Stephania Sikora

Following a nine-day child protection trial in which the Society's application was dismissed and the child was returned to the mother's care, the mother sought costs of $5,000 against the Society on a partial indemnity basis.

The court applied the framework from Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. K.L. and T.M. and found that the Society's conduct was patently unfair and indefensible, including: failure to disclose 400 pages of contact logs until three days before the final decision was rendered; failure to present relevant child welfare information to the court during trial; failure to increase access despite court direction and the absence of protection concerns; and failure to facilitate contact between the child and her maternal grandfather for over one and a half years.

Costs were awarded, but reduced to a nominal $500 on the basis that both Legal Aid Ontario (representing the mother) and the Society are publicly funded, and that limited public funds should remain directed toward the child's continued care rather than past legal fees.

Costs endorsement following a three-day family law trial in which the applicant obtained a Final Order on parenting issues.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of $24,577.27 based on her Offer to Settle and the respondent's unreasonable conduct.

The court found the applicant's Offer to Settle met the requirements of Rule 24(12) FLR, entitling her to full recovery of costs.

However, applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness from Beaver v. Hill and Lawrence v. Lawrence, and considering the respondent's unreasonable behaviour including overholding the child and breaching court orders, the court awarded the applicant 80-85% of her costs, totalling $20,000 all-inclusive payable within 30 days.

The applicant sought equalization of net family property following the dissolution of her marriage.

The respondent's pleadings were struck for failing to fulfill financial disclosure obligations under the Family Law Rules, and the matter proceeded as an uncontested trial.

The court undertook a detailed valuation of the parties' real property holdings, farm equipment, and the respondent's LIRA pension, relying on MPAC assessments, appraisals, and available bank statements in the absence of disclosure from the respondent.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the applicant $229,896.35 as an equalization payment, less two advances totalling $69,657.21, for a net payment of $160,239.14, together with prejudgment interest and costs.

The respondent in a family law application moved under r. 25(19) of the Family Law Rules to set aside an order noting her in default for failing to serve and file an answer.

The court held it had no jurisdiction to set aside the noting of default under r. 25(19) because the respondent had proper notice and was physically present at the motion.

The court also declined to adopt a procedure analogous to r. 19.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding no gap in the FLRs warranted filling.

Even if jurisdiction existed, the court would not have exercised its discretion in the respondent's favour given her unexplained and unreasonable failure to comply with the rules over nearly a year.

The applicant, a parent involved with the respondent children's aid society, filed an application alleging the society failed to provide her an opportunity to be heard under s. 15(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The applicant raised five issues, including allegations of bias, failure to accommodate disabilities, and failure to hear requests for a new worker, service guidance, and flexible access scheduling.

The Child and Family Services Review Board dismissed four of the allegations, finding the society had reasonably heard and responded to the applicant's concerns.

However, the Board upheld the allegation regarding the request for a new worker, ordering the society to meet with the applicant, hear her reasons, and provide a written decision.

The applicant filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding services received from the respondent children's aid society.

The respondent challenged the Board's jurisdiction, arguing the issues were already before the court in an ongoing child protection proceeding.

The Board reviewed the allegations and found that while some issues related to parenting time and bias in the court proceeding were barred by section 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, other issues concerning the manner of service provision were separate and could proceed to a review.

The applicant wife brought a motion for the interim sale of the jointly-owned matrimonial home.

The respondent husband opposed the sale and brought a cross-motion seeking to have the applicant's interest transferred to him or to be granted exclusive possession.

The court applied the principles for partition and sale in family law cases, finding the applicant had a prima facie right to sale and the respondent failed to show his family law claims would be unfairly prejudiced.

The court noted it lacked jurisdiction to compel one joint tenant to sell to the other.

The motion for sale was granted, with each party to receive 25% of the net proceeds and the balance held in trust pending trial.

The respondent brought a motion to vary a previous order concerning the amalgamation and ownership of corporations, specifically seeking to remove the applicant's interest in the amalgamated entity.

The applicant opposed this motion and brought a cross-motion for alternative relief.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion, finding that it was functus officio and that the respondent had not demonstrated a mistake in the original order under Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules.

The court only corrected a typographical error in the original order, requiring the parties to negotiate a cooperative agreement for the amalgamated corporation.

The applicant mother sought a nesting arrangement with primary care for their child and pro-rata sharing of matrimonial home costs.

The respondent father agreed to nesting but sought a shared parenting regime.

The court ordered a temporary, without prejudice, shared parenting nesting arrangement with a four-day rotation, finding both parents capable and involved, and that the high conflict was detrimental to the child.

The court declined to order pro-rata cost sharing for the matrimonial home, stating both parties benefit equally from the arrangement.

