Peter M. Reinitzer

The defendants brought a motion to amend their pleadings to include allegations of historic sexual assaults and information from a dormant 1989 action, and to consolidate the present action with a related lawyer negligence action.

The court granted the consolidation on consent.

However, the court dismissed the motion to amend the pleadings, finding that the eleventh-hour amendments would cause non-compensable prejudice to the elderly plaintiffs by requiring a substantial adjournment of the impending trial.

The court also found that using the sexual assault allegations as a juristic reason to deny an unjust enrichment claim was not legally tenable.

The respondents purchased a property in 2021 and discovered significant foundation defects in a dwelling constructed between 1986 and 1987.

They sued the appellant municipality in 2022 for negligent supervision of the construction.

The motion judge dismissed the municipality's summary judgment motion, finding that the municipality had an ongoing duty to monitor the open building permit, which constituted a continuous omission tolling the 15-year ultimate limitation period under s. 15(6)(a) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a continuous act or omission requires successive or repetitive actionable conduct, which was absent here.

The claim was therefore statute-barred by the ultimate limitation period.

The Court also noted the motion judge erred in recognizing a novel duty to monitor without conducting an Anns/Cooper analysis.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, commenced an action against his former landlord for the disposal of business assets and related mental distress.

The motion judge dismissed the action as a nullity, finding that only the trustee in bankruptcy had the capacity to sue.

On appeal, the appellant argued the assets were exempt 'tools of the trade' under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the exemption limit was only $11,300, the claim sought damages rather than the return of property, and the mental distress claim was inextricably linked to the property claim belonging to the bankrupt estate.

The respondents purchased a motel and gas station from the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the underground fuel tank system and breached the Agreement of Purchase and Sale by failing to provide a required safety compliance report.

The trial judge awarded damages based on the cost to replace the tank system.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by not granting an adjournment due to late disclosure of a Pierringer agreement, misapprehending evidence about compliance alternatives, and using the wrong measure of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants never requested an adjournment or stay at trial, and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of damages or contractual interpretation.

The Township of McMurrich Monteith brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss a negligence claim by the plaintiffs, William and Emily Huether, on the grounds that the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs alleged the Township was negligent for failing to continuously monitor an open building permit file and conduct necessary inspections for a house built in 1986, whose foundation was failing.

The Township argued its duty ended with construction or permit closure in 1988, making the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the Township had a continuous duty to monitor its open permit file until the building was substantially complete and met occupancy conditions, which never occurred.

Therefore, the ultimate limitation period under s. 15(2) of the Limitations Act did not apply, and s. 15(6) for continuous omissions applied.

The Township's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(3)(b) to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing that the plaintiff, an undischarged bankrupt, lacked the legal capacity to commence the action.

The plaintiff contended this was a misnomer curable under Rule 5.

The court found that the property forming the basis of the claim vested in the trustee in bankruptcy upon the plaintiff's assignment into bankruptcy, and the plaintiff's failure to disclose these substantial assets to the trustee meant the action, commenced while he was an undischarged bankrupt, was a nullity.

The court distinguished the case from situations where a misnomer could be cured, noting the trustee was a distinct party and had not sought to be substituted.

The motion to dismiss was granted, and the action was deemed a nullity, having been commenced outside the limitation period if re-filed.

The plaintiffs purchased a motel and gas station from the defendants.

Prior to the sale, the defendants represented that the fuel tank system was in good condition and only required routine testing, concealing outstanding TSSA orders and a history of non-compliance.

The Agreement of Purchase and Sale included a clause requiring the defendants to provide a report confirming the system was safe and compliant, which they failed to do.

The plaintiffs subsequently discovered the system was non-compliant and faced closure by the TSSA, forcing them to incur significant costs to install a new system.

The court found the defendants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.

The court also found the plaintiffs' real estate lawyer negligent for failing to adequately protect them in the transaction.

Liability for the $635,189.12 in damages was apportioned 80% to the defendants and 20% to the lawyer.

The municipality appealed a judgment finding it liable for negligence in granting a building permit and conducting inspections of the Breens' cottage, which resulted in significant structural and code deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on duty of care and causation, affirming that the municipality owed a duty to inspect even without a builder's request and was liable for major deficiencies (crawl space, roof ventilation, structural issues) due to its unreasonable conduct.

However, the Court found the trial judge applied an excessively strict standard of care regarding minor deficiencies (stair headroom, insulation gaps), reducing the damages awarded.

The appellant Township appealed a trial decision finding it 45% liable for damages resulting from a negligently installed solar panel array on the respondents' barn.

The Township admitted negligence in failing to have an engineer inspect the installation before closing the building permit, but argued its liability should be lower and challenged the quantum of damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 45% apportionment of liability, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the quantum of damages, finding the trial judge made material errors in adopting the respondents' expert's estimate, including double-counting truss repair costs.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a reassessment of damages.

This decision addresses costs and prejudgment interest following a seven-day trial where the plaintiffs were awarded $361,875.33 in damages.

The plaintiffs sought $220,915.33 in partial indemnity costs, while the defendant proposed $154,697.70.

The court, applying the modern costs rules, awarded the plaintiffs $130,000 in fees and $50,809.21 in disbursements, totaling $197,709.21 in costs, plus $1,698.90 in prejudgment interest.

