Riley C. Brooks

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The defendant failed to close on the agreed date and argued the signed agreement was not binding because a clause requiring mutual consent to advance the closing date had not been initialed.

The court applied an objective test and found the signed agreement was valid and binding, noting the defendant had twice signed amendments confirming the existing terms.

Summary judgment was granted in the amount of $76,965.12, representing the difference between the contract price and resale price plus carrying costs, less the deposit which was credited against damages per the Court of Appeal's analysis in Azzarello.

The claim for lost Airbnb income was denied.

A defamation action brought by a not-for-profit housing corporation against a tenant who conducted an extensive social media campaign alleging fraud, conspiracy, and criminal conduct by the housing provider and its staff.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP motion), claiming the statements related to a matter of public interest.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while systemic issues relating to social housing could theoretically be matters of public interest, the defendant's expression was intended to manufacture concern about an issue lacking genuine public debate or notoriety.

The court found the expression was rooted in a private dispute and was a personal attack cloaked in the guise of public concern, intended to foster animosity toward the housing provider without regard for truth.

The defendant, Wolf Schroeder, requested dismissal of the plaintiff’s action under rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the claim was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court declined to dismiss, finding the claim was not clearly abusive or frivolous on its face and that rule 2.1 is reserved for only the clearest cases.

The court emphasized that the proper response to a potentially improper claim is through regular pleadings or summary judgment motions, not the exceptional rule 2.1 process.

The decision addresses two competing motions for the appointment of representative counsel for investors in a receivership proceeding involving Sussman Mortgage Funding Inc. The court reviews the procedural background, the need for representative counsel, and the competing proposals from Aird & Berlis LLP and Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP.

The court ultimately appoints Aird & Berlis LLP as representative counsel, finding their approach and fee structure preferable for efficiency, transparency, and certainty.

The applicant, a tenant of Barrie Municipal Non-Profit Housing Corporation, sought leave to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation, alleging overcharging and fraud.

The court considered whether the applicant qualified as a "complainant" under the Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, and whether the statutory criteria for leave were met.

The court found the applicant was not a proper person to bring the action, was not acting in good faith, and that granting leave was not in the interests of the corporation.

The application was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal two interlocutory decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $2,400 to the responding party.

The applicant sought an order under the Partition Act for the forced sale of a jointly owned property.

The parties, who were in a romantic relationship but never married, held title as tenants-in-common.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction, contending the matter belonged in Family Court, and that a forced sale would be oppressive due to his business being operated from the home.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction, noting that the relief sought was under the Partition Act, not the Family Law Act, and that the property did not qualify as a matrimonial home.

The court found that the respondent's inconveniences, while significant, did not constitute oppression sufficient to deny the prima facie right to partition.

The application for sale was granted, with the proceeds to be held in trust pending further determination of distribution.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce Minutes of Settlement reached in an application concerning the overburdening of a deeded right of way.

The self-represented respondent sought to resile from the agreement, alleging he was pressured and bullied into signing it.

The court found no evidence of duress, noting the agreement was negotiated over two months and the respondent signed it in person after being advised he was not obligated to do so.

The court exercised its common law jurisdiction to enforce the settlement and awarded costs to the applicant.