The applicant sought a temporary parenting time order, specifically that the respondent's parenting time be only in accordance with the children's wishes.

The court had previously ordered specific parenting times, which the children refused.

The children's counsel argued the court erred by prioritizing "maximum contact" over the children's well-being and showed predisposition.

The court rejected these arguments, affirming the statutory presumption of continuing parental contact, but expressed concern about the children's anxiety and the mother's potential influence.

Reluctantly, the court ordered no further parenting time for the moment, emphasizing it was temporary and without prejudice, and encouraged exploration of reunification therapy.

The father brought a motion for a temporary parenting time order after the children, aged 11 and 13, refused to visit him due to his unpredictable outbursts and anger management issues.

The court considered the children's wishes and fears, finding them reasonable.

To ensure the children's emotional and psychological safety, the court suspended the previous parenting regime and ordered a gradual, monitored reintroduction through brief visits in public places, along with mandatory anger management counselling for the father and continued therapy for the children.

The applicant sought an order for partition and sale of a jointly owned 61-acre rural property.

The respondent opposed the motion, raising five arguments including allegations of perjury, disputes over property valuation, child support arrears, equalization of net family property, and claims of hardship.

The court dismissed all of the respondent's arguments, finding them unpersuasive and unsupported by evidence.

The court granted the order for partition and sale, concluding that the hardship to the applicant if the property were not sold far outweighed any potential hardship to the respondent.

The applicant mother moved for week-about access to her two children, who had been living with the respondent father since separation.

The father opposed, citing the mother's ongoing substance abuse and mental health issues, which had led to CAS involvement.

The court found that the current access arrangements lacked structure and required a change.

However, due to the mother's ongoing issues and the negative impact on the children, the court denied week-about access and instead ordered a temporary weekend access regime.

The mother moved to stay a temporary order granting the father supervised access to two children pending an appeal.

The father had previous convictions for sexual interference involving young girls.

The court granted the stay regarding the female child, finding that the motion judge lacked sufficient evidence about the circumstances of the father's prior convictions to ensure the proposed supervision would adequately protect the child.

The stay was granted without prejudice to the father providing further evidence.

The applicant sought interim custody and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, while the respondent sought joint custody and to retain the home.

The court granted the applicant interim sole custody, finding joint custody unworkable due to significant animus between the parties.

The respondent was granted unsupervised parenting time conditional on medication adherence.

The applicant was also granted interim exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, prioritizing the child's best interests over the respondent's business needs.

Costs were divided due to mixed success.

In a family law matter involving three children from a common law relationship, the court determined custody and access arrangements following separation.

The applicant father sought to make permanent the existing temporary orders providing him with primary residence of the two youngest children and week-about shared residency for the oldest child.

The respondent mother sought week-about shared residency for all three children or, alternatively, primary residence of the oldest child with access to the two youngest.

The court found both parents capable and loving, but determined that a week-about shared residency arrangement for all three children best served the children's interests, allowing maximum contact with both parents and siblings.

The court also adjusted child support obligations based on the new shared parenting arrangement and the parties' current incomes.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that a newborn child was in need of protection under Section 74 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, alleging risks based on parental substance use, the father's youth justice involvement and anger management concerns, lack of engagement with the Society during pregnancy planning, and inadequate preparedness for the child's discharge from hospital.

The court rejected all grounds for the protection finding, determining that the Society failed to establish a real and likely risk of physical or emotional harm on a balance of probabilities.

The court found the parents' plan to reside with extended family support was reasonable and responsible, and that the Society's concerns were largely speculative or based on incomplete and misleading information presented in the apprehension warrant application.

In this motion for temporary child support, the respondent mother sought an order for child support for the two children of the marriage, which the applicant father resisted.

The parties shared parenting time, necessitating the application of section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

Due to conflicting financial information and a lack of child expense budgets, the court imputed incomes for both parents and calculated a set-off amount.

The court then adjusted this set-off to account for the father's higher standard of living and debt burden, ultimately ordering the father to pay $300 per month in temporary child support.

The court declined to award costs due to unnecessarily lengthy affidavits containing irrelevant information.

Richard Wight moved to terminate a child support order and expunge arrears.

The Ministry of Community and Social Services (MCSS), as assignee of the support order, opposed this and brought a motion for extensive financial disclosure from Wight, including tax returns from 1978.

The court applied the proportionality principle, finding MCSS's disclosure requests disproportionate given the age of the order and the limited amount of outstanding arrears.

Wight was ordered to provide consents for MCSS to obtain information directly from CRA and FRO, and to provide a copy of a related Owen Sound order, but the broader disclosure requests were dismissed.