Stephen Price

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol on April 17, 2014.

The Crown's case relied on observations of poor driving on the Gardiner Expressway, evidence of alcohol consumption, and the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath.

The defence argued that the impaired driving could be explained by fatigue and distraction from cell phone use, rather than alcohol impairment.

The court found that while the driving was severely impaired, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the impairment was caused by alcohol rather than other factors.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicants sought a temporary injunction to prevent a power of sale, an order to assign a first mortgage, and a vesting order for three lots, aiming to extinguish a second mortgage held by one of the respondents.

The court dismissed all requests, finding the applicants' attempt to "cut out" the second mortgage was not bona fide.

The court held that the assignment, even if granted, would not extinguish the second mortgage due to contractual subordination and the subsequent mortgagee's right to redeem.

The court also found no serious issue to be tried for the injunction, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored the respondents, noting the applicants did not come with clean hands.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop on Leslie Street in Richmond Hill.

The defendant admitted to consuming multiple glasses of red wine, providing reasonable suspicion for an approved screening device (ASD) demand.

However, the arresting officer delayed making the ASD demand for 16 minutes and 29 seconds while conducting vehicle registration and background checks.

The defendant applied to exclude the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the delay violated the "forthwith" requirement established in case law, constituting unlawful detention and unreasonable seizure.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the charge.

The appellant, Nishan Minhas, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and "over 80" stemming from a RIDE checkpoint stop.

He alleged multiple Charter violations by the police officer, including errors in credibility assessment, acceptance of impairment evidence, handling of mouth alcohol, and the timing of the approved screening device demand relative to the right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, the reliability of the impairment indicia, or the handling of the mouth alcohol issue.

Crucially, the court held that the brief delay in providing the right to counsel during the roadside investigation, including the approved screening device test, was a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit under section 1 of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision on January 15, 2015.

The trial involved a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and the admissibility of breath sample evidence.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest, having only reasonable suspicion, and that the officer's credibility and reliability were seriously compromised by inadequate notes, failure to use required recording equipment, and evasive testimony.

The court concluded that the defendant's s. 9 Charter rights against arbitrary detention were violated.

Under s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence obtained after the arrest, finding that the seriousness of the state misconduct outweighed other considerations.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility by using his post-arrest silence regarding post-driving alcohol consumption and by misapplying the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by drawing an adverse inference from the appellant's silence, which violated his constitutional right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court also found an error in the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule.

Given that credibility was central to the trial's outcome, these errors were deemed serious and not harmless.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

Other grounds of appeal, including alleged Milne/Coutts/Orbanski error, lack of privacy during counsel call, and insufficient grounds for arrest/breath demand, were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the property assessment of her single-family detached home for the 2013-2016 taxation years, originally assessed at $3,550,000.

The appellant argued for a reduction to $3,080,000 based on comparable properties and previous Board decisions, while MPAC defended the assessment based on its own comparables and a 5% positive adjustment for abutting green space.

The Assessment Review Board rejected both parties' comparable sales as insufficiently similar.

However, the Board agreed with the appellant that the 5% positive adjustment for the abutting green space was unreasonable due to nuisances such as a leash-free dog park, a public walkway, and a water culvert causing flooding.

The Board removed the 5% adjustment, reducing the current value assessment to $3,372,000.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impaired operation and dangerous driving and was sentenced to three years' probation, fines, and consecutive driving prohibitions totaling five years.

He appealed the driving prohibition as demonstrably unfit.

The Crown conceded the consecutive prohibitions were an error.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the sentencing judge overemphasized denunciation, noting the appellant's lack of prior record, glowing pre-sentence report, and successful rehabilitation efforts.

The appeal was allowed and the driving prohibition was reduced to a total of two years.

The appellant, Jasvinder Shoker, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80 mg.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding impairment and erred in finding no s. 10(b) Charter breach concerning his right to counsel.

The appeal court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of impairment, noting sufficient indicia despite some inconsistencies.

Regarding the Charter issue, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that no breach occurred, as the appellant had agreed to speak with duty counsel if his preferred lawyer was unavailable and expressed no dissatisfaction with this arrangement at the time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an "over 80" charge.

The trial judge had found no reasonable and probable grounds for arrest or breath demand, leading to the exclusion of breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in law by not making a clear finding of fact regarding the respondent's slurred speech, which was a crucial factor in determining reasonable and probable grounds.

Without a definitive finding on this key indicium of impairment, the court could not determine with certainty if reasonable and probable grounds existed.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Mohammed Karimullah appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The appeal raised several grounds, including alleged factual errors by the trial judge, the rejection of expert evidence regarding alcohol impairment, and the failure to adequately address good character evidence.

The court found that the alleged factual errors were either insignificant or not palpable and overriding.

