Benedict Wray

The appellant commenced an action in Ontario for breach of a share purchase agreement.

The respondent successfully moved to stay the action in favour of an ongoing International Chamber of Commerce arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in a subsequent agreement to which it was not a named party.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding an arbitration agreement existed between the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding an 'arguable case' that the respondent was an affiliate entitled to benefit from the arbitration clause, thereby engaging the competence-competence principle.

Following the applicant's success on an application regarding the end date of a contract, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the respondent's conduct, which included taking inconsistent positions throughout the dispute and failing to meaningfully engage in settlement negotiations, warranted an elevated costs award.

The court fixed the applicant's costs on a substantial indemnity scale in the amount of $99,855.00.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal of a stay order granted under section 9 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, arguing that the stay order was temporary and therefore interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that a stay order under section 9 of the ICAA is generally final in nature for purposes of determining the proper appeal route, as it effectively ends the action before the court.

The court rejected arguments that the stay was temporary merely because the arbitral tribunal might decline jurisdiction, and clarified that statements in cost submissions and the motion judge's characterization of the order do not alter its legal nature for appeal purposes.

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the end date of a contract for the supply of telephones, televisions, and multimedia terminals to the applicant's inpatient facilities.

The original agreement commenced in September 2003 for 9.5 years.

An amending agreement in 2009-2010 extended the term by 7 years to March 1, 2020, and introduced new multimedia terminals.

The respondent argued the contract contained an alternative term triggered upon completion of terminal installation in July 2014, extending the contract to January 2031.

The court applied principles of contract interpretation and found the alternative term was vague and unenforceable.

The court also found the respondent was precluded by the doctrine of election from asserting the alternative term, having previously relied on the contract's terms in the commission dispute.

The court declared the contract term to be September 1, 2003 to March 1, 2020.

The court considered whether to stay Bombardier Inc.'s Ontario action against Alstom Rail Sweden AB for a tax loss purchase price adjustment, pending arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce.

The dispute centered on whether the claim fell within the scope of an arbitration agreement in a 2020 share purchase agreement, or was carved out by a prior 2017 agreement that conferred exclusive jurisdiction on Ontario courts.

Applying the Supreme Court’s guidance in Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp., the court found Alstom Sweden had established an arguable case that the dispute was subject to arbitration and stayed the action.

Two foreign nationals were found inadmissible on security grounds under s. 34(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for engaging in acts of violence, without any alleged link to national security or the security of Canada.

The administrative tribunals interpreted s. 34(1)(e) as not requiring such a nexus.

Applying the Vavilov reasonableness review framework, the Supreme Court held that the administrative decisions were unreasonable for failing to address critical points of statutory context, the broad consequences of the interpretation, and Canada's non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention.

The Court held that the only reasonable interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) requires a nexus between the relevant acts of violence and national security or the security of Canada.

Appeals allowed and administrative decisions quashed.

The Province of British Columbia referred the constitutionality of proposed amendments to the Environmental Management Act to the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The proposed amendments would have introduced a hazardous substance permit system regulating the presence of heavy oil in the province, directly impacting the Trans Mountain pipeline expansion.

The BCCA held that the proposed amendments fell outside provincial legislative authority because their pith and substance — placing conditions on, and if necessary prohibiting, carriage of heavy oil through an interprovincial undertaking — related to Parliament's jurisdiction over federal undertakings under s. 92(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's 2006 breach of contract action for delay.

The court found that the 11-year delay was inordinate and inexcusable, but noted that the defendants had condoned the delay by consenting to set aside a previous dismissal order and allowing amendments to the statement of claim.

Furthermore, the court found no substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible, as witnesses were available and documentary evidence was preserved.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a written caution issued by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The caution was issued because the applicant's clinic used patient and staff testimonials in its advertising, contrary to the regulations under the Medicine Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the investigation was adequate and the interpretation of the regulation prohibiting testimonials was reasonable.