Julie Richard

The Corporation of the Municipality of Temagami sought a permanent injunction and other orders to enforce its zoning bylaws against Temagami Barge Limited (TBL) and Dashiel Lowery Delarosbel, alleging unlawful commercial uses on Crown land zoned for "Special Management Area (SMA) Zone (Crown Land)".

TBL argued its uses were lawful non-conforming or permissible expansions under the Planning Act.

The court found most of TBL's commercial uses (marina, retail fuel, commercial docking, barge rental, retail aggregate sales, sewage waste disposal) unlawful, not qualifying as lawful non-conforming uses or reasonable expansions of prior industrial uses.

The court granted a permanent injunction against these unlawful uses but denied the request for partial closure of the property and removal of sea-can containers and an office trailer, finding insufficient evidence of public nuisance or contravention for the latter.

The applicant sought to set aside a separation agreement, address child support for their biological child, and parenting time.

The respondent cross-claimed to set aside the agreement and sought child support for all three children (one biological, two from previous relationships) and extended benefits.

The court ordered temporary child support and benefits for the biological child, and deferred the issue of child support for the step-children to a long motion or trial due to contested facts regarding in loco parentis status and the involvement of biological fathers.

The court also ordered both parties to facilitate the biological child's extra-curricular activities.

The plaintiffs in the main action brought a motion to strike a jury notice in consolidated motor vehicle accident trials, arguing that the estimated 8-10 week trial duration could not be accommodated within the court's allotted 6-week jury trial period due to limited judicial resources and pandemic-related backlogs.

The defendants opposed, asserting the motion was premature.

The court granted leave to bring the motion, finding the delay justified by the pandemic's impact and judicial resource constraints.

The motion to strike the jury notice was granted, converting the main action to a judge-alone trial, emphasizing the necessity of ensuring timely justice given the case's age and the unlikelihood of completing a jury trial within the available time.

The Applicants (grandparents) brought a motion to enforce an interim contact order for their two grandchildren, alleging the Respondent mother had failed to comply with the previous order.

The court denied the Respondent's adjournment request, deeming it a delay tactic contrary to the children's best interests.

The court found the Respondent was actively preventing contact and influencing the children against their grandparents.

The motion for enforcement was granted, with the court ordering a new, detailed contact schedule, involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer, and a police enforcement clause as a last resort.

Costs were awarded to the Applicants.

The Corporation of the Municipality of Temagami brought a motion seeking leave to file an additional affidavit (Picard Affidavit) after cross-examinations were completed, pursuant to Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The affidavit contained evidence regarding the historical land use of the property, discovered during an additional search requested by the respondents.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing it was fresh evidence and would cause non-compensable prejudice.

The court granted leave, finding that the proposed evidence was relevant, responded to matters raised during cross-examinations, would not result in non-compensable prejudice, and the applicant provided a reasonable explanation for its late discovery.

The applicant sought an order under the Partition Act for the forced sale of a jointly owned property.

The parties, who were in a romantic relationship but never married, held title as tenants-in-common.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction, contending the matter belonged in Family Court, and that a forced sale would be oppressive due to his business being operated from the home.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction, noting that the relief sought was under the Partition Act, not the Family Law Act, and that the property did not qualify as a matrimonial home.

The court found that the respondent's inconveniences, while significant, did not constitute oppression sufficient to deny the prima facie right to partition.

The application for sale was granted, with the proceeds to be held in trust pending further determination of distribution.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking a temporary order for primary residency of the child, a change in school, disallowing the mother from school pick-ups, a 12-panel hair follicle drug test for the mother, and suspension of the mother's parenting time, along with child support adjustments.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the mother's unexplained absence from the child's life for approximately eight months following the signing of Minutes of Settlement.

The court granted the father primary residency and ordered drug testing for the mother, structuring a slow reintegration of her parenting time contingent on clean urine tests.

The request to change the child's school was denied at this stage, and child support obligations were adjusted, with the mother ordered to pay support to the father.

