Sandra Antoniani

The court considered costs following a 13-day trial in which the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed in its entirety.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, relying on their complete success and the plaintiff’s rejection of settlement offers.

The court reviewed the scale and quantum of costs, the parties’ conduct, and the complexity and importance of the case.

Ultimately, the court awarded the defendants $155,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, less a prior set-off, declining to order substantial indemnity or to affect property held in trust in related proceedings.

The court considered a failed real estate transaction for a commercial property, where the plaintiff sought rescission and return of a $50,000 deposit after discovering outstanding work orders for a fuel tank.

The defendants counterclaimed for forfeiture of the deposit and damages.

The court found that the defendants repudiated the agreement, the plaintiff accepted the repudiation, and the defendants were unjustly enriched by retaining the deposit.

The court ordered the return of the deposit and dismissed all other claims.

The defendant moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against their property and sought security for costs, arguing the plaintiff, a non-resident, had no Canadian assets.

The plaintiff cross-moved for a Mareva injunction.

The court discharged the CPL, finding no evidentiary support for the plaintiff's claim to an interest in the land.

The Mareva injunction was dismissed as the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case and, even if they had, the "clean hands" doctrine would apply due to the plaintiff's admitted involvement in an illegal lending scheme.

Security for costs was ordered against the plaintiff in the amount of $50,000, as she is a foreign national with no Canadian assets and was not found to be impecunious.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order compelling the respondents, unit owners, to remove alterations made to common elements without consent, in violation of sections 97 and 98 of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The respondents argued they had obtained consent or were being treated unfairly compared to other owners.

The court found that no valid consent was given for the expansion of their fenced backyard into common elements and rejected the argument of unfair treatment due to lack of evidence.

The application was granted, ordering the respondents to restore the common elements at their own expense.

The plaintiff, Rana Alsous, claimed a beneficial interest in a property (227 Rymal Road) held in the names of the defendants, Bishara and Duaa Hadweh, asserting it was purchased with her funds or gifted to her.

The defendants contended the property was beneficially owned by their father, Ibrahim, who provided the funds for an earlier property (536 Upper Sherman Avenue) which was then used for Rymal Road.

The court found that Ibrahim provided the funds for Upper Sherman, and Rana held it in a resulting trust for him, failing to rebut this presumption.

Consequently, the proceeds from Upper Sherman, used for Rymal Road, also belonged to Ibrahim, and the defendants held Rymal Road in trust for him.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a motion to appoint a litigation guardian for an incapable party in family proceedings.

The court found that the motion itself was largely unnecessary, as the proposed litigation guardian already held a power of attorney with express authority.

Both parties engaged in unreasonable and irrelevant litigation conduct, focusing on personal allegations rather than the core issue, which significantly inflated the costs.

The court awarded a substantially reduced amount of costs to the applicant, reflecting only the necessary portion of the litigation, and directed the litigation guardian to seek court approval for legal accounts before recovering from the incapable person's estate.

The plaintiffs (vendors) brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a $50,000 deposit from the defendants (purchasers) after a residential real estate deal failed.

The vendors argued a binding agreement was formed, while the purchasers contended that the vendors' addition of "Schedule B" and requirement for its acknowledgment constituted a counteroffer that was never accepted.

The court applied the test for summary judgment and found that the vendors' actions, including the MLS listing stipulation and the demand for Schedule B to be initialled and signed, indicated they considered Schedule B an essential part of the agreement.

Therefore, the return of the agreement with Schedule B was a counteroffer, which the purchasers did not accept.

The court concluded that no binding contract existed and dismissed the vendors' claim for the deposit.

The applicant, Alan Durand, as Estate Trustee for Helen and Zsolt Molnar, brought a motion seeking a "Benjamin" order to distribute Helen's estate as if a beneficiary (Kata Kovacs) had predeceased Helen, and a declaration that Zsolt's Tax-Free Savings Account (TFSA) beneficiary designations were invalid due to undue influence or lack of capacity.

The court declared the TFSA designations invalid due to undue influence, finding they were made during a period when Zsolt was under undue influence from his former house cleaner.

The court also appointed Alan Durand as Estate Trustee for Helen Molnar.

However, the request for a "Benjamin" order was adjourned, as the applicant had not yet made sufficient efforts to locate the beneficiary or her issue.

