Jeffrey R. Goit

The court considered a motion for summary judgment brought by Allstate Insurance Company of Canada to determine whether William Bezemer was at least 1% liable for a motor vehicle accident involving the plaintiff, Charmaine Farrugia.

The accident involved an unidentified third driver, John Doe.

The court found that a third vehicle was involved and that Mr. Bezemer was not negligent, applying the "agony of the moment" doctrine.

The action was dismissed as against Mr. Bezemer, and costs were awarded.

The applicant sought a declaration of insurance coverage and relief from forfeiture after the respondent insurer denied coverage due to the applicant's misrepresentation and civil fraud regarding a motor vehicle accident.

The court found the applicant breached her insurance contract and committed civil fraud by falsely representing herself as the driver and lying under oath.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application, denying relief from forfeiture due to the fraudulent conduct and the gravity of the breach.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that declined to order a special award under s. 10 of Regulation 664 for the respondent's alleged unreasonable withholding of Income Replacement Benefits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the issues raised regarding the adjudicator's assessment of expert evidence and the respondent's conduct were questions of fact or mixed fact and law, not extricable questions of law.

The court concluded there was ample evidence to support the adjudicator's factual findings.

The appellant (defendant at trial) appealed a judgment awarding damages for a respiratory injury allegedly caused by being sprayed with a fire extinguisher.

The appeal raised issues regarding the admission of participant expert evidence, the adequacy of the trial judge's reasons for not considering defence expert evidence on causation, and the quantum of non-pecuniary damages.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons insufficient for failing to analyze the appellant's expert evidence on the diagnosis of Reactive Airways Disorder Syndrome (RADS) and for relying on an unqualified expert's incorrect summary of other specialists' views.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a commercial bakery, appealed a summary judgment dismissal of its insurance claim against Intact Insurance Company for losses resulting from a power outage caused by an ice storm in December 2013.

The losses claimed included stock spoilage and business interruption.

The motion judge found that exclusionary clauses in the insurance policy precluded coverage because the loss or damage to electrical transmission lines or distribution lines was not located on the appellant's premises.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's interpretation of the policy and rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding partial summary judgment principles and the need for expert evidence.

The plaintiff, a commercial bakery, sought damages for stock spoilage and business interruption following a power outage caused by an ice storm.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the policy's exclusions for loss or damage to electrical transmission or distribution lines not located on the premises applied.

The court found that the policy exclusions clearly precluded coverage for both stock spoilage and business interruption losses caused by damage to off-premises electrical transmission lines.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the insurer.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's administrative dismissal of his personal injury action.

The plaintiff argued he was under a disability at the time of the dismissal and, alternatively, that the dismissal should be set aside based on the Reid factors.

The court found the plaintiff did not meet the strict definition of disability under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, applying the Reid factors, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the dismissal, noting the plaintiff's mental health struggles, his self-represented status at the time, the shared responsibility for delay, and the lack of significant prejudice to the defendants.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to validate the late service of a statement of claim.

Although the claim was issued within the two-year limitation period, it was served more than two years after the six-month service deadline under the Rules of Civil Procedure, causing the limitation period to expire before service.

The appellant argued that the defendant waived the irregular service by delivering a statement of defence and that the motion judge erred in finding prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both arguments, finding no waiver and no error in the motion judge's prejudice analysis.

The appellant, a plaintiff and defendant by counterclaim in a motor vehicle accident action, appealed a Master's order dismissing his motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The appellant argued that because he was counterclaimed against for contribution and indemnity regarding his co-plaintiff daughter's damages, their joint counsel was in a disqualifying conflict.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's conclusions that the risk of conflict was remote, that the clients had provided fully informed consent to waive any potential conflict, and that the risk of improper disclosure of confidential information was speculative.

The plaintiff, Parker Pad & Printing Ltd., sought partial summary judgment against its insurer, Gore Mutual Insurance Company, regarding coverage for water damage caused by significant rainfall.

The property insurance policy excluded "flood" (defined as the rising, breaking out, or overflow of any body of water) and seepage from natural sources through foundations.

The plaintiff also had a flood endorsement with an identical "flood" definition.

The court found that the pooling of rainwater did not constitute a "flood" as restrictively defined in the policy or endorsement, as it was not a pre-existing body of water.

Therefore, the damage was not covered by the flood endorsement and was excluded by the policy's seepage clause.

The motion for partial summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision dismissing his application for arbitration regarding an outstanding account for a catastrophic rebuttal report from a service provider.

The arbitrator found that the appellant had previously settled his accident benefits claim on a full and final basis and that the true claimant was the service provider, which lacked standing to commence arbitration in the insured's name.

The Director's Delegate confirmed the arbitrator's decision, holding that the service provider had no standing and that the prior settlement precluded further claims since the appellant had not rescinded the settlement or returned the funds.

The plaintiffs, a married couple, sued their insurer for the balance of a contents claim after their house was destroyed by fire.

The insurer appealed an interlocutory order that permitted the plaintiffs to attend each other's examinations for discovery.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in applying a strict test from a Court of Appeal decision dealing with the exclusion of witnesses at trial.

The Court held that for discoveries, the onus is on the party seeking exclusion to demonstrate it is necessary to meet the ends of justice.

Given that the plaintiffs had identical interests, shared counsel, and their credibility was the central issue, there was a risk of tailoring evidence.

The Court ordered the plaintiffs to be examined individually.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for a claim against their home insurance provider following extensive water damage to their property.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the damage fell under policy exclusions.

The court reviewed expert reports which unanimously concluded the water entry was caused by continuous seepage through the foundation and wear and tear, rather than a sudden and accidental escape of water.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, held that the damage was excluded under the policy, and granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action.

The applicant claimed statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident and applied for arbitration when disputes arose with the insurer.

The applicant failed to communicate with his legal representatives for over a year and did not attend the arbitration hearing.

The applicant's counsel requested an adjournment, which was denied as there was no reasonable prospect of locating the applicant.

The arbitrator dismissed the application on a without costs basis due to abandonment.