Richard Pharand

The respondent husband brought a motion to dismiss the applicant wife's family law application, arguing that a prior consent order dividing his pension constituted a full and final settlement of all claims.

The court found that there was no agreement for the wife to release her other claims, such as spousal support and equalization, and that enforcing such an alleged agreement would be unconscionable given the wife's limited means and the traditional nature of the marriage.

The court dismissed the husband's motion to dismiss, allowed the wife to continue with her claims, and granted the husband's request for a divorce order.

The plaintiff sought costs after successfully defending the defendants' motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The plaintiff claimed between $45,330 and $75,550, representing 161 hours of work by two senior counsel.

The defendants argued the claim was unreasonable and suggested partial indemnity costs of $19,763.40.

The court agreed the plaintiff's claimed hours were excessive and lacked detailed dockets.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff in the amount of $23,947.10, inclusive of disbursements and HST, matching the defendants' suggested figure.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's 2006 breach of contract action for delay.

The court found that the 11-year delay was inordinate and inexcusable, but noted that the defendants had condoned the delay by consenting to set aside a previous dismissal order and allowing amendments to the statement of claim.

Furthermore, the court found no substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible, as witnesses were available and documentary evidence was preserved.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action, which arose from a real estate transaction and a forfeited deposit, was dismissed after the plaintiff failed to set it down for trial by a deadline established at a status hearing.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, did not move expeditiously to set aside the order, and could not rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendants.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce an existing child support order and sought contribution toward post-secondary education and private school expenses.

The respondent argued that support should terminate because the adult child had ended the relationship with him and had completed secondary school.

The court found the estrangement was mutual and that the respondent had not proven a unilateral repudiation by the child, but also concluded that the applicant failed to establish that the child remained a dependent for support purposes under the principles set out in Farden.

The court declined to order payment of university expenses due to insufficient evidence regarding full‑time enrolment and commitment to studies.

The court also held that private school tuition incurred unilaterally by the applicant was neither necessary nor reasonable.

No new support payments were ordered unless future evidence demonstrates that the child qualifies as a dependent.