Stephen Price

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown proved both charges based on breath readings of 186 and 191 mg% obtained approximately 2.5 hours after the accident, expert toxicology evidence establishing the accused's BAC at the time of driving, and observations of impairment indicators by police officers at the scene.

Although the court found a Charter violation regarding the right to counsel, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) as the breach was minor, the officers acted in good faith, and the evidence was reliable and necessary.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol (over 80) on October 30, 2011.

His trial commenced on October 31, 2012, but was not completed that day.

The Crown withdrew the over 80 charge.

The trial was scheduled to continue on April 10, 2013.

The accused brought a Charter application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) seeking a stay of the remaining charge based on unreasonable delay.

The court found that the total delay of 17.3 months, comprising approximately 4.25 months of neutral intake and preparation time, 7.75 months of institutional delay to the first trial date, and an additional 5.3 months of combined institutional, Crown, and defence delay to the continuation date, exceeded constitutional tolerability.

The court granted the application and stayed the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a roadside breath sample.

He argued that the trial judge erred in assessing police credibility, that he had a reasonable excuse for refusing the sample due to mistrust of the officer, and that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were violated by his detention and a strip search at the police station.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the credibility assessment, holding that his subjective mistrust was not an objectively reasonable excuse, and concluding that the detention and strip search were lawful and justified on safety grounds.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following observations of erratic driving on Highway 401 and subsequent breath samples showing more than three times the legal limit.

The Crown conceded that the accused's Charter rights were breached: a strip search violated s.8 rights, and the lack of an interpreter violated s.10(b) rights.

The court found the impaired driving charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of evidence including poor driving, physical signs of impairment, and odour of alcohol.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under s.24(2) due to the Charter breaches, resulting in acquittal on the over 80 charge.

For the impaired driving charge, the court declined to stay proceedings despite the serious Charter violations, finding this was not one of the clearest cases warranting a stay.

Instead, the court imposed a nominal $1 fine and the mandatory one-year driving prohibition to reflect the seriousness of the illegal strip search while protecting the public interest.

The applicant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and over 80 on April 23, 2011.

She brought a motion to stay the charges pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging that she was not tried within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled to commence on January 25, 2012, but did not conclude until July 13, 2012, resulting in a delay of approximately 14.5 months from arrest to the second trial date.

The court found that the Crown's inattention to disclosure obligations, including the failure to timely provide police officer notes and a 911 recording, contributed significantly to the delay.

The court concluded that the applicant's s. 11(b) rights were violated and granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and brought a Charter application under sections 7, 11(b), and 24(1) seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The trial commenced approximately 18 months after the charge date.

The court analyzed the delay using the Morin framework, considering the overall length of delay, waiver periods, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

After deducting waived time and characterizing various periods as inherent time requirements, institutional delay, or neutral time, the court found approximately 6 months and 14 days of institutional delay.

The court concluded this fell well below the Morin guideline of 8 to 10 months and that societal interests in a trial on the merits outweighed the moderate prejudice suffered.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that his roadside statement, made before he was advised of his right to counsel, was improperly admitted.

The Court of Appeal, applying its previous decision in R. v. Huff, held that the statement must be excluded from the evidence available for the Carter defence and credibility assessment.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant trade union sought a related employer declaration under section 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, to treat Royal Taxi and various Associates as a single employer.

The union had recently certified only the brokerage (Royal Taxi) and subsequently negotiated a collective agreement with it.

The Board declined to exercise its discretion to make the declaration, finding that the union had strategically chosen to certify only the brokerage and that adding the Associates now would unfairly disrupt the newly negotiated collective agreement, which did not address Associate-specific issues.

The applicant, a newly formed independent union, applied for certification to displace the intervenor union.

The Board held a hearing to determine whether the applicant met the statutory definition of a 'trade union' under section 1(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

Despite irregularities in following its own constitution during its organizational meeting, the Board found that the essential features of forming a trade union—adopting a constitution, admitting members, and having representative officers—were present.

The Board concluded that the applicant is a viable organization of employees and therefore a trade union within the meaning of the Act.

The applicant, a university professor, applied under section 47 of the Labour Relations Act for an exemption from paying mandatory union dues to the faculty association on the basis of his religious beliefs.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board applied the three-part Wybinga test.

While the Board accepted that the applicant held sincere religious beliefs, it found that his objections to the union were primarily socio-political, relating to the adversarial nature of unions in a university setting and the impact of strikes on students.

The majority concluded that the applicant was rationalizing his general objections to trade unions in terms of his religious beliefs, and dismissed the application.

One member dissented, finding the religious objection bona fide.

The applicant, a university professor, applied for an exemption from paying mandatory union dues on religious grounds under section 47 of the Labour Relations Act.

He argued that his religious beliefs, which emphasize individual responsibility and reject coercion, prevented him from supporting the faculty association.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's long-standing opposition to the union was based on professional concerns about academic standards and collegiality, rather than religious conviction.