
(c) No property standards order has been issued by the County as of the hearing of the application; and
(d) No notice of breach of conditions has been provided by the County as of the hearing of the motion.
[94] Neither the Property Standards By-Law 2022-24 nor the approval of the Draft Plan of Subdivision have a bearing on whether a building permit ought to have been obtained, and, as such, I agree that it is irrelevant to the issues in dispute in this application.
Decision
[95] I conclude that no building permit was required as the evidence does not show on a balance of probabilities that the retaining wall meets the definition of a “designated structure” as defined in s. 1.3.1.1.(1) of the Code. The Order to comply is rescinded.
[96] The issue of damages is directed to proceed to trial.
Costs
[97] I would urge the parties to agree on costs. If the parties are unable to come to an agreement, then costs submissions may be made as follows:
a. Within 15 calendar days of the distribution of these reasons to counsel, the Plaintiff shall serve and file their written costs submissions, not exceeding three pages, double-spaced in 12pt font, together with a draft bill of costs and copies of any pertinent offers;
b. The Defendant shall serve and file its responding costs submissions of no more than three pages, double-spaced in 12pt font, together with a draft bill of costs and copies of any pertinent offers, within 25 calendar days of the distribution of these reasons;
c. The Plaintiff’s reply submissions, if any, are to be served and filed within 30 calendar days of the distribution of these reasons, and are not to exceed two pages;
d. If no submissions are received from either party within the timeline allocated, said party shall be deemed to have no submissions; and
e. If no submissions are received from both parties, the parties will be deemed to have resolved the issue of the costs, and costs will not be determined by me.
Antoniani, J.
Released: June 20, 2025

