Stephen Price

This ruling addresses a defence application to prevent the Crown from calling evidence in response to two Charter applications due to the Crown's late or absent responses.

For the first application (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)), the court found the Crown's late response did not cause surprise and permitted evidence.

For the second 'overholding' application (ss. 7, 9), the Crown had not responded and sought to introduce new, undisclosed evidence.

The court ruled against delaying the case for new disclosure, allowing the Crown to respond only with previously known evidence and denying an adjournment for new evidence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing to provide a breath sample for a roadside screening device (ASD).

The trial judge found that despite an initial refusal, the respondent's subsequent offer to provide a sample, made within approximately ten minutes and while the device was still available and the test could be meaningfully performed, was part of the "same transaction." The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming the "same transaction" principle established in R. v. Domik, which holds that a refusal followed almost immediately by an assent may not constitute a criminal offence.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that later Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions (Woods and Degiorgio) had displaced the Domik principle, noting those cases dealt with different factual contexts and did not address the "same transaction" issue.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to provide a breath sample using an Approved Screening Device (ASD).

He initially refused due to distrust of the device, believing he would be taken to the police station for a more reliable Intoxilyzer test.

Upon learning he would be released from the scene and not taken to the station, he offered to provide a sample into the ASD.

The court found that his subsequent offer, made approximately 10 minutes after the initial refusal and while the device was still available, effectively cancelled his prior refusal as it was part of the same transaction.

The defendant was found not guilty.

The applicants, 2235209 Ontario Inc. and Guy Salt, brought motions seeking interim orders including holding sale proceeds in trust, an injunction prohibiting dealings with Lot 5, a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on Lot 5, and a Mareva Order.

The motions were based on allegations of fraud regarding mortgage amounts, which the applicants claimed vitiated prior settlements where they had terminated their agreements of purchase and sale.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunctions.

The court also noted the applicants' lack of clean hands, delay, and insufficient undertakings.

The appellant, Sean McGovern, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The central issue was whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant and demand breath samples.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in factual findings and credibility assessment, specifically by relying on a single stumble and slightly slurred speech to establish reasonable grounds, and by giving undue weight to the police officer's testimony.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual determinations or credibility assessment.

The court affirmed that the cumulative observations made by the officer, including traffic offences, odour of alcohol, watery eyes, slow document production, and a slight stumble, constituted objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand.

The court also clarified that the trial judge's preference for the officer's evidence was based on factual considerations of reliability, not a per se elevation of police testimony.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, arguing the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by excluding Intoxilyzer test results.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) Charter violation due to police failure to ensure the respondent received legal advice despite diligence.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in assessing the seriousness of the breach, its impact on Charter interests, or society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court affirmed that the police's prior compliant conduct did not mitigate the breach and that the right to counsel has intrinsic value beyond discoverability.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams.

He argued the trial judge erred in findings of fact and credibility, and that his rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter were breached.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's global assessment of credibility, which concluded the appellant had fabricated evidence.

The court also upheld the finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make an ASD demand based on the odour of alcohol.

Andre Hidi appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had found him guilty based on an off-duty police officer's observations of "horrible" driving, an odour of alcohol, and the appellant's testimony of alcohol consumption, despite the exclusion of breathalyzer data.

The appellant raised five grounds of appeal, primarily challenging the trial judge's factual findings, credibility assessments, and the application of legal principles regarding evidence inconsistent with impairment.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's deference on factual findings and credibility, and clarifying the interpretation of "horrible driving" in conjunction with other evidence to infer impairment, particularly distinguishing and adopting the analysis in *R. v. Kumric* over *R. v. Singh*.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and "over 80" operation of a motor vehicle following a traffic stop on Highway 404.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing blood alcohol concentrations of 150 mg/100ml and 140 mg/100ml.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, alleging the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds.

The defence also alleged a breach of section 10(b) rights regarding privacy during consultation with duty counsel.

The trial judge found the officer's testimony regarding grounds for arrest was riddled with anomalies, implausibilities, and internal inconsistencies, and rejected most of the officer's evidence concerning indicia of impairment.

The court found the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand, constituting a Charter breach.

The court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was serious and compounded by misleading testimony.

