Robert G.S. Del Frate

The applicant sought to exclude a statement given to police following his arrest during the execution of a search warrant, alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 10(a) and (b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police failed to adequately inform the applicant of the reasons for his arrest and delayed his access to counsel, noting significant deficiencies in the officers' note-taking.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the applicant's statement but declined to exclude the physical evidence seized during the search, as its discovery was unrelated to the Charter breaches.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings on charges of impaired driving and driving over the legal limit.

The trial judge had found that the accused's language rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were infringed because the police did not communicate with him in French, and that he was arbitrarily detained under section 9.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by raising the language rights issue on his own during closing arguments, taking improper judicial notice of facts, and misapplying the law on language rights.

The court also found no arbitrary detention and set aside the stay of proceedings, remitting the matter back to the trial court to hear a pending section 11(b) application.

The respondent husband brought a motion to dismiss the applicant wife's family law application, arguing that a prior consent order dividing his pension constituted a full and final settlement of all claims.

The court found that there was no agreement for the wife to release her other claims, such as spousal support and equalization, and that enforcing such an alleged agreement would be unconscionable given the wife's limited means and the traditional nature of the marriage.

The court dismissed the husband's motion to dismiss, allowed the wife to continue with her claims, and granted the husband's request for a divorce order.

The plaintiff sought costs after successfully defending the defendants' motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The plaintiff claimed between $45,330 and $75,550, representing 161 hours of work by two senior counsel.

The defendants argued the claim was unreasonable and suggested partial indemnity costs of $19,763.40.

The court agreed the plaintiff's claimed hours were excessive and lacked detailed dockets.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff in the amount of $23,947.10, inclusive of disbursements and HST, matching the defendants' suggested figure.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to grant a stay of proceedings after finding that a police officer used excessive force by Tasering the accused in the back as he was walking away from a scuffle.

The Crown argued the trial judge applied the wrong standard of review, provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended expert evidence, and erred in granting a stay.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and that the use of the Taser in these circumstances offended society's sense of fair play and decency, justifying a stay of proceedings under the Babos framework.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash her committal to stand trial for first-degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant had participated in a group assault by tripping and kicking the victim, but a co-accused ultimately stabbed the victim to death.

The reviewing judge found there was no evidence that the applicant had the objective knowledge and subjective purpose required for first-degree murder, nor did her actions constitute forcible confinement distinct from the assault.

The court quashed the committal for first-degree murder and ordered the applicant to stand trial for second-degree murder as a party to the offence.

The moving party brought a motion to terminate spousal support, arguing his income substantially decreased upon retirement.

The responding party opposed termination but conceded a reduction was appropriate.

The court found a material change in circumstances but declined to terminate support given the 22-year relationship.

Spousal support was reduced retroactively, and the moving party was granted a credit for overpayments to be applied against future support obligations.

The respondent sought costs after successfully defending a motion brought by the applicant and succeeding on a cross-motion for security for costs.

The applicant argued that no costs should be awarded due to her impecuniosity and because she acted in the best interests of the child.

The court found that the applicant had not taken a realistic or reasonable position and that her impecuniosity did not grant her unrestricted access to the courts.

The court awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $8,754.40, payable within 60 days.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's actions, the successful defendants sought costs.

The self-represented plaintiff also sought costs despite being entirely unsuccessful.

The court denied the plaintiff's request and awarded costs to the defendants, noting the plaintiff's unrelenting and vengeful pursuit of doomed litigation.

The court balanced the plaintiff's conduct with the need for costs to be fair, reasonable, and proportionate, awarding $9,500 to the Queen and $3,500 to the defendant Ramage.

During a jury trial for sexual assault, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on one count, arguing there was no evidence he was awake during the alleged touching and therefore no proof of the required intent.

The complainant testified that she awoke to find a hand under her clothing but could not say whether the accused was awake.

Applying the test from Monteleone, the court held that where there is any admissible evidence that could support a conviction if believed by a properly instructed jury, a directed verdict is inappropriate.

The conflicting evidence regarding whether the accused was awake raised a factual issue for the jury to resolve.

