Paul M. Alexander

The accused, A.R.A., was charged with multiple counts of sexual interference, sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching involving his two nieces.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainants and the accused, and considered the admissibility of similar fact evidence.

The court found the accused's testimony not credible and identified significant inconsistencies in the complainants' accounts, as well as potential collusion between them.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the Crown had not proven the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the charges.

The accused, A.R.A., faced charges including sexual interference and sexual assault.

The defence applied for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court calculated the total delay from charge to the end of evidence, deducting periods attributable to exceptional circumstances: witness illness (4 months), unexpected witness availability (3 weeks), and inaccurate trial estimates/COVID-19 backlog (1 month + 1 week).

The net delay fell below the 18-month Jordan ceiling for provincial court.

The court found the defence did not take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Jerome Kaell, brought an application to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay, arguing that the 18-month presumptive ceiling under R. v. Jordan applied to his case.

Kaell had initially elected trial in the superior court, was committed there, and then re-elected to the provincial court without a preliminary inquiry.

The central issue was whether the 18-month or 30-month Jordan ceiling applied.

The court held that once a case is committed to the superior court and the 30-month ceiling crystallizes, it does not revert to 18 months upon re-election to the provincial court.

The court also found that the delay occasioned by the re-election was attributable to the defence.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for two counts of sexual assault against a mother and daughter during acupuncture treatments.

The appeal was based on alleged errors in credibility findings, uneven scrutiny of evidence, failure to declare a mistrial due to a post-verdict civil claim, and impermissible stereotypical reasoning.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the trial judge's credibility findings and dismissal of the mistrial application were reasonable, the trial judge erred in law by relying on impermissible stereotypical reasoning regarding the likelihood of a civil claim based on masturbation.

This error reversed the burden of proof.

The appeal was granted, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding his recklessness as to consent.

The trial judge had relied on a text message exchange to corroborate the complainant's evidence of non-consent and to establish the appellant's recklessness.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the functional approach to reasons and found the trial judge adequately explained the logical connection between the evidence and the verdict.

The appeal was dismissed.

Golam Mehedi brought three applications for certiorari seeking to proceed with private criminal charges against three individuals, which were opposed by the Crown.

The Crown also brought an application to have Mr. Mehedi declared a vexatious litigant.

The court dismissed all three of Mr. Mehedi's certiorari applications, finding them to be without merit.

The court granted the Crown's application, declaring Mr. Mehedi a vexatious litigant and issuing an order restricting his ability to institute or continue proceedings in any Superior Court in Ontario for the review of lower court proceedings or Crown action with respect to any private criminal information, except with leave of a Superior Court Judge based on written submissions.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of an inmate's appeal against conviction and sentence for assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon.

The appeal was based on four grounds: misapprehension of evidence, error in considering self-defence, error in applying Hodge's Case rule, and reliance on speculation regarding shanks.

The court found no arguable merit in any ground, including the sentence appeal, and granted the Crown's request for summary dismissal under s. 685 of the Criminal Code, emphasizing the need to avoid wasting judicial resources.

Following a judge-alone trial on a charge of sexual assault arising from sexual intercourse in a university residence room after a fraternity party, the court found the complainant did not consent and was in a severely intoxicated, vomiting, and intermittently unconscious state.

The court applied the Criminal Code consent provisions and rejected any notion of implied consent, finding the accused took no reasonable steps to ascertain consent and knew, or was wilfully blind to, the complainant's incapacity and non-consent.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court accepted the complainant's evidence, rejected the accused's account as fabricated and implausible, and relied in part on the physical evidence of the torn costume to confirm the complainant's version.

A finding of guilt was entered on the charge of sexual assault.

This decision addresses the voluntariness and admissibility of statements made by two accused, Youssef El Hariti and Abdelmalek Haddouche, charged with sexual assault and gang sexual assault.

The court found Abdelmalek Haddouche's statement involuntary due to police persistence undermining his right to silence, despite his repeated assertions of not wanting to speak on counsel's advice.

For Youssef El Hariti, the court found his statements were obtained in breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel, as police failed to ensure he received legal advice in a language he fully understood, despite being aware of his limited English proficiency.

Both statements were ruled inadmissible under the confessions rule and s. 24(2) of the Charter, respectively.

The respondent, Orrell Higgins, was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a collision where his vehicle accelerated into a transport truck without braking, seriously injuring his passenger.

The court examined the objective standard for dangerous driving (marked departure) and the more stringent standard for criminal negligence (marked and substantial departure, wanton disregard).

While acknowledging the objectively dangerous driving and inattention, the court found that the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct constituted a "marked departure" or "wanton disregard" required for criminal liability.

Regarding impaired driving, despite a projected blood alcohol concentration (BAC) range of 63-94 mg/100ml, the court had reasonable doubt about actual impairment due to individual variability in alcohol effects.

Consequently, the respondent was found not guilty of all charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown proceeded only on the impaired driving charge.

The trial involved a preliminary voir-dire regarding the qualifications of an unaccredited Korean interpreter, which the court found to be necessary to ensure the defendant's Charter rights were protected.

Following the interpreter qualification hearing, the Crown called four police officers to establish impairment.

The court found that while the evidence established reasonable grounds to believe impairment and made it more likely than not that impairment occurred, the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to the ambiguity of certain indicia.

The defendant was acquitted on the impaired driving count.

The defendant was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence that the defendant removed pizza delivery items from his vehicle after the collision, arguing it showed a consciousness of guilt related to speeding to meet a delivery deadline.

The court ruled the post-offence conduct evidence was admissible, as it was relevant to whether the defendant was speeding or had a motive to speed, subject to a limiting instruction to the jury that it could not be used to elevate the level of culpability to criminal negligence or dangerous driving.