The trial judge was entitled to reject expert opinion, even if uncontradicted, and to use common sense in evaluating the evidence, particularly regarding the appellant's changed driving behavior.

The court also determined that the trial judge's brief reference to good character evidence was sufficient, as a judge is presumed to know the law, and counsel did not emphasize it in closing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood on March 9, 2014.

The court addressed multiple Charter issues including arbitrary stop, reasonable and probable grounds, and rights to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 9 (arbitrary stop), no breach of section 8 (reasonable and probable grounds), and a breach of section 10(b) (rights to counsel) but excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused raised a section 258(1)(d.1) defence (last drinks consumed) but the court rejected the accused's credibility and found the defence not established.

The court convicted the accused.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in concluding that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The appellant alleged that several periods of delay before the breath tests rendered the evidence unreliable.

The court found the trial judge had carefully assessed the evidence and reasonably concluded that delays related to contacting duty counsel, moving the vehicle, a shift change, and the availability of the breath technician were justified.

The factual findings were supported by the record and disclosed no error in principle.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood-alcohol level exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on observations by a police officer at a RIDE spot-check, an approved screening device test showing a "fail" reading, and Intoxilyzer readings of 200 and 190 milligrams.

The defence raised eight major issues including challenges to reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, the reliability of the approved screening device test, potential mouth alcohol issues, and alleged Charter violations.

The trial judge accepted the officer's testimony regarding observations of impairment and rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable.

The court found no Charter breaches and concluded the evidence proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

Guilty verdicts were entered on both counts, with the impaired driving count stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood on April 28, 2013.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 160 mg/100ml taken approximately 2.5 hours after the incident, supported by an expert report estimating the accused's BAC at the time of driving was between 160-205 mg/100ml.

The defence presented evidence of bolus drinking (rapid consumption of alcohol shortly before driving) and expert evidence suggesting the accused's BAC at the time of driving was between 49-73 mg/100ml.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused consumed large quantities of alcohol within 15 minutes prior to the incident, a critical assumption underlying the Crown's expert opinion.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant was charged with having a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration while having care and control of a motor vehicle.

He was arrested on September 28, 2013, with trial initially scheduled for December 11, 2014.

The trial was adjourned due to Crown failure to disclose the correct breath room videotape, and rescheduled to June 2, 2015.

The applicant brought a Charter application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) claiming the delay infringed his right to be tried without unreasonable delay.

The court found that the Crown's conduct was responsible for the adjournment and the subsequent delay, resulting in approximately 19.5 months of total delay, which exceeded the Morin guidelines.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with accessing child pornography.

The Crown sought to introduce purchase orders and invoices found on the defendant's account at AZOV Films (a website selling child pornography) as evidence of the offence.

The central issue was whether these electronic documents were admissible for the truth of their contents.

The Crown argued admissibility under section 31 of the Canada Evidence Act or as admissions against interest.

The defence argued that section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act applied and had not been complied with.

The court held that section 31 addresses only authentication and the best evidence rule, not hearsay exceptions.

Section 30 applies to business records and was not complied with.

The documents were also not admissible as admissions because the accused was not in possession of the computer housing the records and there was insufficient evidence he created them.

The Crown conceded it could not establish admissibility and requested a finding of not guilty, which was granted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown proceeded only on the impaired driving charge.

The trial involved a preliminary voir-dire regarding the qualifications of an unaccredited Korean interpreter, which the court found to be necessary to ensure the defendant's Charter rights were protected.

Following the interpreter qualification hearing, the Crown called four police officers to establish impairment.

The court found that while the evidence established reasonable grounds to believe impairment and made it more likely than not that impairment occurred, the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to the ambiguity of certain indicia.

The defendant was acquitted on the impaired driving count.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle following a three-vehicle collision.

The impairment element was conceded; the sole issue was whether the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea.

The defendant had unknowingly received a prescription for Lorazepam at double his usual dose due to a pharmacy error.

The court found that while the defendant was objectively impaired, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he voluntarily consumed the drug with knowledge that it might impair his ability to drive, given the accidental doubling of his prescription and his lack of prior experience with side effects at higher doses.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving following a summary conviction trial.

At trial, the court found violations of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter relating to an unlawful strip search and failure to provide an interpreter during the exercise of the right to counsel, and excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2), resulting in an acquittal on the “over 80” charge.

The appellant argued on appeal that the impaired driving conviction was unreasonable and that the proceedings should have been stayed due to the Charter breaches.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s verdict was supported by the evidence, including eyewitness testimony of erratic driving and police observations of impairment.

The court also held that the trial judge did not err in refusing a stay, given the seriousness of the driving conduct, the availability of other Charter remedies, and the public interest in prosecuting impaired driving.