David Bennett

The applicant sought interim spousal support from the respondent.

The respondent argued the motion was premature due to incomplete financial disclosure and alleged intentional underemployment.

The court found entitlement to support was conceded and that the applicant's post-separation standard of living significantly declined.

Despite disclosure issues, the court ordered interim spousal support based on averaged incomes using the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

An outstanding legal bill was also ordered paid from matrimonial home sale proceeds.

No costs were awarded due to the applicant's lack of cooperation with disclosure.

This case involved married spouses who separated and had two children.

The court addressed remaining issues after a partial settlement, including parenting arrangements, spousal support, and child support.

The court ordered shared parenting with preferential time allocated to the Mother, while denying the Mother's request to relocate with the children.

Income was imputed to the Mother for support purposes, and the Father was ordered to pay spousal support and ongoing child support with retroactive adjustments.

The applicant mother and respondent father brought cross-motions for temporary orders concerning parenting time and procedural matters for their child.

The mother sought increased unsupervised access and disclosure, while the father sought continued supervised access and various conditions, including drug testing.

The court found the mother had made significant progress in overcoming substance abuse and granted her unsupervised parenting time, including extended periods, while denying most of the father's requests for continued supervision and future conditions.

The court emphasized the need to move towards normalization of parenting time and criticized the prolonged litigation.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg contrary to the Criminal Code.

The trial judge admitted breath test results despite finding an initial breach of the accused’s right to counsel, concluding the breach was attenuated and that the accused later clearly waived the right to counsel by stating “you know what? … fuck it”.

The appeal court held that the statement was equivocal and incapable of constituting a clear and unequivocal waiver of the right to counsel.

The court also found that the trial judge misapprehended the accused’s evidence regarding the meaning of the statement.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed municipal enforcement actions arising from construction of a structure without a building permit, including an order to comply and a subsequent stop work order issued under the Building Code Act.

The initial order to comply and related prosecution were withdrawn, but a later stop work order and new charges under municipal bylaws, the Planning Act, and the Provincial Offences Act remained.

The appellant sought broader relief including injunctions preventing further enforcement actions and a stay or transfer of provincial offences proceedings.

The court treated the matter as an appeal of the stop work order and rescinded that order due to procedural irregularities leading to its issuance.

However, the court declined to grant injunctions or interfere with ongoing provincial offences prosecutions, holding that those proceedings were the proper forum to determine whether the structure had been unlawfully erected.

The accused applied to exclude a police statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(c), and alternatively arguing the statement was involuntary.

During a police interview concerning historical sexual offences, the accused—who had documented intellectual limitations—was initially allowed to contact duty counsel but was not properly informed of the reasons for detention or the extent of his jeopardy.

The court found that the accused was effectively detained once he began making incriminating admissions but was not advised of his detention or given a renewed opportunity to consult counsel.

Police also persisted in questioning after the accused expressed reluctance to continue, undermining his right to silence.

The court concluded the statement was not voluntary and that Charter breaches occurred, rendering the statement inadmissible.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter seeking exclusion of a police statement on the basis of alleged breaches of ss. 7, 10(b), and 11(c) and on voluntariness grounds.

A preliminary evidentiary issue arose regarding whether a pre‑sentence report prepared following an earlier guilty plea—later struck—could be admitted to support the application.

The Crown objected, arguing the report contained hearsay and was intended for sentencing purposes only.

The court held that the pre‑sentence report qualified as a public document and also satisfied the Khan hearsay exception because the requirements of reliability and reasonable necessity were met.

The court further noted that excluding the report could risk unfairness to the accused given the liberty interests at stake.