Drew Leon Bowyer

The court considered whether to rescind an agreement of purchase and sale for farmland and a residence, where the defendant failed to register a severance as required, preventing the plaintiff from regaining title to the house.

The court found the defendant breached a fundamental condition of the agreement and ordered a new severance application, with rescission as an alternative remedy if the severance could not be obtained.

The court also addressed allocation of severance costs, property taxes, and the removal of a fence.

This costs decision follows the successful application by Deborah Lynn Ferris for the removal of her brother, Christopher Ferris, as co-estate trustee of their late father's estate.

The court reviews the parties' submissions and the applicable legal principles, ultimately awarding full indemnity costs to the applicant, with a blended order requiring Christopher Ferris to pay 75% of the applicant's costs and the balance to be paid from the estate.

The court finds Christopher Ferris's conduct to be worthy of sanction and characterizes it as reprehensible and outrageous.

The Children's Aid Society brought a protection application regarding two children.

The older child disclosed sexual abuse by the mother's new partner, and the mother failed to protect the child, eventually resuming her relationship with the abuser.

The children were placed in the temporary care of their paternal grandparents.

At trial, the court found the children in need of protection.

The father sought custody but had moved to a new city with a partner who had seven children recovering from severe trauma, and the older child refused contact with him.

The court granted a final custody order to the paternal grandparents under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, finding it in the children's best interests, and ordered a structured access schedule for the parents.

The applicant mother brought a motion to vary child support, seeking to impute income to the respondent father who had been unemployed for over ten years.

The respondent brought a cross-motion for retroactive child support, alleging the applicant failed to disclose her increasing income and worked undisclosed jobs.

The court imputed income to both parties: to the applicant for 'under the table' restaurant work and a home business, and to the respondent at an ODSP-equivalent level.

Finding the applicant's failure to disclose her income tax returns as ordered constituted blameworthy conduct, the court ordered retroactive child support payable by the applicant from 2015.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a 2016 consent order to allow her to relocate the parties' two children from Cambridge to Waterford in Norfolk County.

The mother had previously moved the children without consent and was found in contempt, but argued she had no choice due to severe financial hardship and the offer of employment and housing from her family in Norfolk County.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the significant economic and emotional benefits available to the mother and children in Waterford.

The court concluded that the mother was the primary parent and that the relocation was in the children's best interests, granting the move and establishing a new parenting schedule.

The father appealed the dismissal of his contempt and summary judgment motions by a lower court.

The motions judge had found the mother was no longer in contempt after relocating the children back to the agreed-upon area and that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the mother's motion to change the parenting order (mobility issue).

The appellate court dismissed the father's appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's application of family law principles.

The court affirmed that the primary purpose of contempt (ensuring compliance) had been achieved and that the mother's motion to change, involving a mobility issue, should be heard on its merits, requiring a fresh inquiry into the children's best interests.

Following a family law trial, the court determined the issue of costs after the successful party had made multiple offers to settle for amounts less than the ultimate judgment.

The court found that the trial was unnecessary in light of the earlier offers and that the successful party was therefore entitled to substantial indemnity costs for preparation and attendance at trial.

Because the moving party failed to provide docket details with the original costs submissions, the court independently calculated allowable hours for trial and preparation.

The court fixed legal fees, law clerk time, and disbursements and applied HST to the approved legal fees.

The parties lived in an unmarried domestic arrangement and jointly operated several motel properties over many years.

Following their separation, the plaintiff claimed an interest in the properties based on unjust enrichment and a joint family venture.

The court found that the parties operated as a partnership, contributing equal effort and capital.

The plaintiff was awarded a 50% interest in the Fairview Motel, a 50% share of the proceeds from the sale of the Queensway Motel, a 25% interest in the Hillcrest property, and reimbursement for joint funds unilaterally withdrawn by the defendant.

The plaintiff's claim for spousal support was dismissed.

Commercial tenant sought a declaration that its lease remained in force after the landlord purported to terminate the lease for alleged non‑rental defaults involving use of areas outside the leased premises.

The court held that the landlord’s termination was invalid because the statutory notice under s.19(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act was deficient, failed to require monetary compensation for the alleged breaches, and the landlord had waived reliance on the defaults by accepting rent after issuing the notice.

The alleged conduct was also largely condoned for years and was not sufficiently serious to justify forfeiture.

The lease therefore remained in effect and the tenant was entitled to damages for the wrongful lockout.

The quantification of damages was deferred to a later proceeding.

Costs decision following multiple motions in a matrimonial proceeding concerning disclosure issues and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The court found that although success on some minor issues was divided, the applicant was successful on the principal contested matter relating to control of the listing and sale of the matrimonial home.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs, but the court declined to award them due to the absence of settlement offers and lack of egregious conduct by the respondent.

Applying a partial indemnity approach and recognizing the mixed success, the court fixed costs at $2,000 inclusive of HST.

The court ordered that the amount be paid from the respondent’s share of the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home with interest.

Following earlier reasons on family law motions, the court addressed the issue of costs after inviting written submissions when the parties were unable to agree.

The responding party had been largely successful on the substantive motion and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The moving party argued costs should be deferred because the spousal support relief granted was only interim in nature.

The court rejected that argument and held that the successful party was entitled to costs immediately.

Due to insufficient differentiation in counsel’s bill of costs between settled issues and argued issues, the court fixed costs at a reduced all‑inclusive amount.

On cross-motions in a family proceeding, the applicant sought interim access while the respondent sought child and spousal support.

The principal issue was whether the applicant stood in the place of a parent to a stepchild who had lived with the parties for approximately ten years.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada framework for determining whether a person stands in the place of a parent, the court found that the applicant had assumed a parental role and therefore owed support under the Divorce Act.

Interim child support for two children was ordered after accounting for the biological father’s obligation, and interim spousal support was awarded due to the respondent’s illness and substantial loss of income.