The motion for a directed verdict was therefore dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion under s. 486.1(2) of the Criminal Code seeking an order permitting the complainant, who had recently turned 18, to testify by closed-circuit television with a support person.

The court considered whether an evidentiary basis existed to exercise its discretion to allow testimonial aids for a witness over 18.

While acknowledging the stress of testifying and reviewing a counselling report suggesting the measure could assist, the court found the evidentiary record insufficient and noted concerns about courtroom logistics and the fairness implications of a jury trial.

The court adjourned the application to the commencement of trial so that the complainant could be questioned and an informed determination made regarding the use of testimonial aids.

The Crown brought a motion under s. 486.1(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to permit the complainant, who was slightly over the age of 18, to testify by closed-circuit television with the assistance of a support person.

The Crown argued the accommodation would reduce trauma and facilitate a full and candid account of events.

The court held that for adult witnesses the provision is discretionary and requires an adequate evidentiary basis.

The evidence filed was of limited assistance and the court expressed concerns regarding courtroom logistics and potential prejudice in a jury trial.

The court adjourned the application to the commencement of the trial to permit further inquiry before determining whether testimonial aids would be appropriate.

In a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual touching involving a minor complainant, the court ruled on pre‑trial evidentiary motions.

The defence sought permission under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross‑examine the complainant about viewing pornographic material on a computer, while the Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct by the accused to show grooming and provide narrative context.

The court held that accessing pornography did not constitute “sexual activity” within the meaning of s. 276 and permitted limited questioning on that topic, subject to sanitizing explicit titles and appropriate jury instructions addressing the twin myths.

The Crown’s application to introduce evidence of teasing, sexual comments, and provision of alcohol as discreditable conduct was dismissed because the probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice and lacked a sufficient nexus to the charged offences.

The parties sought clarification of a prior order that found an enforceable settlement agreement between them, specifically regarding whether a waiver of child support applied to retroactive or ongoing support.

The court determined that because the prior order incorporating the settlement terms had already been signed and entered, the judge was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to interpret the agreement's contents or the parties' intentions.

The Crown brought applications under s. 486(2) of the Criminal Code to permit child complainants to testify by closed‑circuit television and under s. 715.1 to admit their video‑recorded statements.

The complainants were between nine and eleven years old and their statements had been recorded shortly after the alleged incidents.

The defence did not oppose the legal basis for the applications but sought procedural safeguards regarding the functioning of the technology and guidance regarding the witnesses’ obligation to tell the truth.

The court confirmed the presumption of testimonial capacity for witnesses under 14 under s. 16.1 of the Canada Evidence Act and directed that the children promise to tell the truth without questioning about their understanding of the promise.

The court granted the Crown’s requests and ordered the procedure to proceed accordingly.

On a family law motion, the respondent spouse sought interim spousal support following the breakdown of a long-term marriage with two children.

The parties had previously resolved custody, access, and child support by consent.

The moving party had historically been a stay-at-home parent and had recently lost employment in a family business, leaving limited income aside from a training program stipend and child support.

The court held that despite imputed income of $24,000 and the payor spouse’s ongoing expenses for the matrimonial home and child support, the moving party remained entitled to interim support.

Interim spousal support was ordered at the low end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The plaintiff sought costs after successfully defending two motions by the defendants that attempted to restrain her from filing further requests to admit.

The plaintiff claimed approximately $62,895 in legal fees and disbursements and had made a Rule 49 offer to settle costs for $33,000 all-inclusive.

The defendants argued the claim was disproportionate to the nature of the motions and proposed significantly lower amounts.

Applying the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the claimed time and assistant billing rate excessive.

Costs were reduced and fixed at $20,000 all-inclusive.

At a contested status hearing for two related actions, the defendants sought an order dismissing the plaintiffs' actions for delay.

The actions, commenced in 2003 and 2004, involved complex corporate restructuring and real estate disputes.

The defendants argued prejudice due to the delay and the deaths of a plaintiff and a key witness.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not intended to abandon the actions and provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, which included numerous interlocutory proceedings.

The court concluded that dismissing the actions would be a draconian step and instead ordered the actions to continue subject to a strict timetable and a guillotine order.