The court emphasized proportionality, the non-applicability of the old cost grid, and the need for detailed information for claimed disbursements.

The plaintiffs purchased a cottage and later discovered significant structural issues and Building Code violations during renovations.

They sued the Township for negligent building inspections and failure to enforce the Building Code Act.

The court found that the Township owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs and breached that duty by granting a building permit without proper plans and failing to identify structural deficiencies during inspections.

The Township was held liable for the costs to remedy the Code violations and for the plaintiffs' mental distress, resulting in a total damages award of $361,875.33.

The appellant was electrocuted by stray voltage from a light pole at a municipally-owned soccer field.

The damage to the pole was caused by a lightning strike.

The appellants sued under the Occupiers' Liability Act, but the trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality met the standard of care.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his factual findings regarding the timing of the lightning strike and in admitting and relying on the respondent's expert evidence regarding the inefficacy of pen testers to detect stray voltage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's factual findings or evidentiary rulings.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded damages for building deficiencies against the builder and the municipality, the court determined the costs of the proceeding.

The plaintiff sought costs on a joint and several basis.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs but declined to make the order joint and several, instead apportioning liability for costs 65% to the municipality and 35% to the builder based on the relative amounts recovered.

The municipality was also awarded costs on its successful cross-claim against the builder.

The plaintiffs commenced two actions arising from the purchase of a property with structural issues: one against Stewart Title for breach of title insurance contract and a "tort action" against multiple parties (vendors, home inspector, township, contractors) for property defects.

Stewart Title moved to consolidate the two actions.

The plaintiffs and two defendants from the tort action (the vendors) opposed consolidation, preferring the actions be heard together or one after the other.

The court, applying Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, conducted a costs/benefits analysis.

It rejected the notion of an elevated onus for consolidation and found that ordering the actions to be heard together, with common discoveries and pre-trial, best served efficiency and fairness.

This decision was primarily to avoid significant costs and delays associated with potential crossclaims and pleadings disputes that full consolidation would trigger, particularly regarding Stewart Title's potential subrogation claims.

The motion for consolidation was dismissed, and an order for the actions to be tried together was granted with specific directions for common pre-trial and discoveries.

The court issued supplementary reasons to correct three calculation errors in its original judgment (2020 ONSC 3060).

The errors involved the cost of insulating a wall, the omission of alternate living expenses and general damages from the judgment against Mark Grand, and an incorrect contingency reduction applied to damages payable by the Town of Bracebridge.

The corrections resulted in an increase in Mark Grand's liability for repair costs and out-of-pocket expenses, an increase in the total judgment against Mark Grand to include alternate living expenses and general damages, and an adjustment to the joint and several liability of the Town of Bracebridge and Mark Grand for damages.

The plaintiff purchased a renovated property from one defendant, discovering numerous building deficiencies.

He sued the seller for negligent construction and breach of the Ontario Building Code, and the municipality for negligent inspections and breach of statutory duty under the Building Code Act.

The court found the seller liable for negligent construction and breach of contract, and the municipality jointly and severally liable for conceded deficiencies that should have been caught during inspections.

The plaintiff's claim for contributory negligence was dismissed.

Damages were awarded for repairs, out-of-pocket expenses, alternate living expenses, and general damages.

The municipality's crossclaim against the seller for contribution and indemnity was granted, while the seller's crossclaim against the municipality was dismissed.

The appellants, a real estate agent and broker, appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay damages to the respondents (purchasers) for water and mould damage to a residential home, due to the agent's negligence.

The appeal primarily concerned the measure of damages.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by applying the cost of repair measure, as the appellants' negligence did not cause the property defect itself, but rather caused the respondents to enter into a transaction they would have otherwise avoided.

In such cases, the proper measure of damages is the diminution in value of the property.

The Court upheld the trial judge's findings on mitigation of damages and the foreseeability of frost heave damage.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge for reassessment of damages based on diminution in value and for a redetermination of costs from the first trial.

The plaintiffs purchased a home from the defendants, who had built the property themselves without a building permit.

Years later, the foundation wall collapsed due to excessive backfill and poor drainage.

The plaintiffs sued for negligent construction and negligent misrepresentation, alleging the defendants concealed the failing wall with a stud wall and made false statements on the Seller Property Information Statement.

The Superior Court of Justice found the defendants liable for both negligent construction and negligent misrepresentation, awarding the plaintiffs $100,000 in damages.

The plaintiff, an 18-year-old soccer player, suffered an electric shock from stray voltage leaking from a light pole at a municipally-owned sports field.

The shock was caused by internal damage to the pole's wiring resulting from a recent lightning strike.

The plaintiff sued the municipality under the Occupiers' Liability Act, claiming physical and psychological injuries, including PTSD.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the specific nature of the electrical failure was highly unusual and not reasonably foreseeable.

The court concluded that the municipality had met its standard of care by adhering to regular inspection and maintenance protocols, and was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries.

Following a trial where both the plaintiffs' construction claim and the defendants' counterclaims were dismissed, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs had claimed $100,000 for deficiencies and breach of contract, while the defendants counterclaimed for mental distress and injurious falsehood.

Despite divided success, the court found the plaintiffs should not have pursued their claim and that the defendants were entitled to costs for defending the main action.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court awarded the defendants $70,000 in all-inclusive costs.