Serge Hamel

The accused, J.L., was tried on three counts: sexual assault with a weapon, sexual interference, and uttering a threat to cause death, all relating to the complainant, O.P., who was 11 years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The trial involved testimony from the complainant, police officers, the accused, and his mother, as well as an Agreed Statement of Fact.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible on the core issues, despite some inconsistencies on peripheral matters, and rejected the accused's and his mother's evidence as unreliable.

J.L. was found guilty of sexual interference, uttering a threat to cause death, and the lesser included offence of assault with a weapon.

The applicant sought a bail review under s.520 of the Criminal Code, challenging a prior detention order.

The court found new evidence demonstrating a material change in circumstances, allowing the review.

However, the applicant's updated bail plan, particularly concerning unstable housing and proximity to a prohibited person, failed to satisfy the secondary grounds for release, leading to the continued detention of the applicant for public safety.

The accused, Dustin Moffatt, was charged with second-degree murder and aggravated assault stemming from a stabbing incident.

The case primarily hinged on the identity of the assailant, referred to as the 'Man in Black' (MIB), based largely on circumstantial and video evidence.

The court meticulously analyzed video footage and witness testimony, particularly focusing on the accused's location at the time of the incident and the movements of another individual, the 'Red Hat Man'.

The judge found that video evidence indicated the accused was unconscious and lying on the ground during the stabbings, and that the MIB was likely the 'Red Hat Man' who later rode away on the accused's bike.

This raised reasonable doubt regarding the identity of the assailant.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty on both counts.

The accused, Dwayne Nelson, applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging the denial of bail by a Justice of the Peace.

The application focused on whether there had been a material change in circumstances since the original bail hearing.

The court considered the withdrawal of certain drug charges by the federal Crown and the development of a new release plan with new sureties and more onerous conditions.

Applying the principles from R. v. St-Cloud and R. v. Antic, the court found that the proposed new sureties, combined with the tightened plan, constituted a material change in circumstances that addressed the original concerns regarding secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The bail review application was allowed, and the accused was released on a recognizance with specific conditions.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court calculated a total delay of approximately 90 months from charge to anticipated trial end.

After subtracting 25 months (750 days) attributed to defence delay and 36 days for exceptional circumstances, the net delay remained 65 months, significantly exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, leading to a finding that the accused's s. 11(b) right was infringed and a stay of proceedings was entered.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect, a Crown witness who had a sexual relationship with the deceased and a motive to harm him.

The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence connecting the witness to the crime scene and the deceased to establish an air of reality to the defence.

The application was granted, permitting the defence to pursue the witness as a third-party suspect.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to edit portions of his video-recorded police interview.

The defence argued that certain statements made by the interviewing officer expressing certainty of guilt and urging the accused to speak should be redacted as they would act as a 'voice for the Crown' and undermine the accused's right to silence.

The court agreed to redact segments where the officer suggested the accused had an option to explain himself or where the officer expressed disbelief at the accused's denials, finding these could undermine the right to silence or suggest undisclosed evidence.

Other segments providing context to the accused's admissions were retained.

The defence in a first-degree murder trial brought a pre-trial application requesting that the jury be permitted to take a view of the crime scene.

The Crown consented to the view, but an issue arose regarding whether the accused could waive his right to attend under s. 652(3) of the Criminal Code.

Declining to follow conflicting Ontario jurisprudence, the court held that s. 652(3) must be read in conjunction with s. 650(2)(b), permitting the accused to waive his attendance.

The application was granted with specific logistical conditions to protect the integrity of the trial.

The Crown applied for orders to exclude the public, ban publication of a witness's identity, and allow the witness to testify via closed circuit television (CCTV) during a first-degree murder trial.

The witness, the accused's former girlfriend, expressed stress about testifying and concerns for her child's privacy.

The court dismissed the requests for public exclusion and a publication ban, emphasizing the strong presumption of open courts and the importance of public scrutiny given the witness's credibility issues.

However, the court granted the request for the witness to testify via CCTV to facilitate her evidence while allowing the accused to face his accuser.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of a videotaped statement made by the accused, Mathew Hayes, in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive circumstances and police trickery, including alleged threats regarding the accused's girlfriend, use of an intimidating term ("goof"), a story undermining confidence in lawyers, a "non-confrontational" comment, a statement about not incriminating oneself, and the prolonged interview length despite attempts to end it.

The court found that none of the defence's concerns, individually or collectively, raised a reasonable doubt about the statement's voluntariness.

The statement, which contained denials contradicting video evidence, was deemed admissible as post-offence conduct.

In this pre-trial application, the defence sought leave to introduce evidence of alternate suspects in a murder trial.

The court granted the defence's request to introduce evidence regarding Vanessa Tracey, finding a sufficient connection between her and the victim's death to establish an "air of reality" for the defence.