The applicant, the deceased's former wife, sought equalization of net family property (NFP), a declaration that the deceased's 2018 will was invalid, and damages for personal property.

The court dismissed all claims.

The NFP equalization claim was found to be time-barred as it was brought outside the six-month limitation period under the Family Law Act, and even if timely, would have been unconscionable given the marriage's 75-day duration.

The challenge to the 2018 will based on undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity was dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

Claims for damages related to vehicles and other personal property were also dismissed for lack of corroboration and merit.

The applicant, Kenneth Bettes, brought a pre-trial application under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 1447 days (47.5 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Courts set by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, deducting periods attributable to defence conduct (illegitimate actions of first counsel, new counsel's failure to schedule, illegitimate scheduling of a voir dire, and a speculative s. 278 application) and discrete events (COVID-19 court closure, late disclosure by complainant).

The court found the net delay to be 774 days (25.46 months), well below the Jordan ceiling.

Consequently, the defence failed to establish that the delay was unreasonable, and the application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant, Issa Mohammed Abdulkadir, moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by Gore Mutual Insurance Company.

The judgment was for $125,000 plus costs, representing a settlement paid by the insurer in a prior litigation (Alsop litigation) where the insurer had denied coverage to the defendant and taken a Statutory Third Party position.

The defendant argued he was unaware of the current litigation and believed he was covered.

The court applied the five-factor test for setting aside default judgment from Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen.

The court found the motion was brought promptly, the defendant had a plausible explanation for not understanding communications, and an arguable defence existed regarding the insurer's right to reimbursement under s. 258(13) of the Insurance Act and a potential claim for relief from forfeiture.

Balancing the prejudice, the court found the prejudice to the defendant was more substantial.

The default judgment was set aside, and the defendant was granted 45 days to file a Statement of Defence.

The applicant, Langs Community Development Corporation (LCDC), sought a declaration that its property was exempt from municipal property tax under s. 3(1)(12)iii of the Assessment Act, arguing it was a charitable, non-profit corporation organized for the relief of the poor and supported by public funds.

The respondents opposed, arguing LCDC did not meet the statutory requirements.

The court found that LCDC shared an identity in patrimony with Langs Farm Village Association (Langs), was supported in part by public funds (through a significant grant from the City of Cambridge), and was organized for the relief of the poor, both independently and by virtue of its shared identity with Langs.

The application for tax exemption was granted.

The applicant, Victoria Wong, sought a declaration that Aviva Insurance Company of Canada owed her a defence and indemnity under an insurance policy following a motor vehicle accident.

Aviva denied coverage, alleging breach of contract and civil fraud, stemming from Wong's misrepresentation that her mother, Chang Tieu, was driving the vehicle, and their subsequent collusion, including Tieu's false testimony under oath during discovery, assisted by Wong.

Wong also sought relief from forfeiture.

Aviva brought a cross-application to be added as a Statutory Third Party.

The court found that Wong breached her insurance contract and committed civil fraud, and that her conduct barred her from relief from forfeiture.

Consequently, Wong's application was dismissed, and Aviva's cross-application to be added as a Statutory Third Party was granted.

The applicant sought a declaration of insurance coverage and relief from forfeiture after the respondent insurer denied coverage due to the applicant's misrepresentation and civil fraud regarding a motor vehicle accident.

The court found the applicant breached her insurance contract and committed civil fraud by falsely representing herself as the driver and lying under oath.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application, denying relief from forfeiture due to the fraudulent conduct and the gravity of the breach.

The defendant High Tide Inc. brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the action against it by Highland Cannabis Inc., alleging the claims were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and that the pleaded torts of intrusion upon seclusion and conversion were not available.

The court found that the claims against High Tide Inc. were frivolous and vexatious, and that neither the tort of intrusion upon seclusion nor conversion applied to the facts of a data breach involving business sales data.

The motion was granted, and the action against High Tide Inc. was dismissed.

The applicants, the daughter and son-in-law of the deceased, sought a declaration of their beneficial ownership in two properties that the deceased had transferred into joint tenancy with them for no consideration.

Prior to his death, the deceased unilaterally severed the joint tenancies and claimed the properties were held in trust for him.

The court found that at the time of the transfers, the deceased intended to make inter vivos gifts of the right of survivorship to save on probate fees.

The presumption of resulting trust was rebutted, and the applicants were declared to hold a two-thirds legal and beneficial interest in the properties.