Matthew J. Jantzi

The applicant vendor brought an application under Rule 14.05(3) to compel the respondent purchaser to pay a $1,000,000 balloon payment under a vendor-take-back mortgage.

The respondent argued the payment was not due because the applicant had not completed ongoing remediation work required by the local conservation authority.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation and found that the remediation clause only required the applicant to pay outstanding fees, fines, and orders known at the time of closing within a six-month period.

The clause did not create an open-ended obligation to indemnify the purchaser for unknown future remediation expenses.

The application was granted and the respondent was ordered to make the payment.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for a declaration that they are the beneficial owners of the deceased mother's interest in a jointly-owned Hamilton property, relying on doctrines of part performance, proprietary and promissory estoppel, resulting trust, and unjust enrichment.

The defendant trustee sought summary judgment for partition and sale of the property.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that material factual and evidentiary issues remained unresolved, including the formation and terms of the alleged agreement, the reliability of hearsay evidence regarding the deceased's understanding, and the adequacy of financial documentation.

The court determined that a trial was necessary to resolve these live issues.

The moving party, Stride Credit Union, brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of L.B. Stewart J. dated October 2, 2024.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs of the leave motion left to the discretion of the appeal panel.

This appeal arose from a failed residential real estate transaction where the appellant purchasers breached the agreement.

The respondent vendors obtained summary judgment for damages, which the appellants challenged, arguing that the vendors failed to mitigate damages by selling the property at an improvident price and that the matter was unsuitable for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that a trial was unnecessary.

The appellate court found that the appellants failed to satisfy their onus to establish improvident sale, noting their failure to adduce expert evidence or cross-examine on affidavits during the summary judgment motion.

The applicant sought an order under the Partition Act for the forced sale of a jointly owned property.

The parties, who were in a romantic relationship but never married, held title as tenants-in-common.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction, contending the matter belonged in Family Court, and that a forced sale would be oppressive due to his business being operated from the home.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction, noting that the relief sought was under the Partition Act, not the Family Law Act, and that the property did not qualify as a matrimonial home.

The court found that the respondent's inconveniences, while significant, did not constitute oppression sufficient to deny the prima facie right to partition.

The application for sale was granted, with the proceeds to be held in trust pending further determination of distribution.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for damages arising from the defendants' breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The defendants failed to close the transaction, and the plaintiffs subsequently re-sold the property at a lower price.

The court found that the arm's length re-sale price was prima facie evidence of the property's fair market value and that the defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence to challenge the plaintiffs' mitigation efforts.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs for the difference in sale prices plus related expenses.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed an action brought by "Social Justice Network" against the defendants, declaring it was commenced by Althea Reyes, a declared vexatious litigant, without leave of the court.

The court found that "Social Justice Network" lacked capacity to sue as it was neither incorporated nor a registered business.

The action was deemed frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, consistent with Reyes's history of using aliases to initiate proceedings.

Full indemnity costs of $10,000 were awarded against Althea Reyes due to her duplicitous and abusive conduct.