Stephen Price

In an impaired driving trial arising from a late-night traffic stop, the accused alleged breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter and sought exclusion of breath readings.

The court held the arrest and breath demand were supported by objectively reasonable grounds, and rejected the claim that police failed to diligently assist access to counsel of choice through the accused's cell phone.

However, the court found a s. 10(b) breach when police were told duty counsel had hung up and failed to offer reconnection or confirm satisfaction with the legal advice received.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath results under s. 24(2), dismissed the 80 plus and dangerous operation charges, and convicted on impaired operation based on the officer's observations and video evidence.

This ruling addresses a defence application to prevent the Crown from calling evidence in response to two Charter applications due to the Crown's late or absent responses.

For the first application (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)), the court found the Crown's late response did not cause surprise and permitted evidence.

For the second 'overholding' application (ss. 7, 9), the Crown had not responded and sought to introduce new, undisclosed evidence.

The court ruled against delaying the case for new disclosure, allowing the Crown to respond only with previously known evidence and denying an adjournment for new evidence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing to provide a breath sample for a roadside screening device (ASD).

The trial judge found that despite an initial refusal, the respondent's subsequent offer to provide a sample, made within approximately ten minutes and while the device was still available and the test could be meaningfully performed, was part of the "same transaction." The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming the "same transaction" principle established in R. v. Domik, which holds that a refusal followed almost immediately by an assent may not constitute a criminal offence.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that later Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions (Woods and Degiorgio) had displaced the Domik principle, noting those cases dealt with different factual contexts and did not address the "same transaction" issue.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to provide a breath sample using an Approved Screening Device (ASD).

He initially refused due to distrust of the device, believing he would be taken to the police station for a more reliable Intoxilyzer test.

Upon learning he would be released from the scene and not taken to the station, he offered to provide a sample into the ASD.

The court found that his subsequent offer, made approximately 10 minutes after the initial refusal and while the device was still available, effectively cancelled his prior refusal as it was part of the same transaction.

The defendant was found not guilty.

The applicants, 2235209 Ontario Inc. and Guy Salt, brought motions seeking interim orders including holding sale proceeds in trust, an injunction prohibiting dealings with Lot 5, a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on Lot 5, and a Mareva Order.

The motions were based on allegations of fraud regarding mortgage amounts, which the applicants claimed vitiated prior settlements where they had terminated their agreements of purchase and sale.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunctions.

The court also noted the applicants' lack of clean hands, delay, and insufficient undertakings.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial addressed Charter issues regarding the timing of access to counsel and the privacy of lawyer-client communications during custody.

The court found a technical violation of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding the delay in providing access to counsel (approximately 14 minutes), but found no violation regarding the privacy of the phone booth conversation.

The breath test evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused was convicted.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of driving 'over 80'.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer readings under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding s. 8 and s. 9 breaches because the Approved Screening Device (ASD) used by the police officer was two days past its calibration date.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the finding of the Charter breaches but found the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis, particularly regarding the impact of the breach.

The appeal court admitted the evidence, set aside the acquittal, and entered a conviction.

The appellant, Sean McGovern, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The central issue was whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant and demand breath samples.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in factual findings and credibility assessment, specifically by relying on a single stumble and slightly slurred speech to establish reasonable grounds, and by giving undue weight to the police officer's testimony.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual determinations or credibility assessment.

The court affirmed that the cumulative observations made by the officer, including traffic offences, odour of alcohol, watery eyes, slow document production, and a slight stumble, constituted objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand.

The court also clarified that the trial judge's preference for the officer's evidence was based on factual considerations of reliability, not a per se elevation of police testimony.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, arguing the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by excluding Intoxilyzer test results.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) Charter violation due to police failure to ensure the respondent received legal advice despite diligence.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in assessing the seriousness of the breach, its impact on Charter interests, or society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court affirmed that the police's prior compliant conduct did not mitigate the breach and that the right to counsel has intrinsic value beyond discoverability.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams.

