George Christakos

The accused brought an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for the production of third-party records.

The accused argued that a Case Management judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the application, asserting that s. 278.3 requires the application to be heard by the trial judge.

The court held that s. 551.3 of the Criminal Code expressly grants a Case Management judge the powers of a trial judge at the pre-evidentiary stage, including the power to adjudicate disclosure and admissibility issues.

The court found no conflict between the provisions and concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the application.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving causing bodily harm (later upgraded to causing death) following a motor vehicle collision.

While detained in police cells, she was subjected to video surveillance, including while using the toilet.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of her s. 8 rights, arguing she should have been automatically provided a privacy gown rather than merely offered one.

The court dismissed the application, finding no s. 8 breach because the police took reasonable steps to protect her privacy by repeatedly advising her of the video surveillance, pointing out signage, and offering her a privacy gown, which she declined.

The applicant brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of breath sample evidence, alleging breaches of her ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) Charter rights following a motor vehicle collision.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant for impaired driving, based on her admission of alcohol consumption, the smell of alcohol, and her attempt to flee the scene after making a suicidal statement.

The court also found no breach of the applicant's right to counsel, as a 9-minute delay was justified by safety concerns.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was tried on three historical sexual assault counts and one count of assault with a weapon arising from alleged incidents involving the complainant.

The court held that credibility and reliability were central, applied the W.(D.) framework, and found the accused's evidence could not be rejected.

The court also found material inconsistencies and reliability concerns in the complainant's evidence, considered the surrounding family access dispute as relevant context, and concluded the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with break and enter, assault, arson, uttering threats, and damage to property following a home invasion.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator.

The Crown relied on the eyewitness identification of the two complainants and a corroborating witness.

The court found the identification evidence to be unreliable due to the fleeting nature of the observations, the stressful circumstances, the influence of marijuana, and the fact that the witnesses had collaborated on a collective narrative before speaking to police.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt as to identity and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The accused was charged with uttering a threat to bomb Gilly's Pubhouse, mischief, breach of probation, and public mischief.

The sole issue at trial was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made the bomb threat call.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including testimony from the doorman who heard the accused threaten to call in a bomb threat, and voice identification evidence from police officers.

The court found the voice identification evidence unreliable and placed no weight on it.

However, based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence—including the accused's explicit threat, his agitation, the timing and location of the 911 call, and his presence at the scene—the court found the accused guilty of all four charges.

John Kavinsky was found guilty of aggravated assault.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the serious and life-threatening injuries inflicted with a knife, the deliberate act of carrying a weapon to a social event, the motive of resisting efforts to prevent drunk driving, and attempts to conceal evidence.

Mitigating factors included his youth, lack of prior criminal record, genuine remorse, and positive prospects for rehabilitation.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, rejecting a suspended sentence or intermittent custody.

A custodial sentence of 21 months was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by two years of probation, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, forfeiture of the knife, and a victim surcharge.

The appellant, J.M., appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by reversing the burden of proof on consent, failing to consider evidence holistically before applying the R. v. W.(D.) analysis, and misapprehending evidence.

Specifically, the trial judge incorrectly placed the burden on the appellant to prove consent and failed to reconcile material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, such as her moaning during the alleged sexual assault and her actions following the incidents.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The accused attended a birthday party where the hosts enforced a strict rule against drinking and driving.

When the intoxicated accused attempted to leave in his vehicle, the host confronted him and a physical altercation ensued.

During the struggle, the accused repeatedly stabbed the host with a pocket knife, causing severe injuries.

The accused fled the scene and participated in hiding the weapon and his bloody clothes.

At trial, the accused claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the defence, finding that while the accused had a reasonable belief that force was being used against him to prevent him from driving, his response of repeatedly stabbing the host was unreasonable and excessive.

The accused was found guilty of aggravated assault.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence sought to exclude breathalyzer evidence on grounds of Charter violations under sections 10(b) and 24(2), arguing that the accused was denied a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel at the roadside during a 19-minute delay while awaiting a tow truck.

The court found a section 10(b) violation but ultimately admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding that the circumstances favoured inclusion despite the breach.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood on March 9, 2014.

The court addressed multiple Charter issues including arbitrary stop, reasonable and probable grounds, and rights to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 9 (arbitrary stop), no breach of section 8 (reasonable and probable grounds), and a breach of section 10(b) (rights to counsel) but excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused raised a section 258(1)(d.1) defence (last drinks consumed) but the court rejected the accused's credibility and found the defence not established.

The court convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown alleged the accused drove while impaired after consuming alcohol and subsequently crashed her vehicle into a ditch.

The defence raised Charter violations regarding the right to counsel, arguing the accused did not understand her rights and that the police failed to adequately explain them or inform her of duty counsel availability.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and excluded the breath test evidence.

On the impairment charge, the court found the Crown had not proven impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the accused's cognitive disability from a prior head injury and alternative explanations for observed symptoms.

The accused was charged with impaired care and control of a motor vehicle and care and control with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused and his partner were found sleeping in a parked minivan in an underground parking garage.

The Crown alleged the accused had consumed alcohol and had care and control of the vehicle.

The defence argued the accused had no intention to drive and had taken steps to avoid driving.

The court found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand breath samples, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had care and control of the motor vehicle.

Both counts were dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident under s. 252(1.2) of the Criminal Code after striking a pedestrian with his vehicle and leaving the scene.

The victim suffered severe injuries including multiple fractures, skull fracture, and upper vertebrae fracture.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 months imprisonment followed by 12 months probation and a 2-year driving prohibition, rejecting the defence submission for a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized that principles of general deterrence and denunciation were paramount given the serious nature of the offence and the significant harm to the victim.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and admitted guilt at trial, but sought a stay of proceedings due to multiple Charter breaches.

Despite having no criminal record, strong ties to Ontario, and being cooperative, the accused was detained for a show cause hearing solely because he resided in the Northwest Territories.

The court found this constituted arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter.

This arbitrary detention led to an unjustified strip search at the jail, breaching s. 8.

Furthermore, the police failed to inform the accused of the reasons for his continued detention or his right to counsel, breaching ss. 10(a) and 10(b).

Given the cumulative effect of these breaches and the inability to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence, the court granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1).

The accused pleaded guilty to theft over involving the theft of thirty-two Blackberry Smart Phones valued at approximately $14,368 from his employer, Research in Motion, over a seven-month period.

The accused, a 48-year-old first-time offender with no criminal record, was employed in a position of trust at RIM and sold the phones to a hairstylist for $2,000.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 18 months probation, including community service and restitution, finding that despite the breach of trust, the offender's personal circumstances, genuine remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and positive antecedents warranted a discharge rather than custody.