Without the breath evidence, the Crown could not prove impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and breath demand, as the grounds relied upon were not objectively supported.

The court also found that the accused was subjected to an unlawful arrest and detention, during which he was handcuffed excessively tightly despite being compliant, causing him significant pain.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction on the Over 80 count only.

The defence argued that the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were violated and sought exclusion of the Intoxilyzer results under section 24(2).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, having manufactured evidence of slurred speech and taken an impermissible shortcut by proceeding directly to arrest rather than first administering an approved screening device test.

The court excluded the breath test results and acquitted the accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding his statements voluntary, finding reasonable suspicion for the roadside demand, finding reasonable grounds for the breathalyzer demand, refusing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter for a s. 10(b) breach, refusing a stay for lost video evidence, and rejecting his bolus drinking defence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, factual findings, or application of legal principles.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal and a stay of a six-year driving prohibition following conviction and sentencing to six months imprisonment plus two years probation.

The Crown opposed on the ground that the appeal was frivolous.

The motion judge found that while most grounds were frivolous, one alleged error of law regarding the trial judge's use of the appellant's failure to comment on a van in front of him to the 911 operator could not be characterized as frivolous at that stage.

The Crown did not rely on other grounds to oppose bail or the stay.

Bail and the stay were granted.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop in a parking lot.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results.

The defendant, self-represented, raised a Charter breach under section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel.

The court found that the defendant had clearly requested to speak to his counsel of choice, Reid Rusonik of the Reid Pinkofsky firm, but the officer failed to adequately facilitate this request.

Although the defendant eventually spoke to duty counsel, the officer's failure to make reasonable efforts to contact the defendant's counsel of choice constituted a serious Charter violation.

The court excluded the breath test evidence as a remedy and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no section 8 or 9 violation, as the officer reasonably believed the approved screening device was functioning properly.

However, the court found a section 10(b) violation when police refused to permit the accused to contact a third party to obtain a lawyer's name and contact information.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court admitted the breath samples, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol on April 17, 2014.

The Crown's case relied on observations of poor driving on the Gardiner Expressway, evidence of alcohol consumption, and the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath.

The defence argued that the impaired driving could be explained by fatigue and distraction from cell phone use, rather than alcohol impairment.

The court found that while the driving was severely impaired, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the impairment was caused by alcohol rather than other factors.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicants sought a temporary injunction to prevent a power of sale, an order to assign a first mortgage, and a vesting order for three lots, aiming to extinguish a second mortgage held by one of the respondents.

The court dismissed all requests, finding the applicants' attempt to "cut out" the second mortgage was not bona fide.

The court held that the assignment, even if granted, would not extinguish the second mortgage due to contractual subordination and the subsequent mortgagee's right to redeem.

The court also found no serious issue to be tried for the injunction, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored the respondents, noting the applicants did not come with clean hands.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop on Leslie Street in Richmond Hill.

The defendant admitted to consuming multiple glasses of red wine, providing reasonable suspicion for an approved screening device (ASD) demand.

However, the arresting officer delayed making the ASD demand for 16 minutes and 29 seconds while conducting vehicle registration and background checks.

The defendant applied to exclude the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the delay violated the "forthwith" requirement established in case law, constituting unlawful detention and unreasonable seizure.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the charge.

The appellant, Nishan Minhas, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and "over 80" stemming from a RIDE checkpoint stop.

He alleged multiple Charter violations by the police officer, including errors in credibility assessment, acceptance of impairment evidence, handling of mouth alcohol, and the timing of the approved screening device demand relative to the right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, the reliability of the impairment indicia, or the handling of the mouth alcohol issue.

Crucially, the court held that the brief delay in providing the right to counsel during the roadside investigation, including the approved screening device test, was a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit under section 1 of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision on January 15, 2015.

The trial involved a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and the admissibility of breath sample evidence.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest, having only reasonable suspicion, and that the officer's credibility and reliability were seriously compromised by inadequate notes, failure to use required recording equipment, and evasive testimony.

The court concluded that the defendant's s. 9 Charter rights against arbitrary detention were violated.

Under s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence obtained after the arrest, finding that the seriousness of the state misconduct outweighed other considerations.