The respondents (Stewart and her business) brought a motion seeking an order to cross-examine the applicant's affiants and for leave to file their own affidavit evidence at a later time.

They argued that their right to silence in ongoing Provincial Offences Act proceedings justified delaying the filing of their evidence.

The applicant (Health Unit) did not oppose cross-examination but contended that the respondents must first file their affidavits as required by Rule 39.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents failed to meet the test for advance leave under Rule 39.02(2).

The judge held that the right to silence in quasi-criminal proceedings did not outweigh the prejudice to the applicant or justify circumventing the civil procedural rules, which require parties to put all relevant evidence forward before cross-examination to ensure fundamental fairness and efficiency.

The applicant sought interim spousal support from the respondent.

The respondent argued the motion was premature due to incomplete financial disclosure and alleged intentional underemployment.

The court found entitlement to support was conceded and that the applicant's post-separation standard of living significantly declined.

Despite disclosure issues, the court ordered interim spousal support based on averaged incomes using the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

An outstanding legal bill was also ordered paid from matrimonial home sale proceeds.

No costs were awarded due to the applicant's lack of cooperation with disclosure.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary a temporary order to increase his parenting time and allow for unsupervised access.

The applicant mother opposed, arguing no material change in circumstances and citing the father's recent assault conviction against their daughter.

The court found that the filing of the OCL report and the conclusion of the father's criminal trial constituted a material change.

Considering the children's best interests, the father's rehabilitation efforts, and the OCL's positive observations of his interactions with the children, the court granted the father's motion, establishing a progressive schedule for unsupervised parenting time and ordering the mother to pay costs.

Lorence Hud appealed a decision by the Ontario Court of Justice that upheld the Chief Firearms Officer's (CFO) revocation of his firearms licence.

Hud argued the lower court erred by refusing a Charter application and denying an adjournment.

The Superior Court clarified the distinct administrative nature of the CFO's role from the Crown's office and applied the appropriate standards of review.

The court found no error in the lower court's handling of the Charter issue (as it was not properly advanced) or the adjournment request (given the applicant's burden and preparation time).

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the revocation of Hud's firearms licence.

This endorsement addresses two motions: the plaintiff's motion to compel an affidavit of documents from one defendant (Drake Cartier), and a defendant's (Lowe, Gravelle & Associates Inc., also known as EFI Engineering) motion for leave to amend its Statement of Defence and, if necessary, withdraw admissions.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion against Drake Cartier, ordering the affidavit by August 1, 2023, but without costs due to short service.

The court also granted EFI Engineering's motion to amend its Statement of Defence, finding no non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff, particularly regarding limitation periods.

The court found no admissions were made that needed withdrawal, but would have granted leave if they had been.

Costs for the second motion were awarded against the plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs sought costs after the Defendants abandoned a motion they had brought seeking various reliefs, including an injunction and declarations regarding a mortgage loan.

The court found that the Defendants' motion was deemed abandoned under Rule 37.09(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, entitling the Plaintiffs to costs forthwith.

The court rejected the Defendants' argument that these were "interim costs" or should be "costs in the cause," distinguishing them from the extraordinary circumstances for interim costs.

While the Defendants' abandoned motion included a request for a declaration that could have disposed of the entire action (akin to a summary judgment), the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs under Rule 20.06, finding that the Defendants did not act unreasonably or in bad faith in bringing or abandoning the motion, as they were genuinely attempting to secure alternative financing.

The Plaintiffs were awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant mother sought a nesting arrangement with primary care for their child and pro-rata sharing of matrimonial home costs.

The respondent father agreed to nesting but sought a shared parenting regime.

The court ordered a temporary, without prejudice, shared parenting nesting arrangement with a four-day rotation, finding both parents capable and involved, and that the high conflict was detrimental to the child.

The court declined to order pro-rata cost sharing for the matrimonial home, stating both parties benefit equally from the arrangement.