He argued the trial judge erred in findings of fact and credibility, and that his rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter were breached.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's global assessment of credibility, which concluded the appellant had fabricated evidence.

The court also upheld the finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make an ASD demand based on the odour of alcohol.

The accused was charged with failing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device and several provincial driving offences.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the accused's credibility, ultimately rejecting his testimony that he had attempted to provide a proper sample.

The court accepted the evidence of the police officers that the accused was intentionally thwarting the test by not sealing his lips, sticking his tongue in the mouthpiece, and blowing short bursts.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her Charter applications under s. 10(b), alleging police failed to assist her in contacting her counsel of choice and failed to provide adequate privacy during her consultation with duty counsel.

She also argued the trial judge failed to properly consider evidence regarding her impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the law, concluding the appellant's belief that she lacked privacy was not reasonably held.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but abandoned the sections 8 and 9 arguments before trial.

The court found no breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel, rejecting arguments that police "funnelled" the accused to duty counsel or that the telephone consultation lacked privacy.

On the trial proper, the accused testified he consumed two double vodka drinks in the 10 minutes before leaving the restaurant, raising a bolus drinking defence.

The court rejected this evidence as incredible and unreliable, finding it inconsistent with the bartender's testimony and contrary to common sense.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicology evidence and the common sense inference that people do not normally consume large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving.

Andre Hidi appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had found him guilty based on an off-duty police officer's observations of "horrible" driving, an odour of alcohol, and the appellant's testimony of alcohol consumption, despite the exclusion of breathalyzer data.

The appellant raised five grounds of appeal, primarily challenging the trial judge's factual findings, credibility assessments, and the application of legal principles regarding evidence inconsistent with impairment.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's deference on factual findings and credibility, and clarifying the interpretation of "horrible driving" in conjunction with other evidence to infer impairment, particularly distinguishing and adopting the analysis in *R. v. Kumric* over *R. v. Singh*.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and "over 80" operation of a motor vehicle following a traffic stop on Highway 404.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing blood alcohol concentrations of 150 mg/100ml and 140 mg/100ml.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, alleging the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds.

The defence also alleged a breach of section 10(b) rights regarding privacy during consultation with duty counsel.

The trial judge found the officer's testimony regarding grounds for arrest was riddled with anomalies, implausibilities, and internal inconsistencies, and rejected most of the officer's evidence concerning indicia of impairment.

The court found the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand, constituting a Charter breach.

The court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was serious and compounded by misleading testimony.

Without the breath evidence, the Crown could not prove impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and breath demand, as the grounds relied upon were not objectively supported.

The court also found that the accused was subjected to an unlawful arrest and detention, during which he was handcuffed excessively tightly despite being compliant, causing him significant pain.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction on the Over 80 count only.

The defence argued that the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were violated and sought exclusion of the Intoxilyzer results under section 24(2).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, having manufactured evidence of slurred speech and taken an impermissible shortcut by proceeding directly to arrest rather than first administering an approved screening device test.

The court excluded the breath test results and acquitted the accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding his statements voluntary, finding reasonable suspicion for the roadside demand, finding reasonable grounds for the breathalyzer demand, refusing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter for a s. 10(b) breach, refusing a stay for lost video evidence, and rejecting his bolus drinking defence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, factual findings, or application of legal principles.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal and a stay of a six-year driving prohibition following conviction and sentencing to six months imprisonment plus two years probation.

The Crown opposed on the ground that the appeal was frivolous.

The motion judge found that while most grounds were frivolous, one alleged error of law regarding the trial judge's use of the appellant's failure to comment on a van in front of him to the 911 operator could not be characterized as frivolous at that stage.

The Crown did not rely on other grounds to oppose bail or the stay.

Bail and the stay were granted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no section 8 or 9 violation, as the officer reasonably believed the approved screening device was functioning properly.

However, the court found a section 10(b) violation when police refused to permit the accused to contact a third party to obtain a lawyer's name and contact information.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court admitted the breath samples, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.