However, the court dismissed the application concerning Roger Busch and Laura Heavens, concluding that the evidence presented for them was insufficient to create the necessary connection to the crime and would lead to impermissible speculation by the jury.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to introduce evidence of the accused's post-offence conduct, specifically an alleged threat to set his pregnant girlfriend on fire, as evidence of consciousness of guilt and to explain the girlfriend's delay in reporting a confession.

The court found that the evidence lacked probative value, as the inferences sought by the Crown (consciousness of guilt or intimidation) were not logically supported by the facts presented.

The court noted there was no evidence linking the alleged threat to the confession or to the girlfriend's silence.

Furthermore, even if the evidence had some probative value, its highly prejudicial effect, given the nature of the alleged threat, vastly outweighed its evidential worth.

The Crown's application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion seeking disclosure of the wording of an anonymous Crimestoppers tip suggesting another person may have committed the homicide.

The Crown resisted disclosure on the basis of informer privilege.

The court reviewed the strict doctrine of informer privilege and the narrow “innocence at stake” exception, requiring proof that disclosure is the only way the accused can raise a reasonable doubt.

Although the case against the accused was circumstantial and the defence proposed an alternate suspect theory, the court found that other evidentiary avenues remained available to advance that theory.

Because the accused could potentially raise a reasonable doubt through other evidence, the threshold test for the exception was not met.

The accused applied to exclude evidence following a fatal accident investigation, arguing Charter breaches under ss. 8, 9, and 10 after police obtained statements, roadside screening results, and subsequent breath samples.

Earlier reasons excluded the accused’s compelled roadside statements under s. 24(1) and ruled they could not justify the approved screening device demand.

The remaining issue concerned whether observations made by a breath technician while obtaining Intoxilyzer samples should also be excluded.

The court held the detention was not arbitrary and the arrest was justified by a failed roadside screening device.

However, because the Intoxilyzer process and resulting observations flowed solely from compelled statements, admitting the observations would indirectly permit use of compelled evidence and undermine the right against self‑incrimination.

The observations were therefore excluded under s. 24(1), or alternatively under the court’s common law discretion.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of her s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court analyzed the 891-day period between arrest and the scheduled trial date.

After deducting delay attributable to the defence and inherent time requirements, the remaining delay was approximately 11 months, which fell well within the 14 to 18-month guideline established in Morin.

Finding no actual prejudice linked to the delay, the court dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death following a UTV accident.

In a pretrial motion, the accused sought to exclude statements made to police at the scene, arguing they were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and their admission would violate his right against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court found that the accused honestly and reasonably believed he was required by law to report the accident and answer the officer's questions.

The court excluded the statements for all purposes under s. 24(1) of the Charter, including as the basis for the approved screening device demand.

However, the court held that the officer's observations of the accused at the scene were not compelled and remained admissible.

The accused applied to exclude a police statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(c), and alternatively arguing the statement was involuntary.

During a police interview concerning historical sexual offences, the accused—who had documented intellectual limitations—was initially allowed to contact duty counsel but was not properly informed of the reasons for detention or the extent of his jeopardy.

The court found that the accused was effectively detained once he began making incriminating admissions but was not advised of his detention or given a renewed opportunity to consult counsel.

Police also persisted in questioning after the accused expressed reluctance to continue, undermining his right to silence.

The court concluded the statement was not voluntary and that Charter breaches occurred, rendering the statement inadmissible.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter seeking exclusion of a police statement on the basis of alleged breaches of ss. 7, 10(b), and 11(c) and on voluntariness grounds.

A preliminary evidentiary issue arose regarding whether a pre‑sentence report prepared following an earlier guilty plea—later struck—could be admitted to support the application.

The Crown objected, arguing the report contained hearsay and was intended for sentencing purposes only.

The court held that the pre‑sentence report qualified as a public document and also satisfied the Khan hearsay exception because the requirements of reliability and reasonable necessity were met.

The court further noted that excluding the report could risk unfairness to the accused given the liberty interests at stake.

The accused applied for a review and modification of bail conditions contained in a recognizance dated August 19, 2011.

The accused faced multiple charges including sexual assault and breaches of a prior undertaking arising from his activities as a self-described healer.

Certain conditions restricting travel and contact were modified on consent.

The accused sought removal of a condition prohibiting him from practicing any form of healing, arguing it prevented him from earning a livelihood and assisting patients.

The court held that allowing the accused to continue such activities while facing related charges and following prior sexual assault convictions would undermine the public interest and administration of justice.

The requested modification to that condition was therefore denied.

The applicant brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of roadside statements, police observations, and breath sample results arising from a motor vehicle collision investigation.

The court reconsidered an earlier ruling in light of appellate authority holding that statements compelled under a statutory duty to report a collision under the Highway Traffic Act are inadmissible in a criminal prosecution, including for the purpose of establishing grounds for a breath demand.

The court excluded the applicant’s admissions about having consumed alcohol because they were statutorily compelled.

However, the officer’s observation of the odour of alcohol was admissible as it was a passive observation made during a lawful detention and not the result of compelled participation.

The detention was reasonable and no breach of the rights to silence or counsel was established.