Samuel-Eugene Mosonyi

The decision addresses two competing motions for the appointment of representative counsel for investors in a receivership proceeding involving Sussman Mortgage Funding Inc. The court reviews the procedural background, the need for representative counsel, and the competing proposals from Aird & Berlis LLP and Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP.

The court ultimately appoints Aird & Berlis LLP as representative counsel, finding their approach and fee structure preferable for efficiency, transparency, and certainty.

This decision concerns three related matters: the appointment of a receiver over the assets of Sussman Mortgage Funding Inc. and related companies, the granting of a Mareva injunction against Sanford Sussman, and the scheduling of a motion to appoint representative counsel for investors.

The court finds the appointment of B. Riley Farber Inc. as receiver to be in the public interest and grants the Mareva injunction on consent.

The decision addresses the statutory and common law bases for receivership, the public interest in protecting investors, and the coordination of proceedings involving multiple stakeholders.

This endorsement addresses three related matters: the appointment of B. Riley Farber Inc. as receiver over the property of the respondents, the granting of a Mareva injunction against Sanford Sussman, and the scheduling of a motion to appoint representative counsel for investors in mortgages brokered and administered by Sussman Mortgage Funding Inc. The court finds the appointment of a receiver to be in the public interest and just and convenient, and grants the Mareva injunction on consent.

The endorsement also sets out the background of the proceedings, the issues to be determined, and the reasons for the orders made.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal concerning a "Lender Fee" in a multimillion-dollar loan agreement.

The motion judge had ruled that the balance of the fee was an unenforceable penalty clause and granted relief against forfeiture, also suggesting it was not earned as the loan was not advanced.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the Lender Fee was consideration for obtaining the loan commitment, not a stipulated remedy for breach, and therefore the doctrines of unenforceable penalty clauses and relief against forfeiture did not apply.

The court further clarified that the fee was not contingent on the loan being advanced based on the contract's terms.

The appeal was allowed, ordering the balance of the fee to be paid to the lender.

Dag Hrvoic appealed a trial judgment that found equal shareholdings between him and Melissa Hrvoic in a co-founded company and ordered him to purchase Melissa's shares.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on the shareholding agreement, company valuation, the application of the "clean hands" doctrine, and the commencement of the limitation period for Melissa's claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's factual findings and legal conclusions, including the existence of an agreement for equal shareholdings and the proper application of the Limitations Act.

The appellant sought a review of a chambers judge's order that partially lifted an automatic stay pending appeal, arguing the judge erred in finding financial hardship without sufficient evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion for review, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the chambers judge's exercise of discretion under Rule 63.01(5).

The court affirmed that the chambers judge correctly applied the factors for lifting a stay, including financial hardship, ability to repay, and appeal merits, and that the appellant's own admission regarding the minimum amount owed supported the decision.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two motions arising from an appeal of a trial decision concerning the division of a business.

The appellant sought to file an extended factum, which was unopposed and granted.

The respondent moved to lift an automatic stay of enforcement for a portion of the trial judgment, arguing financial hardship and that the amount represented the appellant's "best position" even if successful on appeal.

The court granted the motion to lift the stay for $1,874,400, finding demonstrable hardship to the respondent, minimal risk of non-recovery for the appellant given his admitted liability, and that the appeal on factual findings was not strong.

The order included a proportional transfer of shares to the appellant upon payment.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal the orders of the motion judge dated June 29, 2020, and August 17, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the total amount of $10,000, payable jointly and severally by the moving parties.

The applicants, 2235209 Ontario Inc. and Guy Salt, brought motions seeking interim orders including holding sale proceeds in trust, an injunction prohibiting dealings with Lot 5, a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on Lot 5, and a Mareva Order.

The motions were based on allegations of fraud regarding mortgage amounts, which the applicants claimed vitiated prior settlements where they had terminated their agreements of purchase and sale.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunctions.

The court also noted the applicants' lack of clean hands, delay, and insufficient undertakings.

The plaintiffs moved for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a mortgage held by the defendant on a property sold to a third party.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was overpaid upon the discharge of prior mortgages and claimed a trust interest in the new mortgage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while a claim to a mortgage may constitute an interest in land, the equities weighed heavily against granting a CPL due to the plaintiffs' significant delay, prior acknowledgments of the debt, and inability to satisfy a potential damages award.