John Frederick Hanbidge

The Crown brought an application to qualify Detective Constable Charlie Rau as an expert witness on possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis marihuana, including production, valuation, and trafficking.

The defendant opposed, challenging the officer's methodology and expertise.

The court applied the two-step Mohan test, focusing on reliability and proper qualification.

It found the officer qualified based on extensive experience and training, rejecting the strict application of Daubert factors for non-scientific expert evidence.

The court admitted the expert evidence but imposed specific limitations on its scope, particularly regarding medical users, edibles, and extracts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with blood-alcohol content exceeding eighty milligrams per one hundred millilitres of blood, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused admitted guilt to both charges.

However, the court found that the police violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) by arbitrarily detaining him solely based on his residence in the Northwest Territories, conducting an unreasonable strip search, and failing to inform him of the reason for his continued detention or his right to counsel.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy, finding that the cumulative effect of the Charter breaches warranted this exceptional remedy despite the seriousness of the offence and the strength of the Crown's case.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and admitted guilt at trial, but sought a stay of proceedings due to multiple Charter breaches.

Despite having no criminal record, strong ties to Ontario, and being cooperative, the accused was detained for a show cause hearing solely because he resided in the Northwest Territories.

The court found this constituted arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter.

This arbitrary detention led to an unjustified strip search at the jail, breaching s. 8.

Furthermore, the police failed to inform the accused of the reasons for his continued detention or his right to counsel, breaching ss. 10(a) and 10(b).

Given the cumulative effect of these breaches and the inability to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence, the court granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1).

The applicant sought to quash a committal for trial on an allegation of attempting to obstruct justice arising from advice given to a prospective witness before a preliminary inquiry.

Applying the review standard on a motion to quash committal, the court held the Crown evidence lacked sufficient contextual completeness to support a reasonably available inference of specific intent to obstruct justice.

The court distinguished authorities where surrounding words and circumstances supplied interpretive reliability, and found the impugned fragmentary utterance equally consistent with lawful advice to use a proper name rather than a nickname.

Because the record did not provide evidence from which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, the committal order could not stand.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of second-degree murder.

He argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) were violated during police questioning and the taking of bodily samples, that the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were inadequate, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant made an informed choice to cooperate with police, the jury instructions substantially complied with the required standards, and trial counsel's tactical decisions were reasonable and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.