Mathieu René Ansell

The respondent pleaded guilty to multiple counts of sexual assault and uttering threats against two employees at his workplace.

The sentencing judge imposed a 16-month jail sentence but declined to make a mandatory Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order, finding it would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The Crown appealed the refusal to impose the SOIRA order.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by reversing the statutory presumption in favour of the order and failing to properly analyze the enumerated factors under s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code.

A SOIRA order was imposed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and having a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

At trial, the Crown conceded the impaired operation charge.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights were breached.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked objective grounds for the arrest and breath demand, breaching ss. 8 and 9.

The court also found a s. 10(b) breach because police failed to identify the accused when leaving voicemails for his counsel of choice.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the breath evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breaches were not serious and had minimal impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

The accused was found guilty of the 80 plus charge.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder and dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm.

The court determined as fact that the accused intentionally stabbed the victim in the neck over a drug debt and deliberately drove the victim's vehicle into him.

The court sentenced the accused to life imprisonment with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility for the murder, and a concurrent 5-year sentence with a 10-year driving prohibition for the dangerous operation offence.

Sentencing for a mid-level trafficker convicted after trial of possessing significant quantities of fentanyl and cocaine for the purposes of trafficking, possessing a loaded prohibited handgun, resisting arrest, and possessing proceeds of crime.

The court held that trafficking fentanyl in a vulnerable Northern Ontario community, near an elementary school, while armed with a loaded concealed handgun, substantially increased both the gravity of the offences and the offender’s moral blameworthiness.

The court applied the Kienapple principle, imposed consecutive sentences for fentanyl trafficking and the firearm offence, and treated Charter breaches, anti-Black racism social context, traumatic childhood history, family separation consequences, and stringent bail and remand conditions as mitigating factors.

A global 12-year sentence was reduced to 10 years under the totality principle, with additional pre-sentence credit.

The court sentenced R.B. to three years in custody after he pleaded guilty to sexual touching of a child under s. 151 of the Criminal Code.

The decision reviews the facts, the impact on the victim, the offender’s background, and the applicable law, including the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Friesen on sentencing for sexual offences against children.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the breach of trust, the victim’s age, and the offender’s health and plea.

The court imposed several ancillary orders, including DNA, SOIRA, and firearms prohibitions.

This is a sentencing decision for a defendant who pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing death.

The defendant struck and killed a pedestrian, then fled the scene, concealed vehicle damage, and lied to avoid detection.

The court considered the principles of denunciation and deterrence, emphasizing the seriousness of the offence and the defendant's reprehensible conduct.

Despite the Crown seeking a nine-month jail sentence, the court imposed a 15-month conditional sentence of imprisonment, including strict house arrest and curfew, citing the defendant's remorse, lack of prior criminal record, and positive pre-sentence report, and noting recent legislative changes (Bill C5) widening the availability of conditional sentences.

Additional penalties included a driving prohibition, firearms prohibition, and DNA order.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference relating to three historical incidents alleged by the complainant, who was a child at the time.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding two incidents in her bedroom lacked sufficient reliability to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in acquittals for those events.

However, the court accepted the complainant's evidence, corroborated by the accused's admissions to family members, regarding a third incident where the accused touched the complainant's vagina with his mouth.

The accused was found guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault for this incident, with the sexual assault charge stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The accused stood trial on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations that he repeatedly rubbed the child complainant's vagina while babysitting her in her home.

The court admitted the complainant's prior videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and also relied on similar fact evidence arising from a prior conviction involving highly similar conduct with another nine-year-old complainant.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the child complainant credible and reliable, rejected the accused's denial, and held the Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

A publication ban under s. 486.4 was in place.

The Crown applied to admit similar act evidence from a prior conviction against the accused, W.L., in his current trial for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a nine-year-old complainant.

The court analyzed the proximity in time, detailed similarities (age of complainants, nature of sexual acts, circumstances, position of trust), dissimilarities, and the absence of collusion.

Finding the evidence highly probative and its probative value outweighing its prejudicial effect, the court granted the Crown's application, deeming the similar act evidence admissible.

In this criminal trial, the accused, Maggie Hallikainen, faced charges of impaired operation and over 80 blood-alcohol concentration.

The impaired charge was dismissed earlier.

The accused brought a Charter application, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence.

The court found a serious breach of the applicant's section 8 Charter rights due to the arresting officer's unreliable and inconsistent evidence, particularly concerning the Approved Screening Device (ASD) test administration and note-taking.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Additionally, the Crown failed to prove the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt due to unresolved discrepancies between two Certificates of a Qualified Technician.

Consequently, the remaining charge was dismissed.

The accused, charged with impaired driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, brought a Charter s. 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings due to delay.

The delay was primarily attributed to the late disclosure of a breath room video and the suspension of court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court calculated the net delay at 12 months and 17 days, falling below the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The court found that the delay was not unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings on charges of impaired driving and driving over the legal limit.

The trial judge had found that the accused's language rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were infringed because the police did not communicate with him in French, and that he was arbitrarily detained under section 9.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by raising the language rights issue on his own during closing arguments, taking improper judicial notice of facts, and misapplying the law on language rights.

The court also found no arbitrary detention and set aside the stay of proceedings, remitting the matter back to the trial court to hear a pending section 11(b) application.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer and its owners, alleging age discrimination.

The personal defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the age discrimination claims against them.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on the entire claim.

The court granted the personal defendants' motion, finding no employment relationship and no factual foundation for the age discrimination claim.

On the plaintiff's motion, the court found no cause for termination and that the plaintiff had mitigated his damages, leaving only the quantum of notice to be determined at a later date.

This decision addresses costs following a seven-day trial concerning the validity of a will, where the plaintiffs' claim of invalidity due to lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence was dismissed.

The defendants, as the successful parties in the main action, sought costs, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court, exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, declined to award costs to either party.

It found exceptional circumstances, noting that the defendants' $20,000 offer was not reasonable given the familial relationship and the inherent injustice of the trial's outcome, which the law could not remedy.

The court concluded that each party should bear their own costs.

The plaintiffs, step-children of the deceased, challenged the validity of a 2007 will that left the estate entirely to the deceased's biological children.

They argued the 2007 will was invalid due to lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and the existence of a prior 1983 mutual will.

Alternatively, they claimed compensation for services rendered on a quantum meruit basis.

The court dismissed the action, finding no evidence that the 1983 wills were mutual wills incapable of revocation.

The court also found the deceased had testamentary capacity based on medical evidence and that the presumption of undue influence was rebutted.

The quantum meruit claim failed because the services were provided out of love and affection without expectation of compensation.