Robin A. Bellows

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action for solicitor's negligence against her former counsel.

She moved to deem facts admitted and to strike the statement of defence.

The defendant cross-moved for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motions as an abuse of process, noting she was attempting to have the court usurp the trial judge's role.

The court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion, finding the action was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period, disclosed no genuine issue for trial, and constituted a collateral attack on prior decisions assessing the defendant's accounts and representation.

The respondent pleaded guilty to multiple counts of sexual assault and uttering threats against two employees at his workplace.

The sentencing judge imposed a 16-month jail sentence but declined to make a mandatory Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order, finding it would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The Crown appealed the refusal to impose the SOIRA order.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by reversing the statutory presumption in favour of the order and failing to properly analyze the enumerated factors under s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code.

A SOIRA order was imposed.

The moving party brought a motion to dismiss the responding party's unperfected family law appeal and sought costs for both the appeal and the underlying Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ) trial.

The responding party consented to the dismissal of the appeal but opposed the costs requests.

The Superior Court dismissed the request to vary the OCJ trial judge's timeline for costs submissions, finding it lacked jurisdiction to amend the lower court's order on a motion.

However, the court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal and awarded the moving party $3,000 in costs for the appeal, noting the responding party filed the appeal solely to buy time and took no steps to perfect it, causing the moving party to incur unnecessary legal fees.

The applicant brought an application under the Road Access Act to close an access road to the respondents, proposing to erect gates that would allow other property owners access while excluding the respondents.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that closure was reasonably necessary to prevent substantial damage or injury to his property interests.

Furthermore, the court held that public interest considerations, including emergency and utility access, weighed in favour of keeping the road open.

The application was dismissed.

Decision on costs following a trial judgment in a civil action.

The defendant argued no costs should be payable because the award was under $200,000 and the action should have proceeded under Rule 76 Simplified Procedure.

The court rejected this argument, finding it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have commenced and continued the action under ordinary procedure given the claims for general and punitive damages were not vexatious.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $77,264.97, noting the plaintiff's multiple settlement offers exceeded the trial outcome except for one early offer.

The plaintiff purchased a home from the defendant and subsequently discovered significant water infiltration, mould, and foundation damage.

The plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation, alleging the defendant concealed the defects.

The court found that the defendant's representations in the MLS listing and warranties that the home was in move-in condition were untrue and made negligently.

The court awarded the plaintiff $119,595.75 for repair costs and $10,000 in general damages for mental stress and inconvenience, but declined to award punitive damages.

The defendants brought a motion to amend their pleadings to include allegations of historic sexual assaults and information from a dormant 1989 action, and to consolidate the present action with a related lawyer negligence action.

The court granted the consolidation on consent.

However, the court dismissed the motion to amend the pleadings, finding that the eleventh-hour amendments would cause non-compensable prejudice to the elderly plaintiffs by requiring a substantial adjournment of the impending trial.

The court also found that using the sexual assault allegations as a juristic reason to deny an unjust enrichment claim was not legally tenable.

A construction company sought payment for work completed on two properties: a commercial dealership and a residential home.

The dealership work was completed under a fixed-price contract for $98,739.83, with an outstanding balance of $33,327.73.

The residential work was completed on a time-and-materials basis with an outstanding balance of $43,743.37.

The defendants disputed liability, claiming deficient work and unfair business practices.

The court found that the residential contract, though not in writing, was enforceable under the Consumer Protection Act's equitable exception, as the defendant was a sophisticated businessman who had directed billing practices to benefit his businesses.

The court awarded the contractor the full amount for the dealership project and substantially the full amount for the residential project, offset by a modest counterclaim award for deficient work.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to exercise their gatekeeping function regarding the respondent's expert witness.

The expert admitted during cross-examination that he did not write his entire report, lacked experience with the specific type of insulation installed, and had altered the scene before taking photographs.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to properly scrutinize and exclude the flawed expert evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code for allegedly touching a child under the age of 14 for a sexual purpose during a family gathering at a cottage on Wasauksing First Nation territory in July 2008.

The complainant, now an adult, testified that the accused entered the bedroom where she was sleeping and sexually assaulted her.

The defence presented evidence suggesting the accused was at a campfire with other family members and did not have the opportunity to commit the alleged offence.

The court found that while the complainant's evidence could not be wholly rejected, the Crown failed to meet the high burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt when considering the totality of the evidence, including significant inconsistencies between witnesses and credibility concerns.

The accused was acquitted.

A municipality sought a declaration that it was not bound by an arbitration clause in a 1993 participation agreement governing a landfill operation, arguing that an amended environmental compliance approval issued in 2019 voided the agreement.

The respondent municipality moved to stay the application in favour of arbitration.

The court applied the two-part framework from Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp. and found that the technical prerequisites for a mandatory stay were met and that neither of the exceptions raised by the applicant—undue delay or suitability for summary judgment—applied on a clear case standard.

The court granted the stay and ordered the matter to arbitration.

The decision addresses whether Eunice Sukhnandan should be added as a party to a family law proceeding between Stephanie Nadon and Glenn Sukhnandan, in order to protect her alleged financial interest in family property.

The court reviews the validity of a purported trust interest in the former matrimonial home, the traceability of proceeds, and the limitation period for such a claim.

The court finds the trust document unreliable, determines that any claim by Eunice against Stephanie is without merit and time-barred, and dismisses the motion to add Eunice as a party, awarding costs to Stephanie Nadon.

The applicants, Zoranna Drumonde and Nicholas Spellay, sought the removal of their sister, Rosalie Spellay, as estate trustee and the sale of the family cottage left by their late mother, Rose Anne Spellay.

The court interpreted the will, which intended the cottage to remain in the family, and found that the property should be treated as held in joint tenancy among the surviving siblings.

The court held that the applicants could force a sale under the Partition Act, and that the opt-out clause for a $5,000 buyout was a one-time option that had expired.

The court ordered the property to be listed for sale, with proceeds to be divided unequally in recognition of Rosalie Spellay’s contributions, and left costs to each party.

The accused, J.L., was tried on three counts: sexual assault with a weapon, sexual interference, and uttering a threat to cause death, all relating to the complainant, O.P., who was 11 years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant, police officers, the accused, and his mother, as well as an Agreed Statement of Fact.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible on the core issues, despite some inconsistencies on peripheral matters, and rejected the accused's and his mother's evidence as unreliable.

J.L. was found guilty of sexual interference, uttering a threat to cause death, and the lesser included offence of assault with a weapon.

The applicant, Douglas LaFramboise, sought to set aside a prior trial decision on the basis of alleged perjury and fraud by the respondent, Sylvia Zwaan, and her counsel.

The court found no new evidence or grounds to support the application, noting that the issues had already been litigated and dismissed at both the trial and appellate levels.

The motion was dismissed as an abuse of process, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicant, Edgewater Park Lodge Inc., sought a permanent injunction and statutory damages against the respondents, Robert and Carol Cadman, for operating a restaurant under the name “Red Canoe Family Restaurant,” which was found to be deceptively similar to the applicant’s “Red Canoe Restaurant.” The court found that the similarity of the names caused or was likely to cause confusion and granted a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from using the name or any similar name, as well as ordering statutory damages and the removal of all